# Foot: Morality As A System Of Hypothetical Imperatives

**URL:** <https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/foot-morality-as-a-system-of-hypothetical-imperatives/1401>\
**Category:** Ethics\
**Created:** [June 18, 2026, 10:38pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/foot-morality-as-a-system-of-hypothetical-imperatives/1401 "2026-06-18T22:38:59Z")\
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**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\
**Post date:** [June 19, 2026, 4:51am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/foot-morality-as-a-system-of-hypothetical-imperatives/1401/4 "2026-06-19T04:51:43Z")

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So to Page Five.

> It follows that if a hypothetical use of “should” gives a hypothetical imperative, and a non-hypothetical use of “should” a categorical imperative, then “should” statements based on rules of etiquette, or rules of a club, are categorical imperatives.

Ouch.

Foot addresses a potential reply: that imperatives of etiquette are answerable with "Why should I bother?', that is, that mere etiquette has no hold on us. We have to add some _reason_ to follow the rules of etiquette. And “…by contrast, it is supposed that moral considerations necessarily give reasons for acting to any man.”

So to things not being as they should be. And here’s a curious comment:

> …the amoral man, who agrees that some piece of conduct is immoral but takes no notice of that, is inconsistently disregarding a rule of conduct that he has accepted… The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency.

This plays somewhat against my own argument, from elsewhere, using T-sentences and Moore’s paradox.

> [@I am a Moral Nihilist](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/i-am-a-moral-nihilist/1218/189):
>
> Consider someone who asserts “There is a fly on the wall”. Now we are entitled, just from the assertion, to infer that they believe that “There is a fly on the wall” is true. For it seems infelicitous for someone to say things like:
> 
> - “There is a fly on the wall, but I do not believe that there is a fly on the wall”
> - “There is a fly on the wall, but it is not true that there is afly on the wall”
> - “I believe that it is true that there is a fly on the wall, but I do not believe that there is a fly on the wall”
> - It is true that I believe there is a fly on the wall but it is not true that there is a fly on the wall.
> 
> and so on. At the very least, there is something incongruous about these combinations. The last, at the least, shows an inconsistency between how things are and what one believes.
> 
> So now consider
> 
> - It is true that we believe people should not kick puppies, but it is not true that people should not kick puppies
> 
> Again, at the least, this shows an inconsistency between how things are and what one believes.

Working through that, Foot seems to be asserting that her man can agree that X is immoral, continue to that one ought not to X and yet still do X, and not be considered as being inconsistent.

Still thinking on that, but as it stands, I think her amoral man _is_ inconsistent, suffering that form of inconsistency we call hypocrisy.

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