Of course. Trivially. No one disputes this. For that reason, I don’t bother to emphasize the obvious.
Instead I just chime in against philosophers who “in the name of science” question the “reality” of pain. This deep question makes more sense to me as a parody of philosophy.
This is Einstein in a Machian mode in Physics and Reality. I don’t mean to appeal to authority but just point at relative philosophical sophistication of some physicists on this issue.
The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of every day thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the physicist cannot possibly be restricted to the examination of the concepts of his own specific field. He cannot proceed without considering critically a much more difficult problem, the problem of analyzing the nature of everyday thinking. On the stage of our subconscious mind appear in colorful succession sense experiences, memory pictures of them, representations and feelings.
In contrast to psychology, physics treats directly only of sense experiences and of the “understanding” of their connection. But even the concept of the " real external world " of everyday thinking rests exclusively on sense impressions. Now we must first remark that the differentiation between sense impressions and representations is not possible; or, at least it is not possible with absolute certainty. With the discussion of this problem, which affects also the notion of reality, we will not concern ourselves but we shall take the existence of sense experiences as given, that is to say as psychic experiences of special kind. I believe that the first step in the setting of a " real external world " is the formation of the concept of bodily objects and of bodily objects of various kinds.
Out of the multitude of our sense experiences we take, mentally and arbitrarily, certain repeatedly occurring complexes of sense impression (partly in conjunction with sense impressions which are interpreted as signs for sense experiences of others), and we attribute to them a meaning–the meaning of the bodily object. Considered logically this concept is not identical with the totality of sense impressions referred to; but it is an arbitrary creation of the human (or animal) mind. On the other hand, the concept owes its meaning and its justification exclusively to the totality of the sense impressions which we associate with it.
Einstein is even a little bit too subjectivistic here, but it’s better than anxious flight from the issue of individual perceivers and their “private” perceptions. I would, in his shows, emphasize the intrinsic sociality of language, the forum, but perhaps he can take all of that for granted, in his case, as too obvious to need mentioning.
Einstein seems to use “representations” for what I’d call perceptions. Then (non-representational) “sense impressions” would be what I’d call “hallucinations.” It’s not always easy to classify a particular experience. This is where we need others in the determination of the “real” as what is reliably shared, etc.