In this OP I build a functional definition of distributive justice via an analysis of distribution of opportunities. I do this in terms of continuous freedoms and the ability to act on one’s desires. What makes my analysis unique is that I employ the theory of “value-specificity”, as I have termed it, in service of that analysis. Value-specificity allows us to logically connect identity to outcome, and, given a watertight definition of justice, should further allow us to develop a model for developing just criteria for determining which freedoms and permitted actions linked to identity are expressions of justice. That is, a model of distributive justice that acknowledges the practical import of identity is sought.
First, I explain some concepts:
The application of justice can be viewed to be based upon what I have come to term “valuations”. “Values” in this post can best be thought of as meaning-laden “measures” associated with a person’s identity that can be referenced against a group of internally hierarchical, or at least graded, categories to determine whether or not a given criterion applies to the person being considered—specifically with regards to criteria dictating the applicability of justice or just treatment. Thus, these measures, although of ambiguous dimensionality, correspond with any theoretical connections between justice and identity when those connections determine the applicability of justice. That is, justice is value-specific. There are, of course, many different valuations that could be irrelevant at any given point in time and some that are perhaps rarely relevant at all—but they could hypothetically become relevant if they were to have the correct sort of meaning. Arbitrary valuations (which might reasonably be considered to be the result of unjust criteria), are of particular importance because they give rise to dispensable forms of inequity.
Justice, although linked to tangible, discrete outcomes, is a deep, continuous project; hence, justice is something that is actively maintained, and the more visible outcomes linked to it do not always give a full account of what is actually happening; there must be an element of continuity over time—which will henceforth be specified as a weak condition necessary for evaluating the existence of justice—in the relationship between the freedoms one enjoys and one’s material conditions and also the traits associated with valuation affecting applicability of policy, one’s socioeconomic status, etc. to control for factors that might not be too easily seen. Clearly, there could be, on a descriptive level, many interrelated elements at play here, and I intend to bypass most of the potential entanglements via a general application of the idea of value-specificity over time.
There is then the part of justice that is more easily interpreted: the ability to act as one desires as is, or should be, allowed by one’s material circumstances or any other measure that is a function of a valuation such that one is not prevented from acting by arbitrary valuations. I take this sentence to mean two things: it means, in a narrow sense, that one should be able to act in accordance with one’s desires as a function of what one already materially has or could have, and, more generally, that one should be able to do what a relatively privileged person would be able to do in any given scenario (perhaps with the material resources). When I write “relatively privileged person”, I mean a hypothetical person possessing a valuation that would permit them to do what another person with a different arbitrary valuation could not do—it is not intended to indicate a general state of privilege.
If a justification for the previous two conditions is needed, consider the case of segregation. If one were to have the resources to move into a particularly “nice” neighborhood but is barred from doing so because it is “whites only”, or perhaps more euphemistically “high class”, then that would be a clear violation of both of the conditions: not only does one have the money to buy a home in the neighborhood, but one is also being barred from doing so via an arbitrary (racially motivated) valuation. That is, one is affected by an unjust criterion. Obviously, that is precisely the kind of thing we don’t want to happen; furthermore, I contend that justice exists in seeking and implementing just criteria to the end of reducing such injustice.
Thus, much of the OP can be distilled into three tidy, formal conditions that together are hopefully necessary and sufficient for determining both whether one is experiencing a state in which one is experiencing justice of opportunity and also what such a state would look like:
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Existence of continuity of freedoms.
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Parity in relative worth and applicability of resources in any given scenario.
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Movement towards, or actual parity in, valuations or criteria that allows one to act in ways unconstrained by unjust criteria, including parity in the valuations that allow opportunities to use material or other types of resources.
I now attempt to create a formal, temporal definition of what constitutes justice:
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If a subset A of a person’s total freedoms and corresponding permitted actions contains freedoms with corresponding permitted actions, that are, as a function of a number of external factors—including those resulting from external valuations—continuous over time \Delta t, we can say that the person is experiencing weak justice across the subset of freedoms being considered over \Delta t.
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If a person experiences weak justice across the subset of total freedoms being considered over time \Delta t, and they are able to take a subset B of subset C of the actions in A available to them that they desire to take as should be allowed by their material circumstances or any other measure that is a function of valuations over \Delta t such that no actions in C except perhaps those in C -B are prevented by arbitrary valuations, they must be experiencing justice across the actions in B taken over \Delta t.
This definition can be applied to determine just criteria for judging how one’s identity should relate to one’s freedoms and ability to act as one desires. Starting with the set of actions C selected from A: if one has the material or other types of resources to take an action in C allowed by one’s freedoms, but an arbitrary valuation is preventing one from taking it, then we know that one is experiencing an injustice—the action, on the basis of the arbitrary valuation, is not in B—and that said action, which must definitionally be in C - B, should actually be allowed under certain circumstances, i.e. the criterion dictating that this action be prevented over \Delta t is unjust and thus ought to be altered to allow the action given the freedoms in effect over \Delta t. This should foster the creation of just criteria. Otherwise, the action is simply an element of B—with the exception of actions prevented by just criteria: it is paramount to note that the definition does not preclude certain actions from being prevented from being taken due to a variety of non-arbitrary concerns: since many freedoms are contingent and I am merely stipulating continuity, even if one were to have a right to take an action in the weak sense at some point in time, many things could justifiably prevent one from taking such an action—including measures that are functions of non-arbitrary valuations and just criteria.
As has may have been noted by the reader, this model would best be applied from a starting point in which everyone is bound by some common, baseline set of principles and fundamental freedoms—even if those principles and freedoms are not themselves sufficient for attaining a complete, coherent model of justice. It is my belief, however, that if such principles and freedoms were to exist, and the definition in this OP were to be applied assiduously, everything would eventually pan out, and we would get something close to a rigorously justified egalitarianism.
Thanks for reading.