The mistake, vis-à-vis the problem of evil, is to think God is good.
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Exactly.
What you often see, I believe, is people wanting to claim that we’re wrong about evil, without realizing that you also have to claim we’re wrong about good.
More common still, perhaps, is the understandable desire to place human judgments in perspective, and argue that from God’s PoV, things may look very different indeed. But you have to remain consistent – if what we call evil isn’t what it appears to be, then neither is good. This may, of course, be true, but then a stoic silence on both subjects is required; we would literally not know what we were talking about.
I don’t think it quite covers it.
The free will argument, as advanced most prominently by Plantinga in recent years, basically postulates that this is the best possible world, even with this level of evil, as a world with free will is the greater good.
Let me be clear that I think 1) free will is an incoherent concept, and that’s precisely why it is used for this apologetic, as well as myriad other problems like divine hiddeness, atrocities in the bible etc.
- The idea of this being the best possible world is laughable on its face, given the great amount of suffering, much of it natural suffering, animal suffering etc.
But I tend to concede the point, and say that, yes, the logical problem of evil can be considered dubious. Because, while the free will defense is a mess, it does at least lead us to consider the possibility of this being the best possible universe for reasons we don’t know.
However, the evidential problem of evil – that each instance of suffering gives us reason to doubt omnimax god’s existence – is another matter entirely. I’ve heard several people assert that Plantinga’s argument deals with this too, but never any explanation of how.
The title is ‘failure of generic arguments against God’, not failure of disproofs of God. Are we moving the goalpost then?
You list 10, ranging from reasonable to good evidence against a god, but none being disproofs, just like none of the ‘evidence for a god’ constitute a proof.
So similar to your refutation of 2, lack of disproof does not constitute a proof.
Arguments 2,3,8,10 are pretty strong in my opinion. The others seem to attack not god, but specific aspects of what some but not all think the god should be.
Not listed: If the deity wanted (is something that ‘wants’ in the first place) to reveal itself, the same story would arise independently in separate cultures, and not evolve from even earlier stories such as is the case with all today’s modern religions.
A deity that is not revealing cannot enforce any kind of ‘objective’ morality on anything.
Another: It seems pretty funny that any deity would change his morals along with the local fashion of the time.
These are both in the weak category since they argue against certain aspects and not against the base idea.
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An argument against X is an argument that not-X. I’ve refuted the latter. This doesn’t mesan X, correct and I never said that.
If we prove that a certain god- quality doesn’t go with what we know then God can’t be.
I never said God wanted to reveal himself and anyway the same story does arise in all cultures, the story of powerful beings. Love is universal.
Thanks for your reply, and apologies for jumping in a couple weeks late, without yet reading most of the comments.
I think your 10 points in the OP typically do indeed argue for not-X, yes. They’re poorly refuted IMO. For example:
This is oft quoted, but flat out wrong. Absence of evidence is very much evidence of absence, just not proof of it, especially if the thing in question is extraordinary.
So for instance, the lack of evidence for Santa is pretty dang good evidence of absence of Santa, but not proof of it. Your refutation implies otherwise.
Another example:
God doesn’t resolve that, since one can ask ‘why is there god instead of not god?’. This also presumes that there is something, a problem much more easily solved by not presuming as much. Unfortunately, it’s a bias quite difficult for most to question. But that question is why I abandoned realism, a much simpler solution that adding something even more unlikely.
If we prove that a certain god-quality doesn’t go with what we know then God can’t be.
Again this does not follow. I just shows that if there’s a god, you don’t know all its qualities. You say ‘what we know’ but very little is ‘known’ (proven). So ‘posited’ seems more appropriate in your statement.
Belief in a god seems ultimately dependent on faith. They teach this as a virtue instead of a line indicating deceit.
Does this car you’re selling me have brakes? I don’t see them.
Well have faith. They’re in there despite lack of evidence or ability to stop on the test drive.
No, but it perhaps belongs on the list of common arguments. Sure, all methods of social control (just like Santa) have common elements like ‘powerful beings’, but the story behind it is never the same.
Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. You never accept the null, you can only reject it.
Occam’s razor doesn’t go with the question, why is there something rather than nothing? Immediately we see the need for a creation factor.
If there’s suffering then God is not Good i.e. the quality of goodness is unsuitable for the creator.
You’re cherry-picking. I might as well.
Santa Claus is a method of social control?
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More of a money-making scheme. 
That’s true.
I remember someone asking Mother Teresa what she thought God was like. ‘Very humble, very ordinary’, came the reply.
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I disagree. That ‘there is something rather than nothing’ suggests there has always been nothing – not even “God” – to prevent something (e.g. the universe) from coming-to-be or continuing-to-be or ceasing-to-be.
That can be challenged by the scenario, either it’ll snow or it’ll not. Whether it snows or does not there has to be a reason. It can’t just snow or not snow, right?
Not to worry, if God does not exist, humans will invent him ( is he male ?)
A non-sequitur and a non-answer (kicks the can down the road)
Answer: Why is there something rather than nothing?
Invent like algebra or something else?
If you’re asking me: I don’t know.
It’s one of many questions we don’t know the answer to at this time.
That’s different from the question being a non sequitur. 
Sure and that’s not the reason for saying it’s a non sequitur.
I’ll do my own version.
Why is there something rather than nothing? Immediately we see the need for a creation factor magic-juice, which is a thing I just defined that becomes a universe. Therefore, magic-juice.