# Free Will: Does it Exist? **URL:** \ **Category:** Metaphysics & Epistemology\ **Created:** [June 2, 2026, 12:30am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200 "2026-06-02T00:30:36Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 7
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 7:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/121 "2026-06-02T19:45:18Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > Again, I see no reason why, in the first case, we shouldn’t say that you are _freely_ willing your ears to move. You have exercised your free will in both scenarios. It’s not as if the _free_ will is only engaged when the act achieves success. Usually when we talk about free will we’re concerned with the relationship between our will and our actions. It would be quite strange to suggest that a paraplegic has free will over his legs simply because he can _will_ his legs to move. The fact that his will does not control his legs is what it means for him to lack free will in this area. Or if something like [psychophysical parallelism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism) is true then any correlation between me willing my legs to move and my legs actually moving (as causally determined by antecedent physical events) is just that — correlation — and so many would say that we don’t have free will (even if we can “freely” will, as you mean by it). Much like there’s really no connection between me willing my heart to beat and my heart beating. > [@Leontiskos](#): > > Again, this is a misrepresentation Okay, so we’ll start again. I am saying that this argument is sound: 1. “A is causally responsible for B” means “A caused B” 2. A can cause B even if A did not will or intend for B to happen 3. Therefore, A can be causally responsible for B even if A did not will or intend for B to happen This is most obvious when A and B are something like “the wind” and “the chair to fall over” respectively. Having A be a human organism doesn’t change the truth values of (1) and (2). Either you agree with (1) and (2) or you don’t. If you agree with them then you must agree with (3). ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 7:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/122 "2026-06-02T19:58:21Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > Usually when we talk about free will we’re concerned with the relationship between our will and our actions. It would be quite strange to suggest that a paraplegic has free will over his legs simply because he can _will_ his legs to move. The fact that his will does not control his legs is what it means for him to lack free will in this area. It’s the same issue. The paraplegic has no voluntary control over his legs. Using your own idioms, no one would say, “The paraplegic has will over his legs but he does not have free will over his legs.” The paraplegic can “will” his legs to move, and he can freely “will” his legs to move. Your theory is incorrect which says he can do one but not the other. Free will does not mean efficacious will. > [@Michael](#): > > Okay, so we’ll start again. Again, I addressed this in the spoiler. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:13pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/123 "2026-06-02T20:13:34Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > The paraplegic has no voluntary control over his legs Yes, and we usually say that we have free will only if we can control our behaviour. If we can’t control our behaviour then we don’t have free will even if we can “freely will”. A causally inert will (e.g. [psychophysical parallelism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychophysical_parallelism)) is probably something that both the compatibilist and incompatibilist will accept entails that we don’t have free will. So the causal connection between one’s will and one’s behaviour is a necessary component of free will, even if incompatibilists claim that it isn’t sufficient. ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:15pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/124 "2026-06-02T20:15:30Z")
In your version of free will there’s no moral culpability, so you aren’t talking about free will as it’s usually understood. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:18pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/125 "2026-06-02T20:18:50Z")
Two questions: 1. Why is there no moral culpability in my version? 2. Why does free will require moral culpability? At least with respect to (2), my initial objections are: 1. We can have free will even if moral nihilism is true 2. Even if we have libertarian free will, some of the things we choose to do are morally neutral (e.g. choosing to have jam on my toast rather than marmite) ---
**Author:** ![MoK](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/mok/32/578_2.png) [@MoK](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/MoK)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:28pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/126 "2026-06-02T20:28:34Z")
The problem of free will within physicalism is twofold: 1) There is only one option at any given point in time, so how could you do otherwise? and 2) Accepting that options are real, how does a deterministic thing like the brain choose one option over another? ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:31pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/127 "2026-06-02T20:31:15Z")
> [@MoK](#): > > 1. There is only one option at any given point in time, so how could you do otherwise? My take is that free will doesn’t require that we could have done otherwise. Free will isn’t a counterfactual. ---
**Author:** ![MoK](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/mok/32/578_2.png) [@MoK](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/MoK)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:33pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/128 "2026-06-02T20:33:18Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > My take is that free will doesn’t require that we could have done otherwise. Then why use “free” if you have only one option at any given time? ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:39pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/129 "2026-06-02T20:39:36Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > Yes, and we usually say that we have free will only if we can control our behaviour. If we can’t control our behaviour then we don’t have free will even if we can “freely will”. You don’t seem to be following. “Voluntary control” is a synonym for will-based control. The point is that your strong distinction between “my will” and “my free will” is non-existent. To say that someone has willed something is to say that they have done it freely. In the cases we are discussing, “free” adds emphasis; it does not qualitatively change anything. When you say that the paraplegic can will his leg to move but he does not have free will over the movement of his leg, you are moving the goalposts. You have switched the object of the act from, “attempting to make the leg move,” to, “moving the leg,” and then you claim that the difference is will vs. free will. It’s not. The difference is the object. The paraplegic’s “will” and his “free will” are exactly the same once we recognize that there are two objects. The paraplegic can “freely will” to “attempt to make the leg move,” and he cannot “will” to “move the leg.” There is no relevant difference. Both will and free will are able with respect to the potential movement of the leg and unable with respect to the actual movement of the leg. The reason this matters is because you are trying to salvage your strange idea that “the will” is an event even though “free will” is a faculty. ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:42pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/130 "2026-06-02T20:42:16Z")
> [@Michael](#): > > 1. Why is there no moral culpability in my version? Moral culpability requires the power to choose. > [@Michael](#): > > 1. Why does free will require moral culpability? Because responsibility, as it’s understood in the moral domain, is the kind of responsibility entailed by freedom of the will. If you change “responsibility” to mean something like _efficient cause_, then you aren’t addressing volition. > [@Michael](#): > > 1. We can have free will even if moral nihilism is true You have free will if you could be held morally responsible. Whether you are or not is another matter. > [@Michael](#): > > 1. Even if we have libertarian free will, some of the things we choose to do are morally neutral (e.g. choosing to have jam on my toast rather than marmite) I don’t disagree. My point is that if you shift the meaning of responsibility so that it precludes moral responsibility, you aren’t talking about freedom of the will. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:44pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/131 "2026-06-02T20:44:25Z")
> [@FlannelJesus](#): > > When I looked at those two options, I realized that “we have free will” doesn’t really make sense just because determinism isn’t true. If determinism isn’t true (and what I’m about to say is certainly controversial), then that means there is randomness. And randomness is not a source of freedom. Randomness is just random. In a deterministic world, it’s said that we’re a slave to causality, to physics. Isn’t that also true in a world with randomness? Wouldn’t we just be a slave to (physics + some randomness)? My intuition says randomness leaves us no more free than determinism. I disagree. I think randomness is very much not determinism. However, I don’t think randomness is any kind of free will worth bragging about. Flip a coin every time you need to make a decision? Roll the dice? As I said way above, I think free will means freedom from laws of physics. The laws of physics did not, and never will, cause there to be, to use Paul Davies’ example from _The Demon in the Machine_, the amount - the growing amount - of plutonium on Earth. any other number of examples will do. Stop signs, automobiles, fire hydrants, on and on. Something is in play other than the laws of physics. We imagine things, then we make them. We can’t violate the laws of physics, but we use them as we choose. That’s what I think free will is. But I still don’t know if we’re free from non-physical determinism. ---
**Author:** ![felipec](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/felipec/32/759_2.png) [@felipec](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/felipec)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:48pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/132 "2026-06-02T20:48:52Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > You have switched the object of the act from, “attempting to make the leg move,” to, “moving the leg,” and then you claim that the difference is will vs. free will. It’s not. He doesn’t understand the philosophical difference between will and desire. Just because someone can desire something to happen doesn’t mean that someone can will something to happen. Everyone understands “you cannot will yourself to fly”, but @Michael pretends the meaning is different. ---
**Author:** ![Leontiskos](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/leontiskos/32/712_2.png) [@Leontiskos](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Leontiskos)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 8:51pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/133 "2026-06-02T20:51:00Z")
> [@MoK](#): > > Then why use “free” if you have only one option at any given time? It’s a good question. Similarly: > [@Michael](#): > > 1. “I have free will” means “My will is causally responsible for my actions” Would Michael affirm that an ant has free will? Does the pool cue have free will if it is “causally responsible for its actions”? Here he seems to commit himself to the position which says that the wind has free will: > [@Michael](#): > > 1. “A is causally responsible for B” means “A caused B” > 2. A can cause B even if A did not will or intend for B to happen > 3. Therefore, A can be causally responsible for B even if A did not will or intend for B to happen > > This is most obvious when A and B are something like “the wind” and “the chair to fall over” respectively. Having A be a human organism doesn’t change the truth values of (1) and (2). This becomes particularly acute once we recognize how nondescript his definition of “will” is (i.e. an event of an unspecified kind). ---
**Author:** ![FlannelJesus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/flanneljesus/32/595_2.png) [@FlannelJesus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FlannelJesus)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 9:06pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/134 "2026-06-02T21:06:50Z")
> [@Patterner](#): > > I think randomness is very much not determinism I didn’t contadict that. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [June 2, 2026, 9:59pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/135 "2026-06-02T21:59:18Z")
True enough. I misread. Ignore the man behind the curtain. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2026, 8:00am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/136 "2026-06-03T08:00:43Z")
> [@Frank](#): > > Moral culpability requires the power to choose. If by “power to choose” you mean “could have done otherwise” then I disagree. If by “power to choose” you mean “power to decide”, meaning “power to control” meaning “power to cause”, then I agree; but “power to cause” does not require “could have done otherwise” — it only requires that I did what I did because I willed it to happen, which is compatible with physicalism and determinism. > [@Frank](#): > > You have free will if you could be held morally responsible. Whether you are or not is another matter. If moral nihilism is true then you can’t be held morally responsible even if you have free will, because there’s no such thing as moral responsibility. Defining free will in such a way that it depends on some kind of moral realism is even less sensible than defining free will as a counterfactual, I think. > [@Frank](#): > > My point is that if you shift the meaning of responsibility so that it precludes moral responsibility, you aren’t talking about freedom of the will. Like another poster you’re conflating moral responsibility and causal responsibility. Free will only requires that I am causally responsibile for my behaviour. Whether or not this causal responsibility entails moral responsibility is a separate issue, and depends on unrelated matters (e.g. which metaethics is correct; realism or nihilism or other). ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2026, 8:07am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/137 "2026-06-03T08:07:02Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > Would Michael affirm that an ant has free will? Does the pool cue have free will if it is “causally responsible for its actions”? Ants might, depending on how complex their brains are. Pool cues don’t because they don’t have a brain, and I quite clearly said before that willing one’s foot to move is a particular kind of brain activity. > [@Leontiskos](#): > > Here he seems to commit himself to the position which says that the wind has free will: I’m not saying that the wind has free will. I’m saying that the wind can be causally responsible for something even though it doesn’t will it to happen, because you were saying that I can only be causally responsible for something if I do will to happen. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2026, 8:10am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/138 "2026-06-03T08:10:16Z")
> [@felipec](#): > > He doesn’t understand the philosophical difference between will and desire. Just because someone can desire something to happen doesn’t mean that someone can will something to happen. Everyone understands “you cannot will yourself to fly”, but @Michael pretends the meaning is different. The paraplegic desiring his foot to move and him willing his foot to move are not the same thing. When he wills his foot to move he’s actually trying to move his foot. It’s a different kind of brain activity — one that were it not for his broken spine would have caused his foot to move. ---
**Author:** ![Michael](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/4bbf92/32.png) [@Michael](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Michael)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2026, 8:15am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/139 "2026-06-03T08:15:22Z")
> [@Leontiskos](#): > > “Voluntary control” is a synonym for will-based control. Yes, which requires that one’s will controls one’s foot; that one’s foot moves _because_ one wills it. The “willing it” is something that happens in the brain, and then the foot moving is something that happens after the aforementioned “willing it” sends a signal down the spine to the muscles in the foot. If the spine is broken and the signal fails to reach the muscles in the foot then there’s no will-based _control_ (and so no free will) but there is still the will. ---
**Author:** ![Corvus](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/corvus/32/1606_2.png) [@Corvus](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Corvus)\ **Post date:** [June 3, 2026, 8:26am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200/140 "2026-06-03T08:26:35Z")
> [@Existism](#): > > I am curious what everyone’s opinions on free will are. Free will is any voluntary act or action performed by thinking being. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200.md?page=6) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/free-will-does-it-exist/1200.md?page=8)