# Do truths about "Reason" exist - somehow - independently of us? **URL:** \ **Category:** Metaphysics & Epistemology\ **Created:** [October 24, 2026, 9:57pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756 "2026-10-24T21:57:47Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 9:57pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/1 "2026-10-24T21:57:47Z")
As far as I understand, there is something about reason that makes it undeniable. Nagel makes this case in his “The Last Word”. If something like “reason” exists at all, it must have objective/universal authority. An attempt to deny it quickly becomes unintelligible (some could claim that’s a feature, but I digress). So my question is this: Does this universality point to reality itself being structured in a “reason-like” fashion, or is reason simply a faculty for us to be able to describe anything at all? Or, to put it another way, when we reason, are we connecting to some structure that is independent of us? Or are we simply using a faculty and the “outer” isn’t even an intelligible concept when at the level of reason itself? For example, Kant employs an argument in his “deduction” (in Critique of Pure Reason) that roughly amounts to saying that the building blocks of reason (understanding) also actively shape our “reality” itself. So the reason “reason” is so effective when applied to the universe is due to the so called “universe” already having been passed through that faculty of “reason” (somewhat). Of course Kant himself would not make a comment on my question and say I missed the point by still asking about metaphysics, but still, I would consider his answer to be closer to saying “Reason is a faculty, not a feature of reality”. I would want to say that something “reason-like” exists for the universe itself independent of us. But I don’t know how to make that argument, or describe what exactly it would be. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 10:09pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/2 "2026-10-24T22:09:51Z")
> [@Puzzled](#): > > As far as I understand, there is something about reason that makes it undeniable. Nagel makes this case in his “The Last Word”. If something like “reason” exists at all, it must have objective/universal authority. Not so sure about that. Isn’t his argument there the fairly simply one that arguing agains reason itself requires reason, and so is self-defeating? hence, he take himself as showing that reason is authoritative. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 10:17pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/3 "2026-10-24T22:17:56Z")
“Reason, if there is such a thing, can serve as a court of appeal not only against the received opinions and habits of our community but also against the peculiarities of our personal perspective. It is something each individual can find within himself, but at the same time it has universal authority. Reason provides, mysteriously, a way of distancing oneself from common opinion and received practices that is not a mere elevation of individuality—not a determination to express one’s idiosyncratic self rather than go along with everyone else. Whoever appeals to reason purports to discover a source of authority within himself that is not merely personal, or societal, but universal—and that should also persuade others who are willing to listen to it.” From the introduction. Though, that argument you mention, too, is in the book. He uses several arguments to defend the view he describes in the introduction against the “skeptics”. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 10:25pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/4 "2026-10-24T22:25:29Z")
Then there is no need to leap to ‘something “reason-like” exists for the universe itself independent of us’, since all we need is a discourse, and the underlying agreement that implies. So here, you and I agree _at least_ that there is a philosopher named Nagel who wrote a neat paper worth talking about. That’s enough to get the conversation going. Any authority might be in that agreement, rather than floating about the universe and _apart from_ our discourse. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 10:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/5 "2026-10-24T22:45:54Z")
Well, that’s the discussion though, isn’t it? I am not saying we can simply “leap” to the conclusion that something reason-like must exist, or that from just Nagel’s words, we can conclude that reality has a “reason-like” structure. Nagel’s book was meant to serve as an introduction to the post, making sure people understand that they would need to grant the universality/objectivity of reason for my question to make sense. Once objectivity of reason is granted, it is indeed somewhat of a mystery, as Nagel himself says, just why a faculty we have would track reality so well. How would it work? This is also why I mentioned Kant. His answer to this in the Critique of Pure Reason is that the “reality” we refer to is indeed the result of such a faculty. So, for him, it becomes not so much a mystery as to why the same faculty would work on reality so well. Because we can only experience objective reality after it has been shaped by a faculty similar to reason. But there definitely exists some kind of intuition here in many. Seeing the total objectivity of reason, it guides one to make the claim that maybe the we really are connecting to some outer structure that grounds the so called “faculty of reason”. In a way that maybe the faculty itself only works due to it. Because trying to imagine a faculty like reason somehow popping up in a “chaotic” reality where reason-like laws are nonexistent, is almost impossible. The faculty itself would undergo change as time passes if it was grounded on such flimsy footing. Having said that, there definitely is some weirdness here because the argument requires looking at “reason” from the outside, which is problematic in the first place. But the worry is nevertheless understandable, that at least some form of mind independent rule-like structure having to ground our faculty of reason. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 10:52pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/6 "2026-10-24T22:52:32Z")
At core, I don’t see how you can make sense of reason apart from something we do, of reason seperate from the interests of you and I and them. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 11:06pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/7 "2026-10-24T23:06:34Z")
Reason is something we use, that somehow works universally. That is the heart of the issue, I suppose. The question is, metaphysically, what can reason be that allows it to showcase such a property? In my mind, there are two reasonable answers; it is only a shared faculty, or it is more than a shared faculty. The status of truths such as “the apple is red.” can be explained by the sharing of, say, the faculty of vision. And if someone sees it as blue, for example, we can say theirs is misfunctioning. But in the case of colors, we can somewhat see that the fact is mainly about us and how we perceive the apple. Reason, I think, is sui generis among human faculties. We cannot shake it off as a “fact about ourselves”, because it pretty much defines reality. It is needed for anything at all to be intelligible. And, reasonably, we can claim that unintelligibility cannot birth intelligibility and thus reality itself would have to grant some sort of structure within it that grounds reason (or, directly, is reason). ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 11:34pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/8 "2026-10-24T23:34:57Z")
> [@Puzzled](#): > > Reason is something we use, that somehow works universally. Does it? There are unreasonable folk, unreasonable answers, unreasonable questions. Reason is something we do rather than something we find. The stories we keep are the ones that work, the ones we find mutually useful, the ones that are, in a word, reasonable. Is reason found in reality, or is it what we do in order to set out reality? Are you perhaps in the place of the puddle who finds herself so comfortable fitting her hole that she thinks it must have been specially designed for her? When all along, she changes to fit the hole. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 11:45pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/9 "2026-10-24T23:45:02Z")
I’d say it does. The most clear case for this is mathematics. The unreasonable folk simply remains unreasonable, and math continues to work as it should. The very fact that you agree there are these “unreasonable folk” is somewhat proof of reason’s universality, I suppose. Imagine we are all wrong about a mathematical idea and never discover it within our lifetimes. That is a coherent thought to have. The entire humanity, at once, can be “unreasonable folk”. Which would suggest that there is something, some kind of system our arguments ought to follow if they are to be “reasonable”. And that the system is not exhausted by what we do in actuality. ---
**Author:** ![Andy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/aeb1de/32.png) [@Andy](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Andy)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 11:48pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/10 "2026-10-24T23:48:44Z")
> [@Puzzled](#): > > I would want to say that something “reason-like” exists for the universe itself independent of us. But I don’t know how to make that argument, or describe what exactly it would be. I’m just an upstart here so don’t mistake me for some kind of authority in your unfamiliarity with this platform. What I see in your question has in my mind a similarity with what Eugene Wigner was pointing out in his “Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.” There is orderliness in the cosmos (IIRC even the word ‘cosmos’ itself is the opposite of the word ‘chaos’). Without orderliness we wouldn’t be here to recognize it, and to “connect dots” (as it were) in a manner conducive to survival and reproduction. Thanks for posting the question – I’ll be following the discussion. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 24, 2026, 11:52pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/11 "2026-10-24T23:52:10Z")
I had heard of it but I haven’t actually read it still. Thank you, I’ll check it out. It seems directly relevant from what you say. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:03am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/12 "2026-10-25T00:03:29Z")
> [@Puzzled](#): > > math continues to work as it should. Or is what happens, that we choose the bits from mathematics that do what we want? We count hours with modular arithmetic, but not apples. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:14am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/13 "2026-10-25T00:14:35Z")
I don’t quite understand this. If you agree that there are bits of mathematics that consistently do things we agree upon - that is mathematics at work, no? How we apply math is a different question to whether math itself works. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:17am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/14 "2026-10-25T00:17:58Z")
> [@Puzzled](#): > > How we apply math is a different question to whether math itself works. Just as there are innumerable sentences, and amongst them are some that set out ow things are - the cat is on the mat - there are innumerable patterns and some of them are useful. There’s nothing magical about maths, such that it can be found floating around the universe, or hiding in a Platonic heaven. It’s just patterns, and some of those patterns are useful. ---
**Author:** ![Johnnywas](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/22d042/32.png) [@Johnnywas](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Johnnywas)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:18am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/15 "2026-10-25T00:18:00Z")
I am not persuaded that reason exists independently of the mind Which means that it’s not objective. That does not make it arbitrary because we have similar minds. Nor does the fact that it is subjective invalidate the benefits that follow from subjecting decisions to consideration of others. The question in relation to Kant is whether Kant offers more than “one” way of looking at the world. Generally, I would rather base morality on what is good for people and specifically what is good for people who live in society. Aristotle is a better guide to that. ---
**Author:** ![Puzzled](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/p/ecb155/32.png) [@Puzzled](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Puzzled)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:24am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/16 "2026-10-25T00:24:17Z")
Well, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The reason I deferred to math was to defend this claim: “Reason is something we use, that somehow works universally.” against your comment: “Does it? There are unreasonable folk, unreasonable answers, unreasonable questions.” The “platonic heaven” criticism you have is a move I would make after you grant that premise of mine. And, in fact, I have never claimed “math” itself is magical. I had made a similar comment on Reason and how it is sui generis among human faculties. My point with raising math up was to showcase how there can be applications of reason that are universal, in that the “unreasonable folk” you speak of cannot really change the validity of a mathematical claim. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 12:32am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/17 "2026-10-25T00:32:26Z")
> [@Johnnywas](#): > > I am not persuaded that reason exists independently of the mind Good. Doesn’t the very idea strike you as - unreasonable? Like suggesting that democracy could exist independently of society, or money independently of an economy? > [@Johnnywas](#): > > Which means that it’s not objective. Why? ---
**Author:** ![Joshs](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/e5b9ba/32.png) [@Joshs](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Joshs)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 1:56am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/18 "2026-10-25T01:56:36Z")
> [@Andy](#): > > What I see in your question has in my mind a similarity with what Eugene Wigner was pointing out in his “Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.” There is orderliness in the cosmos (IIRC even the word ‘cosmos’ itself is the opposite of the word ‘chaos’). Without orderliness we wouldn’t be here to recognize it, and to “connect dots” (as it were) in a manner conducive to survival and reproduction. The assumption that there is orderliness in the cosmos and that mathematics reflects this order seems to me to imply a mathematical platonism or a transcendental realism, and the latter would be opposed by Kant’s transcendental idealism. He does not presuppose an ordered cosmos, independent of our participation in it, but a condition of possibility which rationally orders our perception of the cosmos. It is conceivable that another kind of creature might order the rationality of the cosmos according to an entirely other conditioned scheme of possibility. ---
**Author:** ![Patterner](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/patterner/32/192_2.png) [@Patterner](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Patterner)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 3:57am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/19 "2026-10-25T03:57:55Z")
> [@Joshs](#): > > It is conceivable that another kind of creature might order the rationality of the cosmos according to an entirely other conditioned scheme of possibility. While that may be true, I don’t think it’s conceivable that any entirely other conditioned scheme of possibility could invalidate mathematics. ---
**Author:** ![Andy](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/aeb1de/32.png) [@Andy](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Andy)\ **Post date:** [October 25, 2026, 7:44am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756/20 "2026-10-25T07:44:40Z")
> [@Joshs](#): > > The assumption that there is orderliness in the cosmos and that mathematics reflects this order seems to me to imply a mathematical platonism or a transcendental realism, and the latter would be opposed by Kant’s transcendental idealism. He does not presuppose an ordered cosmos, independent of our participation in it, but a condition of possibility which rationally orders our perception of the cosmos. It is conceivable that another kind of creature might order the rationality of the cosmos according to an entirely other conditioned scheme of possibility. Thanks Josh. I’m not a Kant scholar so I may be misinterpreting some of what you say here, but it sounds to me like Kant insists on finding a ground for the structure that appears to inhere in the “web of being,” and he implicates a transcendental subject that is not itself a member of that web – i.e. structure is not a characteristic of the web but is imposed by this putative transcendental subject. Isn’t this a kind of “half reification” of the subject? What I’m getting at is that if we were to go the whole hog and relinquish our insistence on a ground altogether, then we lose the distinction between “inside the web” and “outside the web.” The knowing subject and the known world each arise dependently on other things, with nothing having a fixed identity of its own (no “things in themselves”). [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/do-truths-about-reason-exist-somehow-independently-of-us/3756.md?page=2)