# I am a Moral Nihilist **URL:** \ **Category:** Ethics\ **Created:** [June 3, 2026, 4:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218 "2026-06-03T16:42:17Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 26
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:24am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/501 "2026-06-12T03:24:24Z")
Hence the move to metaethics, and to why that doesn’t get us anywhere. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:24am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/502 "2026-06-12T03:24:26Z")
“Ceteris paribus” indicates that exceptions are possible. If a puppy is attacking your baby then you kick it. The exception doesn’t disprove the rule. And “pleasure is good” does not mean “pleasure must be sought in every circumstance, even if you must harm others.” ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:32am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/503 "2026-06-12T03:32:43Z")
And so the move from ethics to politics. You have a negative emotional response to puppy kicking. I think cruelty a negative trait. He argues it decreases pleasure. Now, despite these ethical difference, we can together condemn the act. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:37am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/504 "2026-06-12T03:37:37Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > “Ceteris paribus” indicates that exceptions are possible. This is just how practical reason works, by the way. Practical reason allows arguments with contrary conclusions: 1. Pleasure is good 2. Puppies are pleasant 3. Kicking puppies diminishes puppies 4. Diminished puppies are less pleasant 5. Therefore, one should avoid kicking puppies (_ceteris paribus_) - 1. My baby is good 2. My baby is vulnerable 3. Therefore, I should protect my baby from that which attacks it (_ceteris paribus_) At this point if a puppy attacks my baby I must weigh 5 against 8, which in turn means weighing the premises of the first argument against the premises of the second argument. * * * > [@Banno](#): > > Now, despite these ethical difference, we can together condemn the act. A “political” consensus is fine, but if you have no way to motivate someone to accept your position you will have no way to generate a consensus. You will only be able to look for ready-made consensuses. It is similar to the [polling fallacy](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/315). ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:39am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/505 "2026-06-12T03:39:45Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > But “cancer causes suffering and death” is already an evaluative fact, suffering and death are privations, real ills. It isn’t a neutral biological description with a wholly distinct normative gloss added on top of it. Yes, and this aligns, I guess with what I understand of Putman and the facts/values frame. > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > But we can still ask: “why care about _other’s_ good.” Yet because of what man is, the good of the individual is not divorced from the good of other men, or the common good of the community one is a part of. Socrates makes this point in the _Apology_ Yep, good so far. > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > To harm one’s community, and other’s health (and thus their ability to share in these goods, which would enhance them) in order to gain wealth to spend on lower goods, would be to act from ignorance about what is truly best. Is this the Aristotelian use of ignorance? > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > I cannot provide an argument for why one ought never sell cigarettes, because one doesn’t exist Yep, got that too. > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > But based on what is good for human beings, there seem to be plenty of reasons why, in many contexts, we should strive to find a better way to earn a living. Yes. Okay, thanks. That’s not all that dissimilar to how I might frame it myself, except for the understanding of ignorance, which is a separate matter for now. I understand how Aristotle uses it, so I probably just need to sit with it. ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:47am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/506 "2026-06-12T03:47:58Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > Here is a hedonist version: > > 1. Pleasure is good > 2. Puppies are pleasant > 3. Kicking puppies diminishes puppies > 4. Diminished puppies are less pleasant > 5. Therefore, one should avoid kicking puppies (_ceteris paribus_) > > If you accept 1-4 then 5 follows, and the premises are not very controversial. > > But note that this involves realism. (2) says something about puppies. You cannot substitute “snakes” for “puppies” in (2), because (2) indicates something which puppies bring about but snakes do not. It indicates that some real property of puppies is at stake. That’s a very interesting frame. If I may, is there any reason why this couldn’t be argued? 1. Pleasure is good. 2. Kicking puppies is fun, and therefore produces pleasure. 3. Therefore, kicking puppies is good. 4. Therefore, one has reason to kick puppies (_ceteris paribus_). ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:50am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/507 "2026-06-12T03:50:59Z")
> [@Tom\_Storm](#): > > If I may, is there any reason why this couldn’t be argued? > > 1. Pleasure is good. > 2. Kicking puppies is fun, and therefore produces pleasure. > 3. Therefore, kicking puppies is good. > 4. Therefore, one has reason to kick puppies (_ceteris paribus_). Sure, we can even clean it up a bit: 1. Pleasure is good 2. Fun is pleasurable 3. Kicking puppies is fun 4. Therefore, one should kick puppies (_ceteris paribus_) That’s a valid argument. If you accept 1-3 then 4 follows. The question then arises: do you accept 1-3? ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:54am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/508 "2026-06-12T03:54:19Z")
Good, that’s what I thought. And I’m not sure yet how I get to saying (3) should be prevented. Other than someone has a “defective” notion of what counts as good/fun. It seems pretty clear that everyone uses moral terms like “ought,” “should,” and “must.” The why seems to be the tricky part for some of us. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 3:55am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/509 "2026-06-12T03:55:47Z")
Well I don’t think you even accept (3), do you? ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 4:00am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/510 "2026-06-12T04:00:21Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > A “political” consensus is fine, but if you have no way to motivate someone to accept your position you will have no way to generate a consensus. You will only be able to look for ready-made consensuses. Right. Which is the basis for most critiques of post-structuralist accounts of right and wrong: the idea of intersubjective communities of practice that determine what is right/true or factual. I guess someone like Richard Rorty might argue that such conversation is all we have, and that it may well go awry, just as democracy can get things wrong. (Of course just how they are wrong seems a moot point if there’s no other criteria - which is essentially what you are saying. ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 4:02am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/511 "2026-06-12T04:02:19Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > Well I don’t think you even accept (3), do you? Depends on the puppy… No, I don’t accept that. I’m just back at @AmadeusD point about why one preference becomes an “ought” rather than just a preference. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 4:14am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/512 "2026-06-12T04:14:21Z")
Okay: > [@Tom\_Storm](#): > > And I’m not sure yet how I get to saying (3) should be prevented. Good. I actually think this question of badness or moral _falsity_ is important, and that it is where @Banno’s account most struggles. “No other criteria,” as you say. Let’s trade out puppies for something more relatable: 1. Cigarettes are pleasant 2. Pleasure is good 3. Therefore, one should smoke cigarettes (_ceteris paribus_) This argument is a bitch for the _akrasiac_. The remedy is always to attack a premise or use a counter-argument that is contrary to the conclusion. The latter route is like what I outlined [here](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/504). We can try to stay with something akin to hedonism: 1. Suffering is bad 2. Cigarettes cause cancer 3. Cancer often causes a great deal of suffering 4. Therefore, one should not smoke cigarettes (_ceteris paribus_) Note that this counterargument is often sufficient for those who do not hold (1) too strongly (i.e. those who are not hooked on cigarettes). That’s why the ad campaigns worked so well for some but not others. For the person who is addicted, more will be required. They may need a psychologist to help them understand other reasons and means to achieve (7), and in that case they are working in a different direction: 1. Cigarettes are bad 2. I want to stop smoking cigarettes 3. I haven’t found a way to stop 4. Therefore, I need to try new things Note that the top-level question for adjudicating this is, “All things considered, are cigarettes good or bad?” Some might say that this question is unanswerable, and yet it seems that we have answered it in some ways. We had an opinion on the question 50 years ago, we gained new data which informs the question, and now—as a society _in toto_—we have a very different answer to the question. It does not seem to be wholly unanswerable, as if data and reasoning do not bear on it. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 4:29am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/513 "2026-06-12T04:29:09Z")
> [@Tom\_Storm](#): > > I’m just back at @AmadeusD point about why one preference becomes an “ought” rather than just a preference. It depends a great deal on what precisely you mean by an ‘ought’. That’s what I was trying to get at in [this post](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/419). ---
**Author:** ![AmadeusD](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f9ae1b/32.png) [@AmadeusD](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/AmadeusD)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 5:06am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/514 "2026-06-12T05:06:45Z")
Do you not see the abject failure of anything but Emotivism to inform this framework? ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 5:20am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/515 "2026-06-12T05:20:34Z")
How do you view the relation between hedonism and emotivism? ---
**Author:** ![AmadeusD](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f9ae1b/32.png) [@AmadeusD](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/AmadeusD)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 5:28am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/516 "2026-06-12T05:28:33Z")
I see it as one potential instantiation of emotivism. An arbitrary restricted one, though. Seems to capture far less ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 5:51am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/517 "2026-06-12T05:51:05Z")
Emotivism considers only the emotions _qua_ subject. Hedonism has no such restriction. That’s why my claim that, “Puppies are pleasant,” can be a realist claim within a hedonist argument. If we were to rewrite that in an emotivist vein we would have to at least prescind from object properties in favor of emotional reactions, and the emotional reactions could have no real connection to the object. It would be something like Hume’s “constant conjunction” applied to a subject’s emotional reactions. That’s why emotivism is a weak theory, namely because emotions are malleable and manipulable. As I said above, the emotional person is easy to manipulate, but it is also true that the emotions are a fairly superficial level of the human being. Within the causal nexus of human being emotions are close to the surface. They are more effect than cause. The older name is “passions,” because they are undergone rather than chosen. Emotions do interface with motivation and action - everyone admits it. But the emotional response to a stimuli can be shaped, molded, and changed. Sciences like sociology and advertising are very skilled at manipulating emotions. The person experiencing the emotions may believe that they are autonomous and that their emotions are somehow irreducible, or basic, or constitute the proper matter for an ethical theory. But in reality the propagandists—from sociology to advertising to entertainment to politics—are really the ones pulling the strings. The emotions do precisely what the puppeteer wants them to do. They are used as a means to control external actions, and the more emotional a person is, the more easily controlled they are. This is why the great philosophical and religious traditions of humanity do not focus on the emotions _per se_ when they consider human conduct. Instead they focus on the strings that pull the emotions. They focus on reason, habits, dispositions, temperament, viewpoints, self-control, values, etc. Once you get hold of the puppet strings the emotions fall into line. If you fail to grab hold then someone else will be holding them or they will be floating freely as the person is blown about by the random winds of emotion and circumstance. In any case, emotivism isn’t a viable theory in the age of social science. The social scientists may promote it because it makes their job easier, but if you work your way to the top of that hierarchy you will inevitably be required to make decisions about how to shape the emotions of those who live in the society. You will inevitably have to start thinking about which emotions are good and which are bad in each circumstance, and how to form the emotional makeup of the society. You would have to do on a societal level what the great traditions have counseled doing on an individual level. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 9:25am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/518 "2026-06-12T09:25:32Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > If one ought not pick one’s nose, then it is true that one ought not pick one’s nose. Yes, but I’m asking where it’s been established that the antecedent is true. I’d also be wary to consider this ought a _moral_ ought. It’s not _immoral_ to pick one’s nose, is it? > [@Banno](#): > > Of course, if you have no preferences, then there might be no true ought statements. > > But we do have preferences. > > That we have preferences establishes that there are true normative statements. The ought just is the preference. I’m questioning the connection between preferences and true ought statements. At least for the moral realist (and the moral nihilist) there is no connection; if we ought not kick puppies then we ought not kick puppies even if everyone prefers that we kick puppies. Your comments do not suffice as an argument against moral nihilism unless you can _show_ that the ought just is the preference, which I don’t think you’ve done. ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 11:35am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/519 "2026-06-12T11:35:38Z")
I probably should also explain what “moral good” means in this context. “Moral good” would be those goods relating to the moral virtues, their promotion and their failures. So, fornication is said to be “morally bad” not because of some additional property unrelated to human flourishing (individual or common) that attaches to it, some _extrinsic_ “thou shalt notness” attaching to it, but rather because it is a failure in temperance, or more specifically chastity, to be moved by the passions (by epithumia) in ways contrary to what is understood as best (logos, the rational appetites). Of course, these older explanations presuppose that fornication is bad. Both older Pagan and more recent attitudes might deny this. But this just goes to show how “oughts” flow from goodness, because what ought to be done depends on the goodness of an act, and debates around fornication are debates about its goodness. With older systems, it is always important to distinguish individual judgements about what is good, and the broader framework, since the framework might be largely correct, without individual judgements being correct. And moreover, individual judgements might also vary properly according to time and place, with changes in custom and technology. A good example is copyright law, which would have been very deleterious to the spread and safeguarding of texts before the printing press, but which becomes justified later on when printing becomes cheap. Aquinas makes this point on the need for human laws to change and adapt over time. So, the question of what exactly qualifies as gluttony, lust, avarice, etc. might by hard to answer, requiring wisdom and prudence, and it might properly vary from time to time and individual to individual. Standards of gluttony differ in a times of famine, or by individual, since individuals have different dietary needs. The more general rule though is that a habit that inclines a person towards inordinate passions that lead to actions contrary to practical reason (weakness of will) or to the obscuring or twisting of practical reason in service to the passions (false judgements about what is best) is a vice, and this is morally bad. Acts in accord with these vices, and which foster them, are thus said to be so as well. This is why habitual drunkenness can be a vice (inordinate consumption), while wine and beer might be said to be good. Human flourishing, and the common good (which is constitutive of individual flourishing) is the measure of vice and virtue. As Saint Maximos the Confessor puts it: “Food is not evil, but gluttony is. Childbearing is not evil, but fornication is. Money is not evil, but avarice is. Glory is not evil, but vainglory is. Indeed, there is no evil in existing things, but only in their misuse.” So Maximos also focuses on use here, and the key difference from contemporary action-based accounts is that what is good is not grounded in whatever just so happens to be desired by men. Current desire can be inordinate or proper, or fail to be, and so the human will is not the ground of all values or oughts. This is essentially the reverse of Kant, where the self-legislating will is the measure of value, or prescriptivism, where the prescribing agent is the ultimate source of evaluative force. ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 12, 2026, 1:22pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/520 "2026-06-12T13:22:39Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > Emotivism considers only the emotions _qua_ subject. Hedonism has no such restriction. That’s why my claim that, “Puppies are pleasant,” can be a realist claim within a hedonist argument. If we were to rewrite that in an emotivist vein we would have to at least prescind from object properties in favor of emotional reactions, and the emotional reactions could have no real connection to the object. It would be something like Hume’s “constant conjunction” applied to a subject’s emotional reactions. I have no idea what that means. Can you simplify the point? I would have thought that “I take pleasure in puppies” probably expresses an emotional preference. I know people who dislike dogs and do not take pleasure in puppies. Isn’t it the case that whether you like puppies or not reflects an affective relationship to puppies? > [@Leontiskos](#): > > As I said above, the emotional person is easy to manipulate, but it is also true that the emotions are a fairly superficial level of the human being. Within the causal nexus of human being emotions are close to the surface. They are more effect than cause. The older name is “passions,” because they are undergone rather than chosen. A digression. Is there a connection between emotivism and emotional people? I wouldn’t have thought so. I don’t think a person who holds that moral claims are just expressions of emotional reactions is saying all that much about emotion more generally. When someone says it is wrong to kick puppies, we might explain this in terms of an emotional preference, but no two people will necessarily have the same emotional reaction to the kicking of puppies. Some will cry, some will be moved to anger, some might feel sick, and some may not have much of a physical reaction at all but still think it is wrong. I’m not exactly sure what the implications of emotivism are. If it is simply the view that our moral judgments ultimately arise from emotional reactions, that seems consistent with a wide range of different emotional experiences and not particularly informative about emotion itself. Do you think that if someone says their response to moral questions is based on emotion, they are thereby being unreasonably emotional? Or do I have this wrong? > [@Leontiskos](#): > > The social scientists may promote it because it makes their job easier, but if you work your way to the top of that hierarchy you will inevitably be required to make decisions about how to shape the emotions of those who live in the society. You will inevitably have to start thinking about which emotions are good and which are bad in each circumstance, and how to form the emotional makeup of the society. You would have to do on a societal level what the great traditions have counseled doing on an individual level. This is an interesting angle. I don’t think social scientists are particularly keen on emotivism because it doesn’t give them much opportunity to virtue signal. They seem to need to believe in the absolute authority of morality while simultaneously lacking any clear grounding for it. In many cases, they would prefer not to talk about how moral beliefs are formed at all. But the other point about which emotions are good and which are bad for a society is interesting. It’s not a problem I need to resolve, but it is an interesting one to theorise about. I have nothing further to say on the matter. This thread raises too many points for me to respond to them properly. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218.md?page=25) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218.md?page=27)