Not at all. We start with the naive view of perception, as described by Martin 2004:
On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it… Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.
The important points to take from this are:
P1. If I have direct perception of an object then that object is a constituent of the experience
P2. If an object is a constituent of the experience then that object exists
P3. That an object exists and is causally responsible for the experience does not entail that it is a constituent of the experience
I then consider this thought experiment:
P4. An apple is placed 10m in front of me
P5. The light it reflects travels at 1m/s
P6. The apple is disintegrated after 5 seconds
C1. Therefore, I see an apple for 5 seconds starting 5 seconds after the apple has been disintegrated
C2. Therefore, the apple does not exist during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple
C3. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple
C4. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple
P7. If the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 1m/s then it is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 299,792,458 m/s
C5. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 299,792,458 m/s
C6. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 299,792,458 m/s
At no point have I defined experience in such a way that naive realism is false by definition. Instead, I have taken the naive realist definition of direct perceptual experience and shown that it does not obtain.