The logical impossibility of Direct Realism because of the nature of the causal chain from the world to the mind
The Direct Realist (DR) agrees that there is a causal chain between something in the world and our perception of it, but argue that there is a difference between how we see, Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) and what we see, Semantic Direct Realism (SDR).
The SDR justifies knowledge about the external world as immediate awareness of the external world, not any immediate awareness of any intermediary between the external world and perception of it in the mind.
The SDR attempts to solve the problems for DR associated with the causal chain from object to perception using disjunctivism (a veridical perception and an illusion or hallucination are different types of mental states), relational properties (even though a square table may look rectangular, the object does not change but its relation to the observer does) and common sense (the problem with IR is its conclusion that the world as we know it does not exist).
The problem for DR with the causal chain is the nature of the connection between effect and cause, between a subsequent link in the causal chain and an immediately prior link in the causal chain.
Hume wrote that we cannot directly observe any necessary logical connection between cause and effect, but can only observe a āconstant conjunctionā between cause and effect. DR depends on a necessary logical connection between cause and effect in order to directly know the object in the world.
Kant wrote that causality is not something we learn from the world, but is an inherent category within humans that we need in order to be able to understand what we observe. Humans may know without doubt that each effect must have a cause, thereby negating Humeās problem, but this is not the same as knowing from an effect the cause.
Spinoza wrote that, as a conclusion in mathematics logically follows from its premises, an effect logically follows from its cause. However, this relationship is one-directional, from cause to effect, not from effect to cause.
Within the causal chain, which the DR accepts as real, each effect (each subsequent link in the chain) may have more than one cause (each immediately prior link in the chain).
It logically follows that one perception in the mind may have multiple possible causes in the world. This means that SDR cannot ignore the causal chain as an irrelevant intermediary between the external world and the perception of it in the mind, and therefore must take into account the causal chain in any understanding of our perception of the world .
As soon as the causal chain is taken into account in any theory of perception, where one effect may have multiple possible causes, the position of the DR is shown to be logically inviable, if we are to have any direct knowledge of what is in the external world.