# Furthering Philippa Foot

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/furthering-philippa-foot/1367>\
**Category:** Ethics\
**Created:** [June 15, 2026, 10:56pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/furthering-philippa-foot/1367 "2026-06-15T22:56:26Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 249

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**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\
**Post date:** [June 22, 2026, 2:52am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/furthering-philippa-foot/1367/249 "2026-06-22T02:52:39Z")

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> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#):
>
> 1. Justice is morally good.
> 2. X promotes justice.
> 3. It is good for a man to be morally good.  
> C. Therefore, do x.

The argument from Thrasymachus and middle Foot is that injustice is not always bad.

Regarding your own argument, the conclusion looks to be underdetermined. We are neither practically bound nor morally obligated to carry out every act which promotes justice, and yet this is what your argument entails. (See also my post to you [here](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/419).)

> [@Count\_Timothy\_von\_Icarus](#):
>
> But for the austere Kantian we have:
> 
> 1. X is morally obligatory.
> 2. It is choice-worthy to do what is morally obligatory.  
> C. Therefore, do x.

For the austere Kantian it is respect for the moral law which leads one to abide by it, not choice-worthiness or goodness. Similarly, Kant would deem the person confused who praises him for doing what is obligatory. Of course, as you’ve pointed out, @Jay is very far from an austere Kantian, so there’s that.

> [@Jay](#):
>
> And to say “Justice is morally good” is a tautology. “Justice” is already a moral term of approbation. You can form the sentence, “Justice, as a quality or attribute, is morally bad” but it doesn’t mean anything.

In order to claim that it is a tautology you would have to show that “justice” and “moral good” mean the same thing. I don’t think they do, and justice being a term of moral approbation doesn’t show that it is a tautology. In fact lots of contemporary thinkers literally think that classical justice is a moral evil.

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