# Generic failures in arguments for the nonexistence God

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715>\
**Category:** Philosophy of Religion\
**Tags:** god\
**Created:** [August 25, 2026, 12:31am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715 "2026-08-25T00:31:49Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 20\
**Page:** 8

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![180Proof](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/180proof/32/1100_2.png) [@180Proof](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/180Proof)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 5:14pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/144 "2026-09-02T17:14:06Z")

</div>

“Cherry picked?” Try addressing my objections without missing or evading the point.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Pantagruel](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/pantagruel/32/472_2.png) [@Pantagruel](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Pantagruel)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 6:20pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/145 "2026-09-02T18:20:38Z")

</div>

My point was never “Democritus correctly anticipated modern atomic physics.” It was that an apparently stable ontological position can undergo radical revisions while retaining a continuity of reference. Your response actually demonstrates this as ‘atom’ evolves from metaphysical speculation to scientific hypothesis.

Your last point continues to rest on your cherry-picking what you will and won’t accept as evidence. Why assume that ‘what has been claimed about god’ is exhaustive of ‘what could be claimed about god?’

Let’s accept that the most general construal that describes all of the various claims about the nature of god might be the best. In that case, I suggest this is that ‘god is that which is possessed of abilities beyond ours’. This is completely unproblematic. Modern humans defensibly possess abilities beyond our ancient counterparts. And the very fact that those abilities transcend means that essentially defy the kind of trivial evidentiality you seek (by definition). Yet not speculative formulation.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![180Proof](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/180proof/32/1100_2.png) [@180Proof](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/180Proof)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 6:59pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/146 "2026-09-02T18:59:39Z")

</div>

> [@Pantagruel](#):
>
> **Why assume** that ‘what has been claimed about god’ is exhaustive of ‘what **could be claimed** about god?’

I have never assumed or impied that any “claim about god” is “exhaustive of what could be claimed about god”.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Pantagruel](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/pantagruel/32/472_2.png) [@Pantagruel](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Pantagruel)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 7:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/147 "2026-09-02T19:08:58Z")

</div>

> [@180Proof](#):
>
> I have never assumed or impied that any “claim about god” is “exhaustive of what could be claimed about god”

Forgive me. When you claimed to refute (the reasonableness of) the claim that ‘God created the world’ I assumed you were implying that all such claims were similarly refutable. So you aren’t disputing the possibility of some characterizations of god then. Then we agree.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![180Proof](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/180proof/32/1100_2.png) [@180Proof](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/180Proof)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 9:04pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/148 "2026-09-02T21:04:47Z")

</div>

> [@180Proof](#):
>
> As I understand it, atheism (i.e. rejection of theism) is based on **the failure of _all_ theistic claims to meet their burden of proof** and not based on _mere_ “absence of evidence".

However, I’m agnostic (or speculative) regarding other _nontheistic_ concepts of ‘divinity’ such as _acosmism_ and _pandeism_.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Pantagruel](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/pantagruel/32/472_2.png) [@Pantagruel](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Pantagruel)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 9:39pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/149 "2026-09-02T21:39:42Z")

</div>

I tend to view traditional theistic claims (by specific people) to be the product of institutionally conditioned thought patterns largely. Which might otherwise result in a more generalized form of cosmic intuition. Which I think more reasonable than traditional theistic accounts.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 9:50pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/150 "2026-09-02T21:50:48Z")

</div>

> [@Mijin1](#):
>
> Right (I think…it’s a confusing sentence).  
> My position is that “we have free will” and “we do not have free will” are both meaningless sentences. Because “free will” is popularly imagined as some kind of causeless, non-random intention, and that makes no sense at all. No-one has ever described how a reasoned decision would be made by such a “not-this and also not-that” intention.

Confusion arises from previous confusions. To me, either we have free will or we don’t. It’s about whether our choices are ours/not. If it can be shown that our choices arise from (say) particles hitting our brain then our choices are not ours, and if this is not true then we have free will.

Imqgine a person in an expanding universe. His universe is expanding so fast that no light from any other source in this universe has any hope of reaching him. He chooses to eat ice cream.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 9:57pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/151 "2026-09-02T21:57:38Z")

</div>

To some an impersonal God is no God at all. Part of Hume’s, is he neither able, nor willing? Then, why call him God?

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\
**Post date:** [September 2, 2026, 10:01pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/152 "2026-09-02T22:01:25Z")

</div>

> [@Sam26](#):
>
> Obviously global skepticism is untenable. I haven’t made any argument in favor of it.

Did you make an argument from it? 🤔

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![180Proof](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/180proof/32/1100_2.png) [@180Proof](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/180Proof)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2026, 12:38am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/153 "2026-09-03T00:38:38Z")

</div>

> [@Scorpion](#):
>
> To some an impersonal God is no God at all.

To some (e.g. Stoics, Epicureans, Neoplatonists, Spinozists, Deists …) an impersonal God, **unlike personal God or gods** , is the only God that is compatible with both theoretical and public reason.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2026, 4:13am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/154 "2026-09-03T04:13:24Z")

</div>

> [@180Proof](#):
>
> To some (e.g. Stoics, Epicureans, Neoplatonists, Spinozists, Deists …) an impersonal God, **unlike personal God or gods** , is the only God that is compatible with both theoretical and public reason.

Yes, I know. Thank you.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Sam26](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/d9b06d/32.png) [@Sam26](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Sam26)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2026, 4:21pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/155 "2026-09-03T16:21:48Z")

</div>

> [@Jay](#):
>
> I can imagine a believer who’s content to say, “I have no grounds for claiming that God exists that would be rationally compelling, though in fact I believe he does.” Indeed, that seems a relatively common position. But can there be a believer who adds to this, “and my belief must be a necessary one in the same way that your faith in the external world is necessary – that is, for _all of us_”? Suppose the believer’s interlocutor winds up agreeing – has this person now been persuaded that God exists, or only that they can’t do without the concept?

If “God exists” is a hinge, then there isn’t a justification. So, none is available and none is owed. It’s part of the background that allows for reasoning in the first place. And if “God exists” is a lower-level hinge, like the world exists, then it’s arational, and asking for grounds is the wrong question. However, one could argue over it being a hinge, we do that all the time, but that’s a different argument.

I’m not claiming “God exist” does sit at that lower level (at least the theistic God). I have doubts that theism can, since whatever sits at the bottom would have to be thin, and theism carries a lot more than the role requires. If it is a bottom hinge, then the absence of grounds is exactly what you’d expect. Not a failure of the belief, just the ordinary requirement of any such foundational belief. Moreover, nobody can produce grounds for the external world either, and this is important to recognize.

And, yes, if the believer is putting “God exists” at the same level as the external world, then it would apply to all of us, as you say. Which I think answers your question. If the interlocutor agrees that hinges are basic bottom beliefs and that this is one, then I don’t see how the interlocutor could not be a believer. Understanding “God exists” as a foundational hinge requires a specific understanding of what that entails, at least generally. There’s no outside position to hold it from, which is what makes it different from agreeing that something functions as a hinge for someone else. On both accounts, though, you can still operate within the world without understanding the nature of hinges. Acting in the world isn’t dependent on either of these, at least on some level.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 3, 2026, 5:15pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/156 "2026-09-03T17:15:38Z")

</div>

> [@Sam26](#):
>
> However, one could argue over it being a hinge, we do that all the time, but that’s a different argument.

The situation I was imagining between a believer and their interlocutor was of that sort – whether belief in God is a hinge belief. A discussion about the _nature_ of the belief, in other words, not the truth or falsity of the subject of the belief. If the interlocutor comes to agree that it is a hinge belief – _not_ agreeing to some positive statements about God, but only the indispensability of the belief – do we say that they have become convinced that God exists? An odd version of the ontological argument.

> [@Sam26](#):
>
> If it is a bottom hinge, then the absence of grounds is exactly what you’d expect. Not a failure of the belief, just the ordinary requirement of any such foundational belief.

Yes.

> [@Sam26](#):
>
> And, yes, if the believer is putting “God exists” at the same level as the external world, then it would apply to all of us, as you say. Which I think answers your question. If the interlocutor agrees that hinges are basic bottom beliefs and that this is one, then I don’t see how the interlocutor could not be a believer.

I know it looks that way at first. But are these two statements equivalent?:

1. I believe God exists.
2. I can’t do without the belief that God exists in order to carry on even the most basic of my personal and cultural practices.

They may be, but I’m not sure. I suppose it depends on what description one wants to give of theological belief – whether it involves moves that are different from other more quotidian examples of belief.

> [@Sam26](#):
>
> you can still operate within the world without understanding the nature of hinges. Acting in the world isn’t dependent on either of these, at least on some level.

I agree, but tell me why this seems important to you. I would have said that it was true of just about all our beliefs, hinge-like or not. We mostly take them as true and carry on accordingly.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2026, 10:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/157 "2026-09-04T22:45:36Z")

</div>

Nice exchange you two! Kudos. Very interesting.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2026, 10:47pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/158 "2026-09-04T22:47:55Z")

</div>

I wanted to mention you as well, but haven’t yet figured out how to mention multiple users in the same post without quoting them. The above kudos applies equally to you. Intriguing conversation between you and Sam! Thanks to you both!

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2026, 10:59pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/159 "2026-09-04T22:59:44Z")

</div>

> [@creative](#):
>
> Thanks to you both!

Thanks for the appreciation. Sam and I have continued some of this offline; maybe it will show up again here in some form.

Yeah, I don’t think this new platform lets you reply to two people at once. So I just mention the other one, which seems to serve the same “alert” function.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2026, 11:01pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/160 "2026-09-04T23:01:57Z")

</div>

> [@Scorpion](#):
>
> Arguments against God
> 
> 1. Problem of suffering. Free will defense. Evil is a consequence of our free will, which is a gift from God.

I don’t see how the notion of free will exonerates the God of Abraham from the existence of evil.

1. If the God of Abraham exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect(omnibenevolent).
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is omnibenevolent, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, the God of Abraham doesn’t exist.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2026, 11:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/161 "2026-09-04T23:08:48Z")

</div>

Another possibility is that what we believe to be evil is not in fact evil. So premise 5 would be incorrect.

I don’t believe this for a minute, but if someone did believe it – that we’re radically wrong about evil – it would be a successful theodicy. (It would also, of course, make the idea of omnibenevolence as incoherent to us as the idea of evil.)

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![creative](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/creative/32/1449_2.png) [@creative](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/creative)\
**Post date:** [September 4, 2026, 11:27pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/162 "2026-09-04T23:27:26Z")

</div>

Sure, I suppose someone could claim that evil does not exist.

Edited to add…

Wait, I didn’t digest that before replying. It’s not that you’re saying that they deny the existence of evil. But rather, that they may claim that we’re somehow confused and/or mistake about what counts as evil, which in turn would be saying that we’re also confused and/or mistaken about what counts as good.

Yeah. I think that there are any number of people who hold that view, to some extent or another. Some of them fairly powerful.

---

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![Sam26](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/d9b06d/32.png) [@Sam26](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Sam26)\
**Post date:** [September 5, 2026, 12:53am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715/163 "2026-09-05T00:53:06Z")

</div>

Christians often answer the problem of evil with the free will defense, but that’s never answered the problem. If God, as they believe is omniscient, then he would have known creating humans with free will would result in evil, or at the very least, would have suspected it would result in evil. Moreover, he would have know that a large portion of humans would end up in hell (based on what most Christians believe). This would make God responsible for evil.

My metaphysics answers these questions.

[Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715.md?page=7)

[Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/generic-failures-in-arguments-for-the-nonexistence-god/2715.md?page=9)
