# I am a Moral Nihilist **URL:** \ **Category:** Ethics\ **Created:** [June 3, 2026, 4:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218 "2026-06-03T16:42:17Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 21
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:00am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/401 "2026-06-11T03:00:47Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > It is not a metaphysical claim if the concept of ‘good’ is truncated beforehand. So I agree that it’s a false translation, but what comes out the other end of that translation is for Hare metaphysically neutral in a certain sense. Perhaps not. It certainly is in @Banno’s use case though: Teleology is flawed because it cannot respond to Hume’s guillotine. It cannot respond to Hume’s guillotine because its claims about the good are wrong, because goodness is really about commendation/ought claims. I am not sure how claims about what words “really” mean can be invoked to dispute metaphysical theses without themselves implying any metaphysical commitments though. > [@Leontiskos](#): > > But I’m not convinced that for Kant (or Hume if you like) the fact/value distinction generates the is/ought distinction. Fair enough, I would agree for Kant. For Hume, the issue flows from his anthropology, but I would argue his anthropology builds a fact/value distinction in from the outset, and the notion that reason (and so facts) never provide motivation for action is taken as axiomatic. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:09am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/402 "2026-06-11T03:09:58Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > I am not sure how claims about what words “really” mean can be invoked to dispute metaphysical theses without themselves implying any metaphysical commitments though. Yeah, it’s an interesting question. Presumably the claim is that the word in question is non-metaphysical in the desired sense. As I’ve said before, Analytics tend to be poor philologists. A sort of non-analogical cleaving of goodness into the evaluative compartment and the descriptive compartment is a very convenient discovery, and one which does not track actual usage. Note that for Simpson what is at the bottom of all of this is different forms of scientism. A preoccupation with the scientific endeavor led to a _de facto_ deference to that sort of methodology - a methodology which usually intentionally prescinds from goodness, much like mathematics. > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > Fair enough, I would agree for Kant. For Hume, the issue flows from his anthropology, but I would argue his anthropology builds a fact/value distinction in from the outset, and the notion that reason (and so facts) never provide motivation for action is taken as axiomatic. Okay. My posts to you above about Hume’s classicism would get at my opinion. I think a truncation of reason leads him to ground morality in his idea of “sentiment.” I’d say that for Hume, “You can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’,” really means something like, “Instrumental reason cannot get a moral ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.” Hume himself gets ‘oughts’ from ‘is’, it’s just that the ‘is’ is grounded in “sentiment” rather than “reason” (in Hume’s lexicon). ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:21am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/403 "2026-06-11T03:21:57Z")
Are you closer to or further away from emotivism following this discussion? Do you think there is something inherently questionable about a statement like, “We ought not cause suffering”? Sure, there are countless ways to interpret this, but is your main concern simply, “Says who?” What is it that makes a statement like this an authoritative one? What do you think about the idea that there are natural facts about suffering, human interests, and the conditions under which people tend to flourish? If that’s correct, then maybe the important question isn’t “Says who?” but what reasons do we have for thinking this is true? ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 5:09am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/404 "2026-06-11T05:09:08Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > Teleology is flawed because it cannot respond to Hume’s guillotine That’s a very poor representation of what I have argued. I have specifically been showing that the form of teleology that relies on things having a fixed and cosmic “type”, and then bases it’s ethics on failure to match that “type”, is fraught with logical issues. I am not rejecting Teleology, wholesale. This is all quite wearisome. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 5:48am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/405 "2026-06-11T05:48:17Z")
Might be helpful to see an example in order to see where you are going. Are you thinking of whether it was a _kick_, or he just pushed the pup away with his foot? There is a normative component built in to what counts as a kick, yes. That normative aspect is itself a part of meaning as a community activity, of the give and take that is built in to language use. That _reinforces_ the view that ethics is grounded in forms of life rather than in some external standard. Do you agree? ---
**Author:** ![AmadeusD](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f9ae1b/32.png) [@AmadeusD](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/AmadeusD)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 6:06am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/406 "2026-06-11T06:06:14Z")
There’s been a lot said, and I wont bore everyone with my unfortunate takes on all of it. Apologies if something crucial is missed. Feel free to pull me up on it. I’m just going to take one or two points I think I want to answer. > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > Where are you getting “I don’t like this” from? Well, I’m not really getting it from anywhere. It is in the syllogism. Banno has somewhat covered this, bt more explicitly: > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > 1. If I step into the fire I will be burned. **(is-statement, non-evaluative)** > 2. It is bad (not choice-worthy) for a man to be burned. **(ought-statemen, evaluative** > Therefore, I ought not step into the fire. **(ought-statement, evaluative. )** 2 is an ought statement because it already imports the pretty crucial inference of “I ought not do things that are bad” for the “therefore” to follow. It’s not available in the wording, but on the wording, this syllogism fails. That may be what @Leontiskos describes above but I did not read all of the comments there. Apologising if you’ve done a better job, Leon. > [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > if a choice is better, then it is more worthy of choice. Yes. This does not, at all, import an ‘ought’. It is a subjective definition of Good, because each person will assess choice-worthiness along different lines, and toward different goals. This, i would suggest, illustrates why I didn’t get Banno for so long. Where he says “there are true ought statements” I cannot assent. But i do think what he’s saying is correct, in it’s concept: That most people agree kicking puppies is wrong _should_ tell us not to kick puppies. Some are obviously not amenable to this sort of co-operative principle. To me, a ought statement cannot be contingent in this way. Which also goes to Leon’s point about ill-definition. I think he’s wording that badly: Each person probably credibly defines these words in their innner chat. But outing that defintion can be either unwieldy or embarrassing. Between Banno and I, that cause me to waaste about six weeks of his time, collectively, over like three years lol. So point taken, but It’s probabaly less about the words themselves, and about how we communicate. If i’d understood what Banno was saying, I wouldn’t have object to that sentence in the ways I have (and yes, still do, but we (as far as I can tell) get what’s going on there now and don’t need to speak past one another). Perhaps your version of an ‘ought’ falls into this type of category where I might not even know what you’re getting at. It is hard to see, given the above interrogations, how you remain convinced of that reasoning - so I assume i’ve missed the crux. > [@Leontiskos](#): > > The real justification must be found in the puppy himself, as you so ably expressed above. So at the end of the day I would want to talk about the puppy itself, rather than remain a step removed by talking about possible human choices. I do not think this is true. If the justification for the prohibition were in the puppy itself, it would logically obvious because that is a fundamental part of hte equation. But it’s not actually that relevant, when you think about it. as to where it’s “good” or not. In fact, the puppy is completely irrelevant. We could just as well be talking about whether it’s right to spray paint a dick on the side of a bus. The social consensus is still going to be the basis for a “ought no spray paint busses” line. Not the bus, or the paint. I think this is what irks me so much about realists. You can’t drag reason out of another person, unless you’re moved by their emotional response ot hte action (which you have, elsewhere, rejected). ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 11:12am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/407 "2026-06-11T11:12:44Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > I have specifically been showing that the form of teleology that relies on things having a fixed and cosmic “type”, and then bases it’s ethics on failure to match that “type”, is fraught with logical issues. “Cosmic type matching” is entirely your language. Again, if what is good or bad for any organism cannot, on pain of “logical issues,” be read off from nature, in virtue of _what_ do we know “facts about what is good and bad” (as you claim)? Where does our knowledge of such facts come from? These are, of course, not logical but metaphysical issues. A deflationary account of goodness or truth is still an account, regardless of if one tries to argue to it by appealing to what words “really” mean (or really _ought_ to mean if used “correctly”). > [@Banno](#): > > Ever read Hare? good introduction to normative logic. Saying something is good is performing an evaluation. Is says, other things being equal, you ought prefer not being burned. Ok, but weren’t we debating the issue of my claim that “ **if** teleology is true, it faces no substantial difficulty with this is-ought gap” or rather “issues with the is-ought gap tend to be posterior to the rejection of teleology.” Saying, “what goodness _really_ is, is explained according to this non-teleological account” isn’t defusing the hypothetical, it’s just asserting that “teleology is false.” So, the is-ought gap seems irrelevant to your objection, teleology is problematic because you are asserting an opposing view of goodness as, roughly, action-guiding commendation and prescription. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 11:16am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/408 "2026-06-11T11:16:24Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > We’ve established that there are true ought statements. Have we? Forgive me if I’ve missed it in the noise, but as far as I’ve seen we’ve only established that folk _think_ that there are true ought statements, but that folk _think_ that “we ought not kick puppies” is true does not _prima facie_ entail that “we ought not kick puppies” _is_ true (unless we abandon the distinction between what is believed to be true and what is true, but that seems anathema to your philosophy). Either way, it’s not as simple as arguing that there are true ought statements, because not all ought statements are equal. There seems to be a meaningful difference between a) “you ought brush your teeth”, b) “you ought salute your superior officer”, and c) “you ought not kick puppies”. And it’s not even as simple as arguing that (c) is true because we must also argue that its truth is best understood according to moral realism, moral relativism, moral subjectivism, or other. The nihilist for his part argues that no moral ought statement is true in the realist sense, and that the realist sense is the only sense that meaningfully captures our moral intuitions and intentions when we make moral claims. If (c) is true only to the extent that (b) is true, i.e. as an institutional or cultural norm, then it isn’t really the kind of obligation that we ordinarily think it to be, i.e one that “transcends” all institutions and cultures and personal _beliefs_ about how we and others ought behave; it’s something that, if true, is true even if everyone believes and acts otherwise — something which does not hold for (b). ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 11:18am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/409 "2026-06-11T11:18:10Z")
> [@AmadeusD](#): > > Yes. This does not, at all, import an ‘ought’. It is a subjective definition of Good, because each person will assess choice-worthiness along different lines, and toward different goals. Please bear with me, I do believe you’re missing the point of those posts though, which wasn’t to explain or argue for teleological realism at all, but to explain that _if_ (hypothetically) we assume teleological realism, _then_ we face no major issues with an is-ought gap, and there is no hard fact/value dichotomy. All your replies take the form of: “but teleological realism is false, therefore it cannot deal with these issues.” Sure, I never denied that. If you start with a hard fact/value distinction, such that is and ought are totally distinct domains, then you cannot move between them. But here you’re just asserting subjectivism as a premise. The assumption is “there is no fact of the matter about what is truly most choice-worthy, but rather ‘choice-worthyness’ just _is_ whatever people assess it to be.” This is collapsing any distinction between appearances and reality. So, these objections look to me like: Thesis: “If teleology is assumed, these problems don’t crop up.” Response: “But I say teleology is false.” I would say the response is wrong, but at any rate it doesn’t really address the hypothetical either. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 12:27pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/410 "2026-06-11T12:27:33Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > This is collapsing any distinction between appearances and reality. Appearances are a part of reality. Some parts of reality are appearances and some aren’t. Arguing that moral subjectivism is true doesn’t “collapse” the distinction between the appearance parts of reality and the non-appearance parts; it just denies that moral truths are established by the non-appearance parts (even if we believe otherwise). ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 1:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/411 "2026-06-11T13:42:06Z")
Under anti-realism you think there _is_ a distinction between what appears good, or what is said to be good, and what is _really_ good? > [@Michael](#): > > Arguing that moral subjectivism is true doesn’t “collapse” the distinction between the appearance parts of reality and the non-appearance parts; it just denies that moral truths are established by the non-appearance parts (even if we believe otherwise). That’s what I said? Unless, in a thread on _moral_ realism, in a post exclusively about moral realism, in a paragraph on moral realism, you’re reading that sentence in isolation, as about all varieties of realism? ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 2:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/412 "2026-06-11T14:58:20Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > So, the is-ought gap seems irrelevant to your objection, teleology is problematic because you are asserting an opposing view of goodness as, roughly, action-guiding commendation and prescription. And it is clear enough that @Banno’s alternative is no alternative at all. On his view “It is true that we should not kick puppies,” just means, “Someone thinks we should not kick puppies,” or, “Some community thinks we should not kick puppies.” This is faux moral realism, for everyone knows that mere thoughts, beliefs, or evaluations do not generate truths. It is to fail to answer the question, “Why shouldn’t I kick puppies,” to say, “Because some community thinks you should not,” or else, “Because some community will cause you harm if you kick puppies.” This is literally might makes right. So what pretends to be, “Teleology fails and my account is the proper alternative,” is in reality, “Teleology fails and I have no coherent alternative.” Note too that teleological accounts are but one form of moral _realism_, where the reality of a _telos_ grounds the normativity. There are also other forms of realism, like hedonism. But Banno’s, “I think it therefore it is” account is not realism. It is basically a kind of moral idealism, where thoughts or wills are sufficient to generate binding moral truths. Thus even if the invalid arguments against teleological accounts were correct (i.e. question-begging nominalism), we would still have nothing on offer. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:02pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/413 "2026-06-11T15:02:11Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > Under anti-realism you think there _is_ a distinction between what appears good, or what is said to be good, and what is _really_ good? > > … > > That’s what I said? Unless, in a thread on _moral_ realism, in a post exclusively about moral realism, in a paragraph on moral realism, you’re reading that sentence in isolation, as about all varieties of realism? I think even in context there’s a meaningful difference between these two statements: 1. This is collapsing any distinction between appearances and reality 2. This is collapsing any distinction between me thinking that X is good and X being good If your claim is only that moral subjectivism is guilty of (2) then … yes? That’s exactly what it means to be a moral subjectivist; to deny the alleged distinction between us thinking that X is good and X being good. But if your claim is that moral subjectivism is guilty of (1) then I think you’re accusing them of doing more than just (2), and that this equivocation is used as something like an appeal to ridicule. A moral subjectivist is more than capable of accepting that there is more to the world than what we see or feel or believe; they just don’t accept that moral obligations are examples of such things. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:06pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/414 "2026-06-11T15:06:51Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > The nihilist for his part argues that no moral ought statement is true in the realist sense, and that the realist sense is the only sense that meaningfully captures our moral intuitions and intentions when we make moral claims. If (c) is true only to the extent that (b) is true, i.e. as an institutional or cultural norm, then it isn’t really the kind of obligation that we ordinarily think it to be, i.e one that “transcends” all institutions and cultures and personal _beliefs_ about how we and others ought behave; it’s something that, if true, is true even if everyone believes and acts otherwise — something which does not hold for (b). Right, the question is whether the “realist sense” accommodates @Banno’s account. If Banno comes along and says, “I think we ought not kick puppies precisely because the surrounding community will enforce an action-guiding rule against puppy-kicking,” what would the moral realist say? Would they say, “Ah yes, you are a moral realist just like us”? Surely not. “You will be harmed in consequence of doing X, therefore you ought not do X,” is the oldest foil to moral realism in the book: it is Might Makes Right. It makes no difference whether an odd deflationary theory of truth manages to smuggle this theory under the umbrella of so-called “truth” theories. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/415 "2026-06-11T15:17:32Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > 1. This is collapsing any distinction between me thinking that X is good and X being good > > If your claim is only that moral subjectivism is guilty of (2) then … yes? That’s exactly what it means to be a moral subjectivist; to deny the alleged distinction between us thinking that X is good and X being good. Isn’t it fairly clear when we read the exchange with @AmadeusD in context that this is precisely what is being said? See: > [@AmadeusD](#): > > It is a subjective definition of Good, because each person will assess choice-worthiness along different lines, and toward different goals. @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus correctly notes that Amadeus is simply assuming that to define good as choice-worthy is to have conceded subjectivism. This assumption is explicitly denied and argued against going back thousands of years, even to Aristotle, and that’s why it is a form of mistranslation. It’s simply not what is being said. Amadeus is importing his own system into Count’s word ‘good’. ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:19pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/416 "2026-06-11T15:19:46Z")
Ok, sorry, I thought that, in context, 2 is obviously what I meant. Maybe it wasn’t clear. ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:32pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/417 "2026-06-11T15:32:52Z")
Also @Michael and @AmadeusD, perhaps part of the issue is that the thread has a lot of posts and maybe some of them have been missed. My point was in response to @Banno’s claim that teleological accounts face the difficulty that one can never derive “how the world ought to be” from “how it is.” My point was merely that this sort of gap doesn’t exist in the context of teleological metaphysics. In general, that sort of gap is posterior to the assumption of a strong fact/value dichotomy (whether this flows from emotivism, prescriptivism, etc.). But the assumption of such a dichotomy is itself already rejecting teleology, and it is trivial that if teleology is in error, it is in error. It is not a knock against any theory that if it is assumed to be false, it prove false. Assume, hypothetically, that facts about what is good for a being can be derived from what a being is. There are objective facts about values, facts about what is truly most desirable, and so, also, through the lens of practical decisionmaking, facts about what is more or less worthy of choice. Given this metaphysical assumption, the is-ought gap is not hard to cross. So, while teleology might face many hurdles justifying itself, the fact/values distinction and any is-ought gap based on it is not one of them. It does not need to “overcome” these, but rather shows why they don’t obtain. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/418 "2026-06-11T15:45:00Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > @Count_Timothy_von_Icarus correctly notes that Amadeus is simply assuming that to define good as choice-worthy is to have conceded subjectivism. This assumption is explicitly denied and argued against going back thousands of years, even to Aristotle, and that’s why it is a form of mistranslation. It’s simply not what is being said. Amadeus is importing his own system into Count’s word ‘good’. I believe the reasoning is: 1. The moral claim “X is good” is true 2. Moral realism is false 3. Therefore, “good” does not refer to some ‘objective’ property You could counter and say that, by definition, “good” refers to some ‘objective’ property, and so if (2) is true then (1) is false — and that’s certainly the approach that the nihilist takes. But suppose that you’re a realist who, after consideration, decides that realism doesn’t work. Do you become a nihilist and reject (1), or do you instead reassess what it means to be good so as to retain the truth of (1)? If the latter then are you _changing the definition_, or are you _recognizing that it doesn’t mean what you thought it meant_? ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:46pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/419 "2026-06-11T15:46:11Z")
> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#): > > So, while teleology might face many hurdles justifying itself, the fact/values distinction and any is-ought gap based on it is not one of them. Recasting what I’ve said above, a difficulty here is that “ought”—which I repeat is ill-defined—tends to refer to concrete actions or abstentions. If we take your standard way of construing things relatively the difficulty comes out quickly: 1. X is more choice-worthy than Y 2. Therefore one ought to prefer X to Y (2) is not a concrete action or abstention, and this is why folks will deny that it is an ‘ought’ of the relevant kind. You can’t get a standard ‘ought’ such as, “One ought not murder,” from a premise like (1), It may be the case that a fact/value separation entails an is/ought separation, but it’s not so clear that closing the former closes the latter. (See also my archived post [here](https://archive.thephilosophyforum.com/discussions/16235-ought-and-is-are-not-two-types-of-propositions.html#comment-1021392).) ---
**Author:** ![Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/count_timothy_von_icarus/32/675_2.png) [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Count_Timothy_von_Icarus)\ **Post date:** [June 11, 2026, 3:59pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/420 "2026-06-11T15:59:10Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > 1. This is collapsing any distinction between me thinking that X is good and X being good BTW, a naive reading of 2 is, to my mind, no less problematic. If there is no distinction between my thinking something is good and its being good, then I can never be wrong about what it is best to do. What to make of this? If we’re up late drinking and want a last shot of tequila, is that good for us because we want it at that moment? And then when we wake up hung over does that self-same event _become_ bad for us? This would seem to undermine even instrumental reasoning. However, the common out here is also revealing. If we say “good and bad also relate to our future preferences, what we would like to have done” or “what would seem best with perfect information,” or “what our idealized self would choose,” we seem to be allowing that there are facts about what is best that lie outside our _current_ beliefs and desires. But note that this pivot presupposes that there are _better and worse_ conditions for decision-making, and its hard to see how these norms could themselves be grounded without invoking the very sort of thick normativity that is being denied. Now, an anti-realist might very well say that this still counts as “subjective,” because facts about ideal preferences are grounded in sentiment or appetite, which are themselves subjective/phenomenal, and so _not_ objective/factual. That’s something I’m happy to accept, because it makes the disagreement clear. I would reject any strong objective/subjective dualism, at least in its common modern framing. What I think this reveals, at any rate, is that the anti-realism at issue here is not “good is just whatever we currently approve of” (or something like that), but rather rests on a metaphysical thesis about a deep dualism in being, such that there is an objective realm, and a subjective realm, and values aren’t “real” in the sense of belonging to the wrong domain. So, the anti-realist can say that facts about what we will prefer, or would ideally prefer, or would prefer with perfect information, are facts about mere appearances, sure. But the reduction of value to appearances is now explicitly a based on the dualism, which seems to me to be the real issue. Note that the difference from classical accounts is _not_ that goodness relates to desire though. “Being qua desirable” is a decent framing of the Good per the medieval Doctrine of Transcendentals. _Bonum est quod omnia appetunt_, “the good is what all things desire/tend toward,” is about as appetite-relational a definition as any subjectivist could want, right? The difference lies in how the appetites are treated, which seems to me to flow from the dualism. In the subjectivist case, desire is subjective overlay on a value-neutral world (which tends to flow from the assumption that the world is value-neutral itself). [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218.md?page=20) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218.md?page=22)