Hmm. Here’s one way to put it: Both Anscombe and Foot (of that period) held that there are moral truths but they are “unprovable” (so to speak), and therefore they fall on the non-classical side of the dichotomy I presented here. They might say things like, “This is what it is for man to be good, and there could be someone who is perfectly rational and yet denies this.” This is why their views were so unstable. Take Anscombe in that essay:
Now I am not able to do the philosophy involved—and I think that no one in the present situation of English philosophy can do the philosophy involved—but it is clear that a good man is a just man;
(Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 16)
Foot will do the same thing in an even stronger way, as I pointed out here.
Here is a helpful quote from Simpson that will touch on many of the things that you are interested in:
Nevertheless if Phillips’ and Mounce’s argument fails, their objection does not. If by “pure facts” is meant something non-evaluative then no moral term is purely factual and it would be false to say it was. Moral terms involve assessment with respect to a standard and if there is no standard referred to the term is not being used morally. The question, as already stated in the previous chapter, concerns not the reference to standards but the status of them, whether they are set up by nature or not. It is not at all clear whether Foot realises this, and, therefore, not at all clear whether she wants to equate ‘values’ with ‘facts’ in the value-free sense of ‘fact’ used by Hare, Stevenson, Phillips and Mounce. It is thus not clear either whether she realises that one must challenge as much the sense of ‘fact’ used by non-naturalists as their sense of ‘value’, though she is aware that the way these words are defined by them, namely in terms of each other, begs the question (1978: 100). It is this lack of clarity in her position which serves to provide some excuse for the way Hare distorts naturalism when he tries to refute it; for the distorted naturalism that results is the sort of naturalism towards which some of his opponents are inclined.
Foot, however, like Anscombe, has another line of attack against non-naturalism. She maintains that saying something is good need not have any connection with choice. The criteria of goodness for some things are established just by what they are independently of choices, as is the case with ‘good knife’. The same is true of ‘good father’, for a man who offered up his children for sacrifice could not be called by us a good father (in Hudson, 1969: 219). As the example of knife shows, this is just another recourse to a functional sense of good, and leaves her open to her critics’ retort that moral good is not functional. Foot consistently fails to develop a reply to this objection.
Nevertheless, she pursues her point in another way by saying that choosing something is not a mark that one thinks it good, and that one’s thinking something good, even in moral contexts, need not involve any disposition to choose it. Hare rightly regards this view as “not very plausible” (in Hudson, 1969: 209, 254).
(Peter Simpson, Goodness and Nature, 90)
In a general sense, if Anscombe and Foot were not haunted by Hume then there wouldn’t be all of these inconsistencies and confusions permeating their work. For both of them but in different ways, they have their their theory about what is moral or ethical on the one side, and they have their theory about what is rational on the other side, and they have no idea how to put the two things together (for they have not overcome the way Hume draws up reason vs. morals). The reason the two won’t fit together is because of Hume. Or rather, because of “Hume” (in the way he is received and viewed with respect to this juncture between practical and theoretical reason).