# Can morality be objective? **URL:** \ **Category:** Ethics\ **Created:** [September 29, 2026, 5:52am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317 "2026-09-29T05:52:24Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 4
**Author:** ![Kit](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/k/9fc29f/32.png) [@Kit](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Kit)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2026, 7:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/61 "2026-10-04T19:55:51Z")
Morality is objective, it tells you how to act. Sets an Ideal. It demands conformity. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2026, 8:24pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/62 "2026-10-04T20:24:49Z")
> [@j\_j](#): > > Nietzsche allows himself to see that life “is” exploitation. Of course life involves exploitation. It also involves collaboration. While he might have moved beyond good and evil, he still went to the baker to get bread, and the whore house to get laid. It’s those interactions that are the stuff of ethics. There is nobility in a good crust, and a good hand job. Self-sufficiency is an illusion. Ethics isn’t about the grand narrative so much as the grit and grime, the spasm of passing a small quantity of fluid, the ordinary dignity of human contact. The _Übermensch_ as parasite. ---
**Author:** ![gertie](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/b4bc9f/32.png) [@gertie](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/gertie)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2026, 9:22pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/63 "2026-10-04T21:22:41Z")
I think you misunderstood me. As I said, I’m not making a case for objective morality, but I do believe that matering, or having a stake in the ‘Is’ state of affairs can provide a justification for Oughts which is universal to sentient beings. Suffering and flourishing by their nature are qualiative and matter to us. Pretty much everyone gets that. It’s true that humans are the only known species who can conceptualise moral agency and duties, but wolves and perhaps angler fish may have interests in the state of affairs regarding their flourishing and suffering, and if so ought to be treated commensurately under my framing of promoting wellbeing. Because it’s the mattering/having a stake in the factual state of affairs which makes sense of Oughts, makes them meaningful. Contrast this with a universe of mindless rocks and gases interacting, the notion of Right and Wrong or Oughts is meaningless in such a world. ---
**Author:** ![gertie](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/b4bc9f/32.png) [@gertie](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/gertie)\ **Post date:** [October 4, 2026, 10:29pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/64 "2026-10-04T22:29:20Z")
Your being conscious right now, for just a start, is to you _something’s being there_ isn’t it? Something being_right there_, _something given, something somehow or other existing_, also _something being had_, _immediate_, _open_, for _something else, something_ not _deduced from anything else_, _proximal rather than distal_, and so on and so on. I think H is talking about how you open your eyes to being in a particular world, and this is directly there for you with no ifs, buts , reasons or room for error about the ‘being’ experience. He’s getting down to the basics of ‘what it is like to be’ for a person, without contextualising, labelling, dividing, inferring and explaining. And it’s a fair place to start from. The way I get a handle on it is by going a bit further. I like Nagel’s description of conscious experience as ‘something it is like to be’’ eg gertie. And the way that manifests is as a discrete unified self with a first person pov, correlated with a specific body, moving through space and time in a world of couches, other people, gravity, brains, etc. A world which physically ‘contains’ me, as I experientially ‘contain’ it. And when I compare notes with other people, they report much the same, and together we build a model of a shared physical world which ‘contains’, us. And then process of doubting, inferring, explaining, etc begins, if you’re that sort of person… As I said, I’m not making a case for objective reality, but I do believe that matering, or having a stake in the ‘Is’ state of affairs can provide a justification for Oughts which is universal to sentient beings. Suffering and flourishing by their nature are qualiative and matter to us. It’s true that humans are the only known species who can conceptualise moral agency and duties, but wolves and perhaps angler fish may have interests in the state of affairs regarding their flourishing and suffering, and if so ought to be treated commensurately under my framing of promoting wellbeing. Because it’s the mattering/having a stake in the factual state of affairs which makes sense of Oughts, makes them meaningful. (Contrast this with a universe of mindless rocks and gases interacting, the notion of Right and Wrong or Oughts is meaningless in such a world). Where-as imo objective morality would need some mind-independant existence of its own which can be deduced and checked against. An omni perfect god could be such a contender which knows and is the source of the Good. But then you have the problem of establishing such a being exists, and how to understand it. ---
**Author:** ![Astorre](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/astorre/32/545_2.png) [@Astorre](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Astorre)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 5:54am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/65 "2026-10-05T05:54:59Z")
> [@gertie](#): > > Because it’s the mattering/having a stake in the factual state of affairs which makes sense of Oughts, makes them meaningful. That idea appeals to me. I expressed something similar earlier in the form of a formula: **Must = To Be + To Want** _(this is not yet a mathematical equation, but a starting metaphor)_ In this regard, I am left with just one fundamental question concerning this entire topic. You and I exist, and a stone exists—that is hard to dispute (regardless of what we know about it). But can the necessity to continue existing arise from living existence without the element of “wanting”? ---
**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 7:00am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/66 "2026-10-05T07:00:03Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > Of course life involves exploitation. It also involves collaboration. Sure. We are social animals. From a Dawkins POV, the actors are the genes and not the moist robots. Altruism is explained by genes, more or less, the the selfishness of genes partially manifests by altruism among the moist robots. > [@Banno](#): > > While he might have moved beyond good and evil, he still went to the baker to get bread, and the whore house to get laid. It’s those interactions that are the stuff of ethics. I don’t know what’s worse. Is it Nietzsche fanboyism or Nietzsche-phobia ? Most people who hate on Nietzsche seem to me to have never read the work. To hate a cartoon is just as alienated and silly as adoring a cartoon. The point is to get beyond thinking in cartoons. Nietzsche is pretty obviously a response to Schopenhauer. “Life is exploitation” is not some cheap political slogan. I’d even expect someone with a conscience and a drive toward self-honesty to face their complicity in the world’s evil. To be suspicious of their own motives. The guy who pretends that he alone “is truly logical” or “truly innocent” is… truly deluded. From the POV of course of someone a little more grounded. ---
**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 7:01am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/67 "2026-10-05T07:01:16Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > There is nobility in a good crust, and a good hand job. Self-sufficiency is an illusion. Ethics isn’t about the grand narrative so much as the grit and grime, the spasm of passing a small quantity of fluid, **the ordinary dignity of human contact.** > > The _Übermensch_ as parasite. I agree w/ you on the bolded part. But the philosopher in general is a parasite. This is not an anti-philosopher insult. It’s inspired by Schopenhauer. The philosopher ---- in the sense intended here — tries to “hack” the deathfuck wheel, identified with meme rather than gene. As that “terrible monster” Nietzsche might point out in his excellent remarks on asceticism and its relation to philosophy in _GoM._ But before that, this: > the actual work of man on himself during the longest period of the human race, his whole prehistoric work, finds its meaning, its great justification (in spite of all its innate hardness, despotism, stupidity, and idiocy) in this fact: man, with the help of the morality of customs and of social strait-waistcoats, was _made_ genuinely calculable. If, however, we place ourselves at the end of this colossal process, at the point where the tree finally matures its fruits, when society and its morality of custom finally bring to light that to which it was only the means, then do we find as the ripest fruit on its tree the _sovereign individual_, that resembles only himself, that has got loose from the morality of[Pg 64] custom, the autonomous “super-moral” individual (for “autonomous” and “moral” are mutually-exclusive terms),—in short, the man of the personal, long, and independent will, _competent to promise_, and we find in him a proud consciousness (vibrating in every fibre), of _what_ has been at last achieved and become vivified in him, a genuine consciousness of power and freedom, a feeling of human perfection in general. And this man who has grown to freedom, who is really _competent_ to promise, this lord of the _free_ will, this sovereign—how is it possible for him not to know how great is his superiority over everything incapable of binding itself by promises, or of being its own security, how great is the trust, the awe, the reverence that he awakes—he “deserves” all three—not to know that with this mastery over himself he is necessarily also given the mastery over circumstances, over nature, over all creatures with shorter wills, less reliable characters? The “free” man, the owner of a long unbreakable will, finds in this possession his _standard of value_: looking out from himself upon the others, he honours or he despises, and just as necessarily as he honours his peers, the strong and the reliable (those who can bind themselves by promises),—that is, every one who promises like a sovereign, with difficulty, rarely and slowly, who is sparing with his trusts but confers _honour_ by the very fact of trusting, who gives his word as something that can be relied on, because he knows himself strong enough to keep it even in the teeth of disasters, even in the “teeth of fate,”—so with equal necessity will he have the[Pg 65] heel of his foot ready for the lean and empty jackasses, who promise when they have no business to do so, and his rod of chastisement ready for the liar, who already breaks his word at the very minute when it is on his lips. The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of _responsibility_, the consciousness of this rare freedom, of this power over himself and over fate, has sunk right down to his innermost depths, and has become an instinct, a dominating instinct—what name will he give to it, to this dominating instinct, if he needs to have a word for it? But there is no doubt about it—the sovereign man calls it his _conscience_. Later in the same book: > Every animal, including la bête philosophe, strives instinctively after an _optimum_ of favourable conditions, under which he can let his whole strength have play, and achieves his maximum consciousness of power; with equal instinctiveness, and with a fine perceptive flair which is superior to any reason, every animal shudders mortally at every kind of disturbance and hindrance which obstructs or could obstruct his way to that optimum (it is not his way to happiness of which I am talking, but his way to power, to action, the most powerful action, and in point of fact in many cases his way to unhappiness). Similarly, the philosopher shudders mortally at _marriage_, together with all that could persuade him to it—marriage as a fatal hindrance on the way to the _optimum_. Up to the present what great philosophers have been married? Heracleitus, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Schopenhauer—they were not married, and, further, one cannot _imagine_ them as married. A married philosopher belongs to _comedy_, that is my rule; as for that exception of a Socrates—the malicious Socrates married himself, it seems, _ironice_, just to prove this _very_ rule. Every philosopher would say, as Buddha said, when the birth of a son was announced to him: “Râhoula has been born to me, a fetter has been forged for me” (Râhoula means here[Pg 136] “a little demon”); there must come an hour of reflection to every “free spirit” (granted that he has had previously an hour of thoughtlessness), just as one came once to the same Buddha: “Narrowly cramped,” he reflected, “is life in the house; it is a place of uncleanness; freedom is found in leaving the house.” Because he thought like this, he left the house. So many bridges to independence are shown in the ascetic idea], that the philosopher cannot refrain from exultation and clapping of hands when he hears the history of all those resolute ones, who on one day uttered a nay to all servitude and went into some _desert_; even granting that they were only strong asses, and the absolute opposite of strong minds. What, then, does the ascetic ideal mean in a philosopher? This is my answer—it will have been guessed long ago: when he sees this ideal the philosopher smiles because he sees therein an _optimum_ of the conditions of the highest and boldest intellectuality; he does not thereby deny “existence,” he rather affirms thereby _his_ existence and _only_ his existence, and this perhaps to the point of not being far off the blasphemous wish, _pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam!_ > > 1. > > These philosophers, you see, are by no means uncorrupted witnesses and judges of the _value_ of the ascetic ideal. They think _of themselves_ —what is the “saint” to them? They think of that which to them personally is most indispensable; of[Pg 137] freedom from compulsion, disturbance, noise: freedom from business, duties, cares; of clear head; of the dance, spring, and flight of thoughts; of good air—rare, clear, free, dry, as is the air on the heights, in which every animal creature becomes more intellectual and gains wings; they think of peace in every cellar; all the hounds neatly chained; no baying of enmity and uncouth rancour; no remorse of wounded ambition; quiet and submissive internal organs, busy as mills, but unnoticed; the heart alien, transcendent, future, posthumous—to summarise, they mean by the ascetic ideal the joyous asceticism of a deified and newly fledged animal, sweeping over life rather than resting. We know what are the three great catch-words of the ascetic ideal: poverty, humility, chastity; and now just look closely at the life of all the great fruitful inventive spirits—you will always find again and again these three qualities up to a certain extent. _Not_ for a minute, as is self-evident, as though, perchance, they were part of their virtues—what has this type of man to do with virtues?—but as the most essential and natural conditions of their _best_ existence, their _finest_ fruitfulness. In this connection it is quite possible that their predominant intellectualism had first to curb an unruly and irritable pride, or an insolent sensualism, or that it had all its work cut out to maintain its wish for the “desert” against perhaps an inclination to luxury and dilettantism, or similarly against an extravagant liberality of heart and hand. But their intellect did effect all this, simply because it was the _dominant_ instinct, which carried through its orders in the case[Pg 138] of all the other instincts. It effects it still; if it ceased to do so, it would simply not be dominant. But there is not one iota of “virtue” in all this. Further, the _desert_, of which I just spoke, in which the strong, independent, and well-equipped spirits retreat into their hermitage—oh, how different is it from the cultured classes’ dream of a desert! In certain cases, in fact, the cultured classes themselves are the desert. And it is certain that all the actors of the intellect would not endure this desert for a minute. It is nothing like romantic and Syrian enough for them, nothing like enough of a stage desert! Here as well there are plenty of asses, but at this point the resemblance ceases. But a desert nowadays is something like this—perhaps a deliberate obscurity; a getting-out-of the way of one’s self; a fear of noise, admiration, papers, influence; a little office, a daily task, something that hides rather than brings to light; sometimes associating with harmless, cheerful beasts and fowls, the sight of which refreshes; a mountain for company, but not a dead one, one with _eyes_ (that is, with lakes); in certain cases even a room in a crowded hotel where one can reckon on not being recognised, and on being able to talk with impunity to every one: here is the desert—oh, it is lonely enough, believe me! I grant that when Heracleitus retreated to the courts and cloisters of the colossal temple of Artemis, that “wilderness” was worthier; why do we _lack_ such temples? (perchance we do not lack them: I just think of my splendid study in the _Piazza di San Marco_, in spring, of course, and in the morning, between ten and twelve). But that which Heracleitus[Pg 139] shunned is still just what we too avoid nowadays: the noise and democratic babble of the Ephesians, their politics, their news from the “empire” (I mean, of course, Persia), their market-trade in "the things of to-day "—for there is one thing from which we philosophers especially need a rest—from the things of “to-day.” We honour the silent, the cold, the noble, the far, the past, everything, in fact, at the sight of which the soul is not bound to brace itself up and defend itself—something with which one can speak without _speaking aloud_. Just listen now to the tone a spirit has when it speaks; every spirit has its own tone and loves its own tone. That thing yonder, for instance, is bound to be an agitator, that is, a hollow head, a hollow mug: whatever may go into him, everything comes back from him dull and thick, heavy with the echo of the great void. That spirit yonder nearly always speaks hoarse: has he, perchance, _thought_ himself hoarse? It may be so—ask the physiologists—but he who thinks in _words_, thinks as a speaker and not as a thinker (it shows that he does not think of objects or think objectively, but only of his relations with objects—that, in point of fact, he only thinks of himself and his audience). This third one speaks aggressively, he comes too near our body, his breath blows on us—we shut our mouth involuntarily, although he speaks to us through a book: the tone of his style supplies the reason—he has no time, he has small faith in himself, he finds expression now or never. But a spirit who is sure of himself speaks softly; he seeks secrecy, he lets himself be awaited, A philosopher is recognised by the[Pg 140] fact that he shuns three brilliant and noisy things—fame, princes, and women: which is not to say that they do not come to him. He shuns every glaring light: therefore he shuns his time and its “daylight.” Therein he is as a shadow; the deeper sinks the sun, the greater grows the shadow. As for his humility, he endures, as he endures darkness, a certain dependence and obscurity: further, he is afraid of the shock of lightning, he shudders at the insecurity of a tree which is too isolated and too exposed, on which every storm vents its temper, every temper its storm. His “maternal” instinct, his secret love for that which grows in him, guides him into states where he is relieved from the necessity of taking care of _himself_, in the same way in which the “_mother_” instinct in woman has thoroughly maintained up to the present woman’s dependent position. After all, they demand little enough, do these philosophers, their favourite motto is, “He who possesses is possessed.” All this is _not_, as I must say again and again, to be attributed to a virtue, to a meritorious wish for moderation and simplicity; but because their supreme lord so demands of them, demands wisely and inexorably; their lord who is eager only for one thing, for which alone he musters, and for which alone he hoards everything—time, strength, love, interest. This kind of man likes not to be disturbed by enmity, he likes not to be disturbed by friendship, it is a type which forgets or despises easily. It strikes him as bad form to play the martyr, “to _suffer_ for truth”—he leaves all that to the ambitious and to the stage-heroes of the intellect, and to all those, in fact, who have time[Pg 141] enough for such luxuries (they themselves, the philosophers, have something _to do_ for truth). They make a sparing use of big words; they are said to be adverse to the word “truth” itself: it has a “high falutin’” ring. Finally, as far as the chastity of philosophers is concerned, the fruitfulness of this type of mind is manifestly in another sphere than that of children; perchance in some other sphere, too, they have the survival of their name, their little immortality (philosophers in ancient India would express themselves with still greater boldness: “Of what use is posterity to him whose soul is the world?”). In this attitude there is not a trace of chastity, by reason of any ascetic scruple or hatred of the flesh, any more than it is chastity for an athlete or a jockey to abstain from women; it is rather the will of the dominant instinct, at any rate, during the period of their advanced philosophic pregnancy. Every artist knows the harm done by sexual intercourse on occasions of great mental strain and preparation; as far as the strongest artists and those with the surest instincts are concerned, this is not necessarily a case of experience—hard experience—but it is simply their “maternal” instinct which, in order to benefit the growing work, disposes recklessly (beyond all its normal stocks and supplies) of the _vigour_ of its _animal_ life; the greater power then _absorbs_ the lesser. ---
**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 7:11am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/68 "2026-10-05T07:11:22Z")
> [@Astorre](#): > > But is my assertion above actually objective? (Let’s examine the premises, just as you like.) It might be, or it might not. It is enough for me to convince many people of this judgment, and it will become _intersubjective_. The greater their numbers, the more weight my position carries. That is precisely how it works with any ideology—communism, socialism, Nazism, or liberalism. I read “objective” as unbiased. In this sense, your assertion is yours. You are bias, you as you are way of approaching things. Same for me. Subjectivity **is** bias. It’s not just an assertion but a comportment. If that comportment catches on, it becomes something to worry about — from the outside. Little you or little me alone ? Just a fool with big ideas. But the big idea is a spark that might start a bonfire. As you say, it’s a numbers game. What I sometimes reflect on is that a “big idea” usually has to become relatively stupid and simple to catch on. Collective consciousness is a crate of cartoons. Mobs are like giants with serious brain damage. The commie theorist is “really on the side of the proles” who don’t know what the hell the theorist is talking about. But the “[progressive] studies” professor in “free” societies is also nonsense to the proles that **they** want to help. Skill at performing obscure theory is of course related to leisure and distance from menial labor, generally speaking. Veblen is great on this stuff. Basically I am pointing at a subgroup of theorists who are bound together in terms of their enacted feelings, even if not so much in terms of their theory. I see Stalin as the kind of person who can manipulate this theorist class from within, secretly contemptuous and cynical. Or perhaps **becoming** contemptuous and cynical. ( I can pick on Lenin too. His book on Mach is weak philosophy. ) This is an old idea. In _Animal Farm_, the clever pigs replace the ousted humans. ---
**Author:** ![Astorre](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/astorre/32/545_2.png) [@Astorre](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Astorre)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 8:00am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/69 "2026-10-05T08:00:36Z")
For everything good and against everything bad! That is really all you need to know to make the right choice. Incidentally, the 1936 Stalin Constitution enshrined something along these lines: “from each according to his abilities, to each according to his work.” This slogan reflects the communist ideal of production and the distribution of its output. According to Marxist theory, production should be based on members of society voluntarily applying their abilities. The fruits of such labor would be more than sufficient to freely satisfy everyone’s needs, eliminating the need for any kind of equivalent exchange—the foundation of a market economy—when distributing goods and services. Such a system would become possible thanks to the extremely high labor productivity achieved in an advanced communist society—specifically because the class of exploiters (owners of the means of production) would no longer be fleecing ordinary workers and peasants, simply because that class would no longer exist. That is essentially all the average person needs to know about communism. To the ordinary citizen, it seems fair: the bourgeois—who pockets the lion’s share of the profits—simply vanishes. Consequently, you live a more prosperous and happy life, free from oppression. How could you not believe it? All of this was later criticized. Yet, it worked. Perhaps it lacked flexibility. Communist philosophers spent their time arguing with one another—“Marx said this,” “No, he said that”—instead of properly developing the system, learning from mistakes, and making adjustments. But that is a digression. Now, imagine a scenario where it all collapses. It is like hypothetically imagining that, fifty years from now, the USA suddenly goes bankrupt and China becomes the world leader. An “inclusive” president of the future steps out before the people and says: “We were wrong. Our ideology is evil.” That is rather hard to imagine. I imagine it was just as difficult to envision the collapse of communism in the 1980s if you were a communist. ---
**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 8:23am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/70 "2026-10-05T08:23:53Z")
> [@Astorre](#): > > This slogan reflects the communist ideal of production and the distribution of its output. According to Marxist theory, production should be based on members of society voluntarily applying their abilities. The fruits of such labor would be more than sufficient to freely satisfy everyone’s needs, eliminating the need for any kind of equivalent exchange—the foundation of a market economy—when distributing goods and services. Such a system would become possible thanks to the extremely high labor productivity achieved in an advanced communist society—specifically because the class of exploiters (owners of the means of production) would no longer be fleecing ordinary workers and peasants, simply because that class would no longer exist. > > That is essentially all the average person needs to know about communism. To the ordinary citizen, it seems fair: the bourgeois—who pockets the lion’s share of the profits—simply vanishes. Consequently, you live a more prosperous and happy life, free from oppression. How could you not believe it? I recognize the expression, and I can still see the beauty in it. You might say that the family is generalized. The population becomes a family. Housework usually isn’t strictly quantified. We tend to be more fair with blood relatives. Family is “inside” posed as a unity against an “outside.” This “outside” is important. A communist war economy is perhaps even the most plausible kind, because the inside is glued together by its hatred for an external threat. One hears stories of great altruism among soldiers. Someone jumps on a grenade perhaps, without hesitation. For the self has been expanded to include the bodies of the rest of the squad. Of course the problem is that somebody controls the violence, and they tend to end up with the choicest living conditions. But we might imagine a ruling ideological class that lives ascetically, and then their “wealth” is pure power, pure status. Can the ideology overpower our genetic nepotism ? Perhaps Comrade Theory poisons Comrade Virtue’s coffee to court the widow. Comrade Theory is not so pure either, for he made sure that his sons were far from the front line. The “free society” (like the USA) is free-ish mostly in terms of what you can say. The serfs can grumble. “Economic punishment suffices.” The managerial class will just keep out the riff raff. So-and-so did a poopoo wrongthink in 1998, so so-and-so will maybe stock shelves. “Let the mob police _itself_ ! They hate the freedom of _others_. And it’s cost effective too !” In the US, the vibe is “managers” versus “owners.” The ideology of the top 20% versus the ideology of the top %1. Trump was something new, a bit like a Joker evolved to survive and challenge the regime of Batman. This was not a good thing, but it was predictable in retrospect. Like you can only stretch a rubber band so far before it snaps. Overuse of antibiotics, etc. Risky overgeneralization of course. The %1 appeals to the reactionary component of the unwashed. The 20% appeals to most of the rest. Red puppet boxing a blue puppet. The main thing is that the poor get poorer, that the great extraction continues. "Culture war is cost effective ! Let them eat themselves ! " Life is funny. And I’m no innocent victim. The pessimist is a curious parasite, re-etching a gallows humor gnosis graffiti via permuted pose thorn. > [@Astorre](#): > > Now, imagine a scenario where it all collapses. It is like hypothetically imagining that, fifty years from now, the USA suddenly goes bankrupt and China becomes the world leader. An “inclusive” president of the future steps out before the people and says: “We were wrong. Our ideology is evil.” That is rather hard to imagine. I imagine it was just as difficult to envision the collapse of communism in the 1980s if you were a communist. A president has to run for election, so yeah it’s hard to imagine. But we might imagine a “Return” or “Original Values.” Really I find a reactionary “religious” movement more plausible. Which is another kind of “communism.” At the structure level, we have “group identity” versus “atomic dissolution of group identity.” As Marx saw, capitalism is an acid that dissolves everything, leaving an sorry ocean of self-marketing product-bots. Toward a liquified gig-economy. Liquid labor goo. Except it costs too much to house and feed and school and cure these “pigs.” Robots obey, robots work 24/7 without pay. Robots can be made cheaper, are being made cheaper. “Don’t even need cannon fodder any more !” But presumably a technological artisan class. On the other hand, the oligarchs need witnesses, foils. I am only Rich and Powerful if others are Poor and Weak. Contrast effect. Mimetic desire. But the little meat pieces of this or that class are caught in a system that exceeds them, tangled in the gears of an incentive structure. And the poor person isn’t better and cleaner than the rich, is indeed probably less so in literal terms. Did you ever read Shaw ? I happened to read lots of G. B. Shaw in my 20s, sort of by chance. _Man and Superman_ is a great play. ---
**Author:** ![Astorre](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/astorre/32/545_2.png) [@Astorre](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Astorre)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 8:31am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/71 "2026-10-05T08:31:57Z")
> [@j\_j](#): > > Can the ideology overpower our genetic nepotism ? Perhaps Comrade Theory poisons Comrade Virtue’s coffee to court the widow. Comrade Theory is not so pure either, for he made sure that his sons were far from the front line. You may already know this, but it is worth noting that Comrade Stalin’s son actually fought at the front against the Nazis. He was taken prisoner. When Comrade Stalin was informed of this, he declared that there were no prisoners of war—only traitors. His dacha is located in a well-known spot and is nothing special. I mention all this not to whitewash the man, but to suggest that he was likely a committed idealist. > [@j\_j](#): > > But the little meat pieces of this or that class are caught in a system that exceeds them, tangled in the gears of an incentive structure. And the poor person isn’t better and cleaner than the rich, is indeed probably less so in literal terms. Did you ever read Shaw ? I happened to read lots of G. B. Shaw in my 20s, sort of by chance. _Man and Superman_ is a great play. No, I haven’t read it, but I’ve heard about it. Maybe someday… > [@j\_j](#): > > On the other hand, the oligarchs need witnesses I think that’s a brilliant idea. What if the witness simply stops caring? It would be interesting to see what happens. ---
**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 8:39am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/72 "2026-10-05T08:39:26Z")
> [@Astorre](#): > > You may already know this, but it is worth noting that Comrade Stalin’s son actually fought at the front against the Nazis. He was taken prisoner. When Comrade Stalin was informed of this, he declared that there were no prisoners of war—only traitors. His dacha is located in a well-known spot and is nothing special. I mention all this not to whitewash the man, but to suggest that he was likely a committed idealist. Interesting ! I am open to changing my understanding of the man. I’m not a hater. But a radical egoist can also transgress traditional family norms and newfangled ideological norms at the same time. Only “weak-willed losers” care about their children. I’m joking to make a point. > [@Astorre](#): > > I think that’s a brilliant idea. What if the witness simply stops caring? It would be interesting to see what happens. I think that’s only possible for a few freaks. Money and fame help with nabbing attractive mates and generating hardy and well-positioned offspring. Even the freaks ( philosophers and artists) end up contributing to the maintenance of the system. Their ideas are adopted, sometimes, 100 years later. I am laying the cynicism on a little thick here, but I am basically serious. If we mix our genes more intensely with technology, then who knows ? The system is perhaps moving toward a less predictable configuration. Note how birth rates fall in developed nations. What if a majority of men settle for porn bots ? Who knows how good this technology will get ? I’m old-ish, so not my thing, but the young aren’t constrained by the forgotten days of **my** youth. Women may design sperm cells for printing in the comfort of their own home. Or external wombs may become all the rage. Is South Korea the vanguard of capitalism ? Advent of neohumans ? Cosmetic surgery may become a right. Obesity a misdemeanor. Sort of joking there, because that’s the problem of the pure atomic happiness-maxxing agent. If you are curious (and are willing to endure subtitles: [![](https://img.youtube.com/vi/eSpofepRFaY/maxresdefault.jpg "G B SHAW Man and Superman Starring Peter O'Toole") ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eSpofepRFaY) ---
**Author:** ![FireOlogist](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/fireologist/32/597_2.png) [@FireOlogist](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/FireOlogist)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 6:11pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/73 "2026-10-05T18:11:15Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > ethical statements work by changing the world to match what we say, where descriptive statements work by changing what we say to match the world. Because these run in opposite directions, there’s no fit-preserving path from one to the other — the “switch” is a change in orientation, not a step in an argument. I think that sums up the “no moral facts” universe. Moral facts are square-circles; the notion “moral fact” misunderstands where facts are born and where morals are born. The “good” doesn’t spring forth from fact-world; the good springs forth from fact interpretation/evaluation world, and that originates in the subject, after they ascribe value. Without the subject, “goodness” isn’t born for moral application or any analysis. What is valued as good and bad doesn’t sit in the fact of the child who dies, or in the fact of the child who lives. The living child or the dead child become good “_within_ the community of practice and the discourse.” We can’t say “children are good and valuable” objectively or universally. Such statements don’t really make any sense. Does the above sound akin to a subjective grounding of ethical statements? @Astorre @j_j @AmadeusD @Wayfarer? … I still see one last opening for objective moral truths. I’m not trying to throw out the moving parts described above, nor the distinction of direction of fit where facts versus valuations come from. But in my experience of some generally bad things, and generally good moral judgment, I find it to be incomplete. We seem to be assuming that the subjective-side introduction of value introduces pure possibility. Any act could be good or bad, in the right context. We are assuming that, because things in world are neutral as to their goodness or badness, that the judgment of goodness or badness can always go either way (as it has often gone opposite ways in historical cultures). I’m asking, **even though we are subjects that evaluate and ascribe values, why must we assume that because value and goodness aren’t inherent in objective fact-world, our evaluations and goodness determinations aren’t directed to any extent by something inherent in subjectivity**? Basically, instead of finding the objectivity of “what is good” in the thing in the world, couldn’t we find it in objective features of all subjects, inside functioning subjectivity? Call this the structure of conscience - part of what it is to be a moral evaluator. The application of this would mean that, because of what all conscience (or subjective value-giving) is, no one in any context at any time, in any universe, who seeks to make a moral judgment could ever conclude that raping and murdering a child is good; if a community seeks to place a moral judgment on such an actor, if they are doing moral evaluation properly, they will conclude such an act is immoral. So objective good/bad isn’t drawn from the thing or act in the world, but it is produced within limits set by the structure of any/all subjects. If one is doing base-10 math properly, one has to conclude that 1+1=2. To quote the Who song _Bargain_, Townsend says “In life one and one don’t make two, one and one make one.” This has a romantic logic to it, as “we are one” has a logic to it - but not if you are doing proper math. In math, one and one don’t ever make one. Similarly, the rapist could say that raping a child is good, but to demonstrate that conclusion he would have to do psychology, or something other than morality. It is impossible for the rapist to demonstrate how rape is morally good. If doing morality, no good results from this act - not for the rapist who destroys his own community and trust, not for the child obviously, not for the community who grieves and fears… Rape and murder are just destructive of goodness. There is no context or POV in which raping a child is morally good, like there is no way to make 1+1=1. Any subject knows this. I’m not saying there are innate ideas. I’m saying visuals, light and reflective objects all come together, like sounds, ears and vibrations all come together, like human actions, human evaluations and good and badness all come together. I’ve basically used the Kantian model for mind (having a categorical structure that allows for our experience), but instead of mind, it is conscience, having a structure that directs our evaluation of what is good. Objective right and wrong have any more plausibility yet? ---
**Author:** ![AmadeusD](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/f9ae1b/32.png) [@AmadeusD](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/AmadeusD)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 6:51pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/74 "2026-10-05T18:51:27Z")
You may, but i’d have no answer. I didn’t say anything about correctness. You could certainly re-frame your question to be relevant to what I said, and I’d be more than happy to engage at that stage 🙂 > [@gertie](#): > > I think you misunderstood me. That’s possible, but even responding to this elucidation, it seems inescapable that you’re saying we need to just make one tough decision and we can roll on from there. Which seems to be true, but is not going to be hte same decision for everyone. So I’m now not quite clear as to what you’re trying to illustrate. It seems as if you’re saying that intuitive notions of suffering and flourishing are the objective basis for Oughts. I do not see how that could be the case. That something matters doesn’t objectify it. You say you’re not arguing for an objective morality - so please notice I’m responding to what you’ve said, rather than that claim. > [@gertie](#): > > And it’s a fair place to start from. Yes, but an arbitrary one (or, rather, as noted, chauvanistic). I’m not sure this is actually where we want to start. > [@gertie](#): > > And when I compare notes with other people Bingo. We compare notes. Again, I may well have misunderstood you, and may still be doing so but responding to these comments hasn’t really changed hte interpretation..I still see no Ought in this. You are describing variously how hte world _is_ and _what we do_. There’s no real connection between them in terms of establishing why someone might follow such a prescriptive system other than that they already intuit it to be correct. > [@FireOlogist](#): > > Such statements don’t really make any sense. That’s right. They make sense as an (in this case, pretty obvious) fact about how the world is. Not as a statement of _actual worth_. > [@FireOlogist](#): > > Any act could be good or bad, in the right context. _logically_. I’m unsure many, if any, would claim there’s actual scenarios in which, for instnace, the violent rape of a child, is acceptable. > [@FireOlogist](#): > > It is impossible for the rapist to demonstrate how rape is morally good. This assumes suffering is worth more than pleasure. That then becomes another pseudo-mathematical pursuit. There are true hedonists who would be balking at the framing of this act. There is obvious good for the rapist. > [@FireOlogist](#): > > There is no context or POV in which raping a child is morally good, like there is no way to make 1+1=1. Any subject knows this. This is patently false, particularly given child rape is often couched as morally correct in the contexts it is common in. > [@FireOlogist](#): > > I’ve basically used the Kantian model for mind (having a categorical structure that allows for our experience), but instead of mind, it is conscience, having a structure that directs our evaluation of what is good. But still, I very much like this conception. I’m unsure how it necessarily generates what we need here, but I really like thinking about it this way and it may explain why I have an intuition toward objective morals, and a knowledge (to the degree one has any) that there is no such thing. ---
**Author:** ![Astorre](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/astorre/32/545_2.png) [@Astorre](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Astorre)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 6:52pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/75 "2026-10-05T18:52:27Z")
> [@FireOlogist](#): > > Similarly, the rapist could say that raping a child is good, but to demonstrate that conclusion he would have to do psychology, or something other than morality. It is impossible for the rapist to demonstrate how rape is morally good It seems you have unjustifiably attributed “subjectivity” to me, whereas I was speaking about intersubjectivity. Let me give you a historical example. Just as you cannot simply excise words from a song, you cannot erase past events from history. They were known as the “Skoptsy”—followers of a mystical sect of “Spiritual Christians” who elevated the act of castration to the status of a God-pleasing deed. (More details here: [Скопцы — Википедия](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%86%D1%8B) ) They simply removed their genitals, viewing them as the source of lust. They sincerely desired to become purer. But tell me: what objective visual images, what light or reflective objects, what sounds or vibrations prompted them to do this? Do you know what happened to them? They died out. Because procreation requires genitals. Similarly, I believe that raping and murdering children is extremely detrimental to population reproduction. You know, if someone were to tell me that a society in the distant past practiced the rape and murder of children, I wouldn’t be surprised—neither by the fact that it occurred nor by how it ultimately ended. However, the question before us is philosophical. There is a philosophical discipline known as logic. Hume took it and demonstrated that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is” (I have written about this). That proof is compelling. Yet, the main philosophical question that has arisen for me in this discussion is this: is it possible to prove that the mere fact of life’s existence imposes an obligation to continue it? Moreover, I would add that this question arises specifically within a _substantialist_ ontology (whereas within a _dynamic_ ontology, such a question does not exist). And, to be perfectly honest, that question doesn’t arise for me—because I _know_ that A exists only in conjunction with B. Can you derive an “ought”—that the burning _must_ continue—from the mere fact of combustion? I am not sure you could pull that off, but it would certainly be worthy of a Nobel Prize. But I have a question for you (feel free not to answer): what personal “want” do you add to “is” in order to derive an “objective ought” from it? ---
**Author:** ![gertie](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/b4bc9f/32.png) [@gertie](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/gertie)\ **Post date:** [October 5, 2026, 8:55pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/76 "2026-10-05T20:55:25Z")
Hi Amadeus, I’ll try to be clearer. I’m **not** claiming morality is an objective fact about what exists in the world - it’s an abstract concept which only exists in human minds. We do have a rough evolutionary account for the basis for that in our history as a social species - the intuitive notions you mention. But that’s not what I base my argument on. But neither do I think morality is just a subjective matter of opinion like a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream, or supporting my local team. So neither Subjective nor Objective seem to me to capture what makes morality meaningful, or seem like appropriate ways to justify Oughts. It seems to me that what does make sense of Oughts is having a stake in the factual state of affairs. Hume says you can’t derive an Ought from an Is, but I’m saying that _having a stake_ in what the Is is, changes the playing field. And the stake is that our wellbeing matters to us, matters to sentient beings generally. Qualiative conscious experience brings into the world new valenced properties - desires, goals, purpose, suffering, flourishing, harm, care, value - everything that makes life meaningful. A quality of life. If I harm you, it matters to you, and vice versa. And this is the natural and appropriate territory of Oughts, of Right and Wrong. And universal to sentient beings, simply because of the qualiative nature of conscious experience, not just humans. What do you think? ---
**Author:** ![Chelydra](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/chelydra/32/659_2.png) [@Chelydra](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Chelydra)\ **Post date:** [October 6, 2026, 4:34am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/77 "2026-10-06T04:34:28Z")
Here is my case for objective morality. Being exists and requires certain differences to hold as itself. Those can be removed by another difference — that removal is harm. Objective harm is the one that is there without anyone noticing. Subjects are beings that notice and exist through relation to other subjects. Because subjects exist through relation, harm to one subject makes a difference to another — it breaks the structure they both depend on. Morality is what follows from taking harm seriously when it affects subjects’ being. Don’t harm is what subject’s being requires to persist . Morality is objective because it is grounded in what being requires, and being’s requirements don’t wait for anyone’s agreement. ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [October 6, 2026, 5:03am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/78 "2026-10-06T05:03:15Z")
> [@gertie](#): > > Hume says you can’t derive an Ought from an Is, but I’m saying that _having a stake_ in what the Is is, changes the playing field. And the stake is that our wellbeing matters to us, matters to sentient beings generally. Qualiative conscious experience brings into the world new valenced properties - desires, goals, purpose, suffering, flourishing, harm, care, value - everything that makes life meaningful. A quality of life. If I harm you, it matters to you, and vice versa. I think you’ve put it about as well as this can be put. I am supportive. But this is a form of reciprocal pragmatism that is not of itself compelling. If I want to build an empire and vanquish all opposition, why should I care about any of the above? For it to work I think we have to make an agreement that wellbeing matters and then agree about how we go about this mattering.. Plenty of room for agreement and furious disagreement there. Ultimately it’s going to end up a brawl over competing values, isn’t it? Like much of human society today. ---
**Author:** ![gertie](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/b4bc9f/32.png) [@gertie](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/gertie)\ **Post date:** [October 6, 2026, 9:53pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/79 "2026-10-06T21:53:30Z")
Fair points, but I think any morality which doesn’t involve something like the hand of God giving us stone tablets with immutable rules on and accompanying promises of eternal bliss or hell is going to struggle in the absence of objective morality. But what philosophy can do is offer ideas. Having said that nearly everyone intuitively gets what I’m saying above (tho they’d perhaps put it differently) and we mostly live our day to day lives understanding that it matters how we treat others. We’re a smart social species, we have the intuitive and cognitive toolkit to make this work (of course we also retain older pre-mammalian ‘selfish’ drives too, exemplified by sociopaths, and often have competing interests). But generally speaking societies set up rules which tend to foster the wellbeing of the in-group. Extending our circle of care to those not within the in-group doesn’t come as naturally, because we developed our evolutionary mechanisms of care within an up close and personal tribal setting. Mirror neurons, oxytocin, reciprocal altruism, physical ‘grooming’, caring for those genetically close to us and so on aren’t easily triggered when it comes to the Other. Reason has to work harder to accept that the Other has similar stakes to ourselves, and ought to be treated accordingly. But this will always be a problem, no matter what you ground oughts in, it’s how we’re built. Responsible moral adults have to deal with this, and teach children how to. As regards competing interests, yes individual subjects are idiosyncratic and it will be messy. And the thing about qualiative conscious experience is that it isn’t quantifiable in the ways physical stuff is, so it’s difficult to weigh interests precisely against each other. So individual freedoms need to be part of the consideration, rather than a purely authoritarian utilitarian approach. Where we draw the lines will be inevitably be blurry. Some are common sense like murder, theft, basic state provision to enable flourishing, others not so much. But at least we’d have a moral foundation of promoting wellbeing to guide us. And a touchstone to check back with if a rule has unforeseen consequences. ---
**Author:** ![Tom\_Storm](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/c57346/32.png) [@Tom\_Storm](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Tom_Storm)\ **Post date:** [October 6, 2026, 10:07pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317/80 "2026-10-06T22:07:11Z")
> [@gertie](#): > > But generally speaking societies set up rules which tend to foster the wellbeing of the in-group. Yes. And this is an ongoing problem. > [@gertie](#): > > Reason has to work harder to accept that the Other has similar stakes to ourselves, and ought to be treated accordingly. But this will always be a problem, no matter what you ground oughts in, it’s how we’re built. I’m not sure this is how we’re built. I’m probably not an essentialist, but it does seem that humans often gravitate towards the familiar and the predictable. The stranger can be perceived as a source of uncertainty or chaos, particularly if they hold funny beliefs. > [@gertie](#): > > So individual freedoms need to be part of the consideration, rather than a purely authoritarian utilitarian approach. Where we draw the lines will be inevitably be blurry. My question is usually: who gets to draw the lines and make the definitions? Christian evangelicals? Platonists? Marxists? Libertarians? We seem to be struggling in the West with balancing pluralism. [Previous page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317.md?page=3) [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/can-morality-be-objective/3317.md?page=5)