Hi all, first time poster and new to Philosophy. Reading this forum has inspired me to write down some thoughts that have been boucing around my head for a couple years now. The concept of objective morality is of interest to me, mainly personally, as I am quite an anxious person. Whether I am doing the “right” thing is a very common thought. It does also leak into my political leanings/thinking etc which you’ll read towards the end. I’d love to hear all of your thoughts on this! Again, first time poster so please go easy on me.
Objective and subjective morality. What is fact?
The Truism/Convention scale, the individual’s local optimum compared to the objective global optimum, and rationalising opinions.
When I think about the world, and the conflict that accompanies religion, capital, war, and justice, I wonder: where do rules end and facts begin? And can any of those rules be objectively moral? Can objective morality be uncovered on the basis of scientific fact?
As someone who views communism favourably and much of the current political system of capital less so, I ask: which opinions does the latter rationalise as fact, and where does the former disallow those opinions as what they may be, opinions?
This text is my own attempt to define objective morality by grounding it in science.
On my scale of human experience, each of the following fields is applied to create the field above it.
Politics
↑
History
↑
Culture
↑
Psychology
↑
Biology
↑
Chemistry
↑
Physics
↑
Maths
I propose that this sequence, which builds from the most basic truism of mathematics to the convention of politics, can help explain how a person rationalises their own subjective morality, and, possibly define some form of objective morality; by building first from objective fact.
When rationalising your own political, philosophical, and social beliefs, you must decide where to draw your own line between Truism and Convention, or your subjective morality.
I propose the “local optimum” (a term I’m borrowing from mathematics, the most basic truism) as the location at which any individual draws said line.
Beneath the local optimum are both fact (truisms) and your own interpretation of those facts (practical truisms). Above it, you may build your own conventions based on this logic.
A modern traditionalist may find their line higher up the scale, towards convention, by treating cultural practices as sacred, whereas a nihilist may draw their line lower, closer to Biology, or fact.
But what is fact?
In order to define objective morality, we must address the hinge between the subjective and objective morality/fact. The Axiom. Human survival and wellbeing matter.
Everyone who builds a morality crosses this gap. To cross it objectively, the fewest, most basic and most widely shared premises must be used.
Human survival and wellbeing matter. Can objectiveness be found from this statement? Or is it just opinion? I’m not sure. I am however, sure, that if my, or another axiom can be objectively moral, that the lower limit of the global optimum’s placement can be higher than basic Biology.
But as it is my view, I would employee the following points from Hart’s “minimum content of natural law.”
(Summarised)
Human vulnerability: we can easily hurt and kill each other, so rules against violence are needed.
Approximate equality: no one is strong enough to dominate everyone for long, so cooperation beats domination.
Limited altruism: people aren’t purely selfish or purely generous, so rules help keep us in check.
Limited resources: there isn’t enough for everyone to take whatever they want, so some form of property is needed.
Limited understanding and willpower: not everyone will follow rules voluntarily, so some enforcement is needed.
These are not inherently truisms, but rather “practical truisms”: largely agreeable solutions to problems that stem/build on truisms (Such as the biological need to survive and reproduce). A practical truism built on fact could then be rationalised as objectively moral. I would guess that the overwhelming majority of people would place their local optimum above these practical truisms (which I would place in Psychology, relating to our own inner sense of justice and kindness).
However, crucially, a person may argue that their own truisms, and practical truisms must be believed, followed, and enforced, but no person has the right to enforce their own conventions merely because they are, conventions.
When settling on your own local optimum, or where you place the end of truisms on the scale of your own beliefs and leanings, you must rationalise the foundation of your own beliefs as practical truisms.
Consider Chesterton’s Fence: if you find a fence in a field and don’t know why it’s there, find out before you tear it down. It can work differently, but why did it end up this way? Do you see your own imaginary fence as a convention, or as a practical truism that you must build your beliefs on? If your belief is a convention, it must be supported by a practical truism beneath it, no matter how many layers must be peeled away.
For me, this sits somewhere inside the Psychology field.
I believe I would land with the following practical truisms supporting my own local optimum’s placement within Psychology, as well as objective morality, the global optimum.
All people deserve to live free from physical, and to some extent emotional/psychological/mental, harm.
Building on a few of Hart’s practical truisms (equality, altruism and availability of resources), if people have a right to these resources, I will make the logical extension that they also have a duty to share their excess, as well as a moral obligation not to impede others’ access to them.
I specify “to some extent” because emotional harm could be subject to interpretation, and the location of said interpreter’s local optimum will affect that interpretation.
I argue that this thought is objectively moral, as it is a logical extension of scientific fact.
Culture and convention cannot be regarded as sacred, or as law, if they contradict any truism or, less sternly (I need to find another word here), a practical truism.
As Religion and Culture sit firmly on the convention side of the scale, religious and cultural ideas that contradict truisms (perhaps the patriarchal nature of Abrahamic religions) cannot form the basis of moral authority.
Because religious morality is formed on the basis of convention, rather than truism, it is subjective morality and therefore cannot be rationalised by fact.