The question of whether the ends can justify the means has been debated by philosophers for centuries. Imagine a situation where manipulating people or concealing the truth could realistically prevent a catastrophe and save many lives. Would those actions become morally acceptable because of their consequences, or would they remain fundamentally wrong regardless of the outcome? I’m interested in reading different philosophical perspectives on this dilemma, whether they come from utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, or any other ethical framework.
If this is for an essay you’re meant to be handing in, you must have already reached some tentative conclusions? 
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It depends on whether I agree with the particulars (right) or disagree (wrong).
I’ll leave this paragraph from Alasdair MacIntyre’s “Truthfulness and lies: what can we learn from Kant?” (1995, 2006) and the suggestion, from the very same paper, that lies can be rejected a) as attacks on trust (i.e. as deceptions) and b) as attacks on truth. A categorical duty to truth does not disallow all forms of deceit:
“When in 1794 Kant was required by King Friedrich Wilhelm II, shortly
before the latter’s death, to refrain from any distortion or depreciation of Christianity, he knew that if he made public anything further of his thoughts on religion, as he had hoped to do, he would be held guilty of just such distortion or depreciation, perhaps with baneful consequences. He therefore responded by making a declaration “as your Majesty’s faithful subject, that I shall in future completely desist from all public lectures or essays concerning religion, be it natural or revealed.” The Prussian censors and, if it was reported to him, the king himself would have understood Kant to be saying that he would never so publish. But that is not of course what Kant had in fact declared. As he later pointed out, his pledge to desist was made only “as your Majesty’s faithful subject,” a status that Kant would lose when this particular king died. “This phrase,” wrote Kant in recounting the story (in the preface to The Quarrel between the Faculties) after the king’s death in 1797, “. . . was chosen by me most carefully, so that I should not be deprived of my freedom . . . forever, but only so long as His Majesty was alive” and Kant knew that the death of Friedrich Wilhelm II was expected imminently. So Kant succeeded in misleading the Prussian censors without lying, something that he thought it morally important to do.”
A case where a leader killed two to save four is fine, while the family of those two will think its wrong and those four family will think its right. if i Decieving public to save more people and less death its fine.
Neo aristotleans such as Foot and others in the tradition tend to think that our behaviour is governed by evolution, learned behaviour and habit. By cultivating life choices we become better at making choices that support flourishing. Flourishing as rational and social creatures. So although we cannot answer the question is deception moral for all circumstances we can by cultivating virtue become better people. Honesty is often seen as a foundation of virtue as it underpins communication but that does not alter the view that moral choices are contingent.
When we realize we’ve been lied to to save our life, do we then need to be saved from our ideas about right and wrong ?
It seems to me truth is as evasive and elusive as morality and ethinks, albeit they have merit, it appears we base much of morality on feeling.
Should we be concerned with a lie that saves our life, or the lie that saves us from the life we live.
Who decides what is lie or what is true ? My cat lies too, as a bit of true humour. When he wants to go into the orchard where it’s dangerous and I block him, he pretends to eat grass and angrily and viciously. 
Yes, in certain situations the ends justify the means. The ambulance can justifiably interrupt traffic and violate speed limit during an emergency but not if it results in death of other motorists.
It’s difficult to build a straight structure on a crooked foundation. We can never build moral principles worthy of humanity on lies.
Well morally acceptable is a perspective. Morals themselves are a perspective. What seems right to one individual may seem wrong to another. We assume collective ethics, but I celebrate personal ethics as in what each individual truly believes in for themselves. In this case, for the ends to justify the means is entirely up to the individual and what they believe in. Sometimes someone does something wrong and sees it as a god send years later down the line. There was a story of a man in japan who “wasted” the towns resources to build a dam. At the time it made no sense and the villagers were outraged. About 2/3 years later a tsunami came and the dam that was a “waste” ended up saving the town. If the tsunami never came it could still be seen as a waste. But since the tsunami came that man is revered as a savior. Under one condition his actions are unacceptable, and under another they are. I think ones individual perspective determines right and wrong for them.
How helpful is that lens? Does this apply to pederasty and genocide too? Isn’t the point of morality that it’s a communal matter and a way to determine how we ought to live with each other to promote flourishing?
Whence the notion that “deception” is somehow evil? Is a poker player’s bluff wicked? How about Magic Johnson’s “look away” passes or Leo Messi’s deceptive ball fakes?
“Show me a man who don’t lie, and I’ll show you a man who ain’t got much to say,” said Mark Twain. Why shouldn’t we embellish stories to entertain our fellows? I’ve always thought that the kid in “To Think That I Saw it on Mulberry Street” (Dr. Seuss’ first book, now cancelled) should have entertained his father with his fanciful stories, instead of “a plain horse and wagon”.
Of course perjury or bearing false witness is dishonorable – but many forms of deception are not.