Clarifying the Concepts of Knowledge Continued

[Amity]

@Sam26

When I claim that justification is concerned with whether a belief is connected to truth in the right way, I’m not saying that there’s only one method or one philosophical procedure. I simply mean that not every connection between belief and truth is enough for knowledge claims.

Yes, I understand that there is not only one method or theory in epistemology. It’s a complicated network:
Epistemology - Wikipedia

I found this outline helpful. An overview of core topics with links to e.g. types and features of justification, belief, truth (helpful for beginners):

Outline of epistemology - Wikipedia

It shows separate branches of knowledge with a wide scope and spectrum of intersecting themes.

You can scroll down and click on topics like ‘Truth’ and ‘Justification’. A fairly easy, informative read which can be taken slowly and carefully.

An established philosophy site can require more effort e.g. Understanding (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

@Sam26

Of course many of these concepts are problematic, which is precisely why they need clarification, especially in epistemology. So, I think you’re overstating the problem.

Yes, the complexity of the subject is clear. However, I am not certain that a forum discussion, like this, would eliminate the inherent and interesting problems.

It is simply another theory which seems to be included in your book. See post 40/65 in Clarifying the Concepts of Knowledge - Metaphysics & Epistemology - The Philosophy Forum

I don’t wish to get into the complications of your argument. It is supposed to be a clarification of the concepts of knowledge. I will leave it here, for now.

[Amity]

Returning to clarify our previous discussion about the hiding of your religious position.

You denied being religious and asked what I meant. I stated clearly that that you appeared to hold an ideological or spiritually-oriented set of beliefs. As per your NDE book.

You gave your different interpretation of ‘religious’:

‘I don’t presently adhere to a religion, religious doctrine, church authority, or institutional religious practice…
Investigating NDE testimony isn’t the same as holding religious doctrine. The book is concerned with testimony, evidence, justification, and knowledge.’

I didn’t say that investigating NDE is to hold a religious doctrine. However, belief in NDEs is spiritually oriented. This can shift a person away from traditional religious beliefs towards a personal spirituality.

You concluded:
‘I’ll put the distinction clearly. If by religious you mean presently committed to a religion, then I’m not religious. If you mean having once been religious, having studied at a Christian college, or being interested in questions about consciousness, then that’s a different use of the word.’

I had already told you what I meant by ‘religious’.

It was not about you being ‘committed to a religion’ or any interest in ‘consciousness’.

So, to review this:

@Sam26

Because someone thinks consciousness is base reality doesn’t make them religious. This is an example of people not paying adequate attention to arguments.

This probably explains some of your sarcasm.

My reply:

If directed at me, this speaks more about you and your rhetorical skills. Your mis-reading and misrepresentation is evidence of untruth.

So what?
For me, this indicates a biased unreliability. But I could be wrong…

It should be clear that it is you who is either not listening closely (‘paying adequate attention’) or deliberately presenting false accusations.

It seems to me that this discussion is a way to build the blocks of any argument. To support a claim or conclusion. Fair enough.

The emphasis on the use of concepts and words is important.

The author assertively sets out their own definitions or understandings (as per the ‘religious’ case) and is generally dismissive or does not always care to recognise any other. It is an argument already ‘won’ by them.

It seems to build toward knowledge as justified true belief. It seems to assume what it is trying to define or defend.

[Jay]

@Sam26

So, understanding fits between mere belief (opinion) and genuine justification. Understanding demonstrates the difference between merely saying the words and grasping their use. Saying the correct words doesn’t mean you understand what you’re saying, and if you don’t understand, then it’s not knowledge.

Circling back to this: I thought you made a strong case for “JTB+U” in your earlier thread. Reading the version here, I found myself wondering whether the emphasis on saying is necessary. Isn’t it equally true that a person who thinks the correct words may not understand what they’re thinking?

This is potentially significant because the real issue may not be about acts of assertion or communication, but rather about forming propositions, which we can do mentally. Granted, there would be no demonstration of understanding, or the lack thereof, in such a case, but there is some kind of self-awareness. I’ve certainly had the experience of mulling over a series of propositions in my mind, looking at whatever argument they seem to make to justify their truth, pondering the terms and relations involved . . . and then, if I’m honest, admitting that I don’t yet understand. I haven’t exactly “demonstrated” this to myself – that would be an odd way of putting it – but something similar. Revealing to myself? And of course later on, if I stick with it, the exact same series of propositions, with the exact same justifications, may come clear to me, at which point I understand, and hence can claim knowledge.

[Sam26]

I agree that the issue is more than just saying, i.e., a person can think using the correct language and still not understand.

However, I’m inclined to resist pushing the issue inward for reasons that Wittgenstein pointed out in his writings. It’s not that we’re denying the internal, which we’re all too familiar with (e.g., the internal feeling of clarity), it’s that understanding isn’t established internally, no more than meaning is established internally. Understanding must come out in practice, viz., using the concepts, applying concepts, recognizing mistakes, etc. If it’s not brought out in practice, then we don’t have a clear basis for saying someone understands.

So, what I’m after isn’t between saying and thinking. It’s between simply having the right words, whether spoken or thought, and being able to use them in practice.

[Jay]

@Sam26

It’s not that we’re denying the internal, which we’re all too familiar with (e.g., the internal feeling of clarity), it’s that understanding isn’t established internally, no more than meaning is established internally. Understanding must come out in practice, viz., using the concepts, applying concepts, recognizing mistakes, etc. If it’s not brought out in practice, then we don’t have a clear basis for saying someone understands.

There’s a lot packed in here. Taking it slowly:

By “established” do you mean established to oneself, or to other people? It looks like you want “established” to refer to a public process, something I couldn’t do on my own. But why?

“Understanding must come out [or be brought out] in practice” seems here to mean that there are public practices which demonstrate understanding. True. But then you say that, if this doesn’t happen, “we don’t have a clear basis for saying that someone understands.” Does this also mean that I would not have a clear basis for saying that I don’t understand? I would challenge that. Everything on the list of how one demonstrates understanding – using concepts, applying concepts, recognizing mistakes – can and does happen internally, not always but often.

I don’t question the insight that this entire framework of concepts, justifications, etc., is a public one, which we learn as individuals and for which we cannot simply substitute something else. But having learned it, any particular application seems to me both individual and potentially internal. And again, it’s not about a feeling of clarity – that would be a psychological observation. It’s about actually being clear, actually understanding. This, I maintain, is possible in the privacy of my own mind, even though you may not know about it.

[Sam26]

The key is between seeming to understand and understanding, which is similar to saying to oneself, “I know,’ as an expression of a conviction, and objectively knowing in the epistemic sense.

The parallel between understanding and knowledge is useful here. Saying “I know” inwardly doesn’t establish that I know. No inner proclamation can establish knowing in the epistemic sense (JTB), and no amount of inner reflection by itself can establish that. It must be established in the public arena, viz., being true, justified and not defeated by relevant objections. My feeling of certainty doesn’t establish anything epistemically.

Understanding works similarly. My inner expression “Now I understand,” expresses my inner application that something seems clear, but understanding isn’t established by some inner application of the concepts. It necessarily must answer to public standards. I’m not a standard unto myself.

When I say understanding must be established publicly, I don’t mean that someone must be present. I mean the standards are public. Once the standards are learned, then I’m able to apply them privately. But, again, private application doesn’t create its own standard, that’s the important point. It’s also the thing that always seems to get lost when people are trying to understand the use of these concepts.

[Jay]

@Sam26

When I say understanding must be established publicly, I don’t mean that someone must be present. I mean the standards are public. Once the standards are learned, then I’m able to apply them privately.

Oh, OK, that’s fine then. We’re saying the same thing. You mean “established” the way we might say a government is “established” – it’s been done once, and we don’t keep doing it every time we vote.

@Sam26

But, again, private application doesn’t create its own standard, that’s the important point. It’s also the thing that always seems to get lost when people are trying to understand the use of these concepts.

Right, that’s what I was referring to when I said that “we cannot simply substitute something else” for the public standards.

All this being true, if we look again at the use of “establish” in a sentence like “Saying ‘I know’ inwardly doesn’t establish that I know,” we can see why it’s ambiguous. On the one hand, of course my mere proclamation, whether to myself or to others, can’t establish knowledge. But on the other hand, once the grounds for knowledge – JTB+U, perhaps – have been established publicly, I don’t need anyone else to witness whether I’ve satisfied those grounds in some particular instance. Not that it isn’t a good idea, in complex cases!

[Sam26]

I agree. I think we’re very close, but let me add one further nuance. It’s true that another person doesn’t have to be present to witness every private application of a concept, idea, or argument, but the application is still governed by public standards. Those standards are never private. So when I apply criteria inwardly, the correctness of the application is never settled by the private act alone. The standards are always public in origin and public in principle.

[j_j]

@Sam26

If you collapse truth into justification, then you lose an important distinction, viz., the difference between a claim being correct and our being entitled to claim it’s correct.

As I see it, it’s not about collapsing truth and justification. It’s a questioning of whether “P is true” is plausibly reducible to P. Given that assertions are made by assertors, “P” is plausibly expanded to “I believe that P.”

Is “P is true” plausibly translated as “I believe that P” ? And the reverse ?

In short it’s not obvious that the “concept of truth” is adding anything to an account that might just work with belief. Knowledge can then be understood as warranted belief that is also my belief. But even this warrantedness is a matter of personal belief. So we might say that "I "call “knowledge” those beliefs that “I” judge to be warranted and which I also share.

[Sam26]

I think it’s incorrect, to say the least, to think P is plausibly expanded into “I believe that P.” If I say, “The book is on the table,” then the statement is about the book and the table, but that’s not the same as “I believe the book is on the table.” Facts aren’t reducible to what “I believe,” which is merely my state of mind. You may believe something false, but that doesn’t make the belief true or factual.

You can’t reduce knowledge to “beliefs that you judge to be warranted.” It makes knowledge too subjective. Being warranted isn’t the same as thinking you’re warranted. Facts are what matter, not what you think the facts are. Truth is about whether you get the facts right; belief is about whether you take the claim to be true; justification is about whether you’re entitled to believe it; and knowledge requires the belief to be true, properly justified, understood, and not defeated by relevant objections.

[Jay]

@Sam26

So when I apply criteria inwardly, the correctness of the application is never settled by the private act alone. The standards are always public in origin and public in principle.

Yes. But this is equally the case for applying criteria outwardly. Such a public act is no more dispositive than the private act. We still need the public standards in order to determine correctness.

I understand why you want to be very careful about the potential hazards of “private” acts. But again, I think once we disambiguate, the hazards disappear. My thought “Therefore P” is private in one sense – it’s mine, no one else has it or can know about it – and public in another – I couldn’t have the concepts of “therefore” and “P” (whatever P may be in this case) without the public standards and criteria.

[Sam26]

@Jay

Yes. But this is equally the case for applying criteria outwardly. Such a public act is no more dispositive than the private act. We still need the public standards in order to determine correctness.

I understand why you want to be very careful about the potential hazards of “private” acts. But again, I think once we disambiguate, the hazards disappear. My thought “Therefore P” is private in one sense – it’s mine, no one else has it or can know about it – and public in another – I couldn’t have the concepts of “therefore” and “P” (whatever P may be in this case) without the public standards and criteria.

I don’t agree that a public act is “no more dispositive” than a private act. That makes the two cases too symmetrical, and they’re not. Disambiguation helps, but it doesn’t make the problem disappear, especially if we still treat private application as equivalent or even close to equivalent to public assessment.

Take “Therefore P.” The mental occurrence may be private in the sense that I’m the one thinking it. I’ve already granted that. But the force of “therefore” isn’t private. The conclusion has force only because it belongs to public standards of inference, implication, validity, and justification. If “therefore P” is correct, it isn’t correct because of any inward thinking. It’s correct because the conclusion follows according to standards that aren’t privately mine.

Part of the problem or much of the problem is confusing two senses of “I know.”

“I know” as a conviction

“I know I’m right.”

“I know what I meant.”

“I know I understand this.”

Here, know is functioning like subjective certainty, viz., “I feel sure,” “I’m confident,” or “I’m convinced.”

But then there’s:

“I know” in the epistemic sense, i.e., it’s properly justified, understood, and not defeated by relevant objections. This use isn’t private. It has an objective standing.

Not having a good understanding between these two uses causes more confusion than people realize.

[Jay]

@Sam26

Take “Therefore P.” The mental occurrence may be private in the sense that I’m the one thinking it. I’ve already granted that. But the force of “therefore” isn’t private. The conclusion has force only because it belongs to public standards of inference, implication, validity, and justification. If “therefore P” is correct, it isn’t correct because of any inward thinking. It’s correct because the conclusion follows according to standards that aren’t privately mine.

That’s right. But I’m not seeing how saying “Therefore P” in public helps us any more than thinking it. That’s the “public act” I’m referring to. What happens next, in either the public (saying) or the private (thinking) case, is just as you describe it. This disjunction, as you point out, isn’t the same as “public assessment” vs. “private application,” and that’s what I was trying to disambiguate. So I still think we’re agreeing.

@Sam26

Part of the problem or much of the problem is confusing two senses of “I know.” . . . Not having a good understanding between these two uses causes more confusion that people realize.

Yes, for sure. The first use is what I’d call a psychological, or possibly phenomenological, observation. But I don’t think that’s in play here. I’ve been speaking entirely in the epistemic sense of “know,” claiming that my warrant for that kind of knowing can be determined by thinking about it, privately. But as we’re both saying, epistemic knowing can only get off the ground, whether in thought or in speech, by adopting the proper public justifications; as you say, it has objective standing. I can determine whether my alleged knowledge meets this objective standard by thinking privately about it . . . so “subjectively,” but only in that sense. I cannot “think privately about it” in the sense of adopting private criteria. We both agree there is no private language and no private scheme of justification.