Bioinsurgency and the Boring Revolution - A Manifesto

I’ll take a trip to the Gulag for that as long as @Hanover precedes me.

I think the proper formula for understanding what Bartelby, as revolutionary, represents, and the lesson we should learn from his tribulations is Beckett’s “I can’t go on I’ll go on”

Formally, we insist on failure but then still go on. This is to perform, as Bartelby did, the persistence of an excess that is not hamstrung by conceptual failure, failure in legible social terms, because it transcends it. Of course, this means too that we can only gesture at Bartleby here, we can’t inhabit him symbolically—the symbolic can only be a gateway, just as his words can only be a gateway to his being as potentiality.

This is because Bartleby inhabits the social only as a negativity. And though he can’t, as a pure negativity, positively engage, it’s just this that keeps his eyes open right up until his death. He can see the social for what it is because he occupies a place outside it. Those who don’t reach this limit (essentially everyone else) cannot achieve that perspective. We live with our eyes closed or close them in order to live whereas he dies with his open or opens them in the knowledge that doing so makes life impossible.

That polarity is important. We can functionalize ourselves within institutions as long as we miss the significance of what we are doing. Or to put it another way, we can manifest the social as necessity by viewing our functionalization within it as such.

In the story, Bartelby’s office colleagues represent those who manifest the social as necessity by treating it as such. The narrator then occupies the meta will of the social in the world of the office and Bartleby is the obscured in-between, the place of ontological freedom that is willing to reject the nominal freedoms necessarily reliant on submission for the ontological freedom inherent in potentiality.

To return to Beckett, we should be precise in claiming re Bartleby that it’s not “I’ll go on even though I can’t go on”, it’s rather “I’ll go on because I can’t go on”. Because I can’t go on allowing the social to simulate the excess for me, I can go on as a free excess that refuses such simulation. Bartleby doesn’t persist in the social world despite his exhaustion with it, instead, he cannot stand to persist in it so he exits it in order to persist outside it. A Bartelby that simply persisted even though he “couldn’t go on” would be indistinguishable from his beleaguered colleagues yet, as the tale makes clear, he stands in polar opposition to them.

We can view this dynamic according to Agamben’s analysis of the story in terms of will, necessity, and contingency. The social will, personified by the narrator, functions smoothly just so long as it is seen—as it is by Bartelby’s colleagues—as a necessity, and this is not to say that any particular social injunction isseen as an absolute necessity. but that there is a social will that (to the limit of the absolute) delimits freedom, that sets the conceptual boundaries of freedom.

Only Bartleby treats the social will as a contingency, as a matter of preference, rather than necessity, and so while he writes as a scrivener should, he “prefers not to” submit fully to the narrator’s demands. More crucially, he shows no indication that he considers what he is doing as disruptive or unusual. Rather, he occupies fully the attitude of the in-between. He is, in his own words, “not particular” and so cannot be particularized; that is, he is not legible and cannot be read in the usual binary categories; he is rather than a particular, a potentiality, the undefinable excess that the social will inevitably asserts itself against in its struggle to be recognized as necessary, but actually being contingent, requires of it acquiescence.

Bartleby refuses to acquiesce and maintains his potentiality. But the cost of keeping his eyes open to this fact of social contingency is his social death. The limit he expresses is authenticity unto oblivion. Or, he presents us both with the possibility and impossibility of authenticity, which is precisely for being in this state, a pure potentiality.

To keep our eyes open as Bartelby did, and more to act fully in accordance with such knowledge, is a fully hopeless hope. However, it exposes the only vulnerability the social has —to be faced with its own contingency. The narrator who is affected by Bartleby shows this—the social can change, but that requires a sacrifice. Bartleby is the authentic subject as social sacrifice taken to the ultimate conclusion.

Further, this is, in a sense, what saves the social from itself. Its excess of will is found in our full submission to it, but if that could really be fully realized, it too would die through stagnation. This is the obverse unspoken limit the story presents us with. Our ontological freedom. in recognizing the social as a contingency, at least to some degree, is necessary for its mutability and its long term viability, just as it is necessary for our authentic survival within it.

We can analogize with evolution here. If we consider particular social forms (the macro-social) against the background of sociality as principle (the meta-social) just as we consider particular species or groups against the background of life as principle, then we see that though mutations can be destructive of the former, they are necessary for the latter. A “perfect” species that resisted such change could not adapt and if all species were “perfect” in this way, life would end. Similarly, if a particular social world could functionalise us fully into a particular formula, that social world would be frozen in a particular state and unable to respond to competition from social worlds that were not so limited. This is somewhat the equivalent of the claim sometimes made that it is great people who change societies not societies that change themselves. And great people can only become great because they resist, or better, transcend their social worlds, and dramatically so, for to overturn social inertia requires dramatic change.

But resisting is a complicated and difficult thing as Bartelby shows. It is not simply overt defiance, certainly not under market regimes where everything, including, and perhaps especially, overt defiance is commodified. Whereas ancient anti-establishment heroes legitimately moved worlds in this way, Antigone being the prime example, the modern hero cannot so move the world. The world, through a potent combination of economic and technological science moves too fast for it to beso moved. It must instead be “moved” by not moving with it, by therefore illuminating, in our relative inertia, the nature of its movements.

And that does not come naturally to us. In fact, it is anything but natural, as, developmentally, after we have taken the primeval bow to language—which we must to become a social subject, or any kind of recognizable subject at all, to become, in effect, a person—we already have one foot in the ideological grave, so to speak. And it is no easy task to dig our way out.

To use a less morbid metaphor, to see socially, that is to see as we are expected to see, we must close our eyes to the social’s contingency, and so it is necessary that we have a blindspot. And it is this blindspot from which it derives its twinned powers of necessity and will, i,e, its potency. Just as the blindspot in our sight is the phenomenological representation of the physical channel of information that makes sight at all possible, so is our blindspot towards the social the opening that allows it to make itself fully visible to us, for it to fill our vision.

So, social potency does not spring from a vacuum. It is transferred or less charitably stolen from the subject who submits but such submission is to some degree inevitable. We are, considering our developmental pathway into society, burdened with a kind of symbolic debt from the start, which, when we try to pay it off through social submission, we only make more of it at the cost of our (ontological) freedom which is just what admission into language first potentializes and the social through its primacy in language, its dominance of the concept tries to take back from us. There is the ultimate bind: that which gives us life, gives in order to deprive us of it.

The suggestion here, to allude to the famous Groucho Marx quip, is that we should refuse any society that would have us as a member because to have us as a member is to use us to transform itself from a contingency into a necessity, to make of us its platform as the final will and arbiter of freedom, the end of the chain of wills defined by its hierarchies. And where there really is a final will as necessity is just where we end as ontologically free subject. It is only beyond that in the contingency of the social where we can creatively rest as Bartelby did “with Kings and counselors”.

Good stuff. I have little to add at the moment, except two things.

First—and this is the next step of my endless pushback—isn’t there a tension between these:

What if, as with Bartleby, there is no longer any “recognizing” of our freedom’s potential, no recognition that it could be “disruptive or unusual”. If it is structural and unconscious, and in the long run quite the opposite of disruptive or unusual, it might at some point never be a site of resistance again.

Second, I like your use of Beckett, which is very Adornian in a specific dialectical sense.

This reminded me of a sentence from Negative Dialectics:

Truth is objective and not plausible.

It would be smoother, more in line with our expectations, to use “but” here instead of “and”, and this would fail to convey the meaning properly, sacrificing precision for the consoling resolution of conflict and contradiction. The meaning, which is only obscured by the conventional schemes of language and thought, is that truth’s objectivity and its implausibility go together (for reasons that I won’t go into here). (And this is also relevant to expression, rhetoric, etc., and it’s why Adorno’s writing is the way it is.)

He sheds light on this in Minima Moralia:

If a dialectician, for example, marked the turning-point of his advancing ideas by starting with a ‘But’ at each caesura, the literary scheme would give the lie to the unschematic intention of his thought.

It’s the same with Beckett. The common literary scheme, running on the rails of conventional thought, wants to put “even though,” but Beckett keeps the contradiction open, because it’s essential to the meaning.

I’m not sure if the following fully addresses your point, but I see exercising ontological freedom as disruptive at the macro-social level because it is how we resist functionalization, but not at the meta-social level because pure functionalization lacks the mutability societies need to compete in social time, so resistance allows for phase changes in the social but is not disruptive at the meta level - just the opposite.

Also, I think we should point out here that Bartleby is a limit case that represents a break that dramatises the existence of potential rather than represents a realistic praxis, the latter requiring negotiation. We can learn from Bartleby but we can’t fully be Bartlebys because we can’t fully make that break - it’s like willing insanity, trying to mentally drown ourselves. Real people will surface for social air, the social must go on. That is, Bartleby as multiplicity does represent the limit destruction of the social at the meta level, but that is not a real possibilty, or at least is unimaginable (the end of the social will arrive by much more prosaic means, I think). But we can still learn something quite serious from him.

But what strikes me now, having read your comment, is the polarizing ambiguity inherent in the concept of recognition. For example, usually to say we recognize the authority of X is to imply we submit to that authority. So “they recognized the judge’s authority in that matter” implies that they accepted that authority. On the other hand, to recognize also means to see things as they are, which is the type of recognition we attribute to Bartleby regarding the social world. And the result is the opposite, he does not submit.

So if we’re asking: is it that Bartleby sees consciously what is going on and decides to opt out, or is it that he truly inhabits the excess that just goes on unconsciously, and can’t do otherwise? I think we can dovetail with my Beckett point here and your commentary on Adorno. Bartleby is different not because he does not submit even though he recognizes the authority of the social (implying the former), but because he does. He recognizes what it is fully and that recognition sets him completely outside it, gives him the (practically impossible) non-blindspot view.

The complication here is that the purity of ontological freedom at its limit seems to collapse into absolute unfreedom (Bartleby is somehow imprisoned in potentiality but then where is the potentiality in that?) So it must be that he manages to fulfill both options and again occupy the in-between space of knowing / acting and just being.

But there is stil a clear separation in that from how we must be, a break that is also in some sense a break with thought itself as we understand it. It is not a considered political rebellion. Bartleby is not the subject exercising his ontological freedom in the social world. He’s the limit case of the excess outside it, but despite the fact that that prevents legible action, just getting into that space of illegibility while still going on is perhaps the ultimate act.

@Jamal

Just to add to that, it occurs to me we can posit a foundational equivalence between the following (radical) conjunctions.

  1. I’ll go on because I can’t go on.

  2. I recognize authority because I don’t recognize authority. (I know authority as contingency because I don’t submit to it as necessity)

  3. I am conscious (inside potentiality) because I am unconscious (outside contingency). I am legible to myself (reflexively) because I am illegible to the social (objectively).

  4. I am the dead (still) living because I am not the living (still) dead.

Bartleby we can then say splits the split between the dead and the living, he exposes a polar binary inherent in the idea of the living dead, i.e. he is the free zombie of illegible potentiality rather than the enslaved zombie of functionalized necessity. He escapes unconscious social desire through the potentialization of desire as a "not in itself’’, the relexive (k)not of potential, the unreadable unconscious from society’s perspective, i.e. that which escapes / excludes social desire by recognizing it. (just as social desire is unrecognisable when seen as necessity and unconsciously included).

When we view social desire as a necessity, when we identify with it, we make of ourselves contingencies subject to the social, we enforce a reflexive disposability.

And this is why the ontological freedom Bartleby gestures towards is decidedly not the Kantian free rational subject, which is a reification of the metasocial, an absolute functionalizing power, just as macrosocial ideologies function in their partially irrational ways.

The Kantian ideal purports to embody the best, i.e. the only universalizable sociality. But this is not Bartleby’s freedom, just the opposite. The Kantian free rationaity is instead the ultimate unconscious, the apotheosis of social desire, that we must negotiate with. Or that must negotiate with the Bartleby unconscious to produce freedom in practice, to produce the consciously free act. Ontological freedom is potentialized in the power to impotentialize the selectively nominal freedoms whose power comes from the impotentialization of ontological freedom.

To put this another way, Bartleby’s strength is his ability to neutralize a social will that would functionalize him. But the limit of that social power is social death, which eventually is just death, though with eyes open.

I feel like resisting this, not just because I have a tendency to jump to Kant’s defence, but because it points to the importance of immanent critique in saving the subject: the complicity of Kant’s system in domination doesn’t render his autonomous moral subject mere ideology. Rational domination can be held to the standards of its greatest formalizer, because it’s not that hard to show that the Enlightenment hasn’t lived up to its own promises.

To me this means that we can do better than a freedom that is pre-reflective and structural. I mean, when we recognize things as they are by making the system conceptually fail according to its own standards, that’s precisely the refusal to allow contingent social conditions to be passed off as necessity.

From the truth that the Kantian autonomous subject is shaped by the forces of domination in a way that Kant and Enlightenment rationality in general doesn’t account for, it doesn’t follow that it—or the philosophy surrounding it—have to be rejected. And this is the deeper meaning of saying that I’m still very attached to my self as the distinctly bourgeois self—it still has a lot going for it.

So the excess is this surplus in Kantian rationality above and beyond functionalization, revealed through critique from within.

Ennui, which requires boredom, thus embrace it, one doesn’t necessarily have to enjoy it. But rather enjoy the stimulus from the constrasting drive that is often caused by boredom… there are so many thing to keep you ‘entertained’ but distracted these days, that boredom away from the dopamine-dribble distractions allows one to actually hear their deeper, more fundamental drives, which are often said, in various cultures even, to require a style of silence to listen to “your ‘true’ self.”

It makes me think of this:

Those however who can do nothing which does not at some point threaten to turn out for the worse even though it wishes for what is better, are constrained to thinking; that is their justification and that of the happiness of the Spirit.

— Adorno, Negative Dialectics: Contemplation

I don’t believe in the “true self” or in the “more fundamental drives,” but if we need to be bored to start thinking properly, then I’m all for it.

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The comment re Kant was careless, i.e. not properly introduced or argued for. And, in realization of the can of worms I was opening up for myself, I had already removed it from the background writing I’m doing on this. So, I won’t try defending that here.

But I certainly don’t want to be misunderstood as saying that freedom is or should be purely pre-reflective. I would be contradicting myself deeply to claim that. Rather, in practice, we must negotiate.

Stepping out of the Kantian quagmire then, what I want to retain from this is the idea that in refusing nominal freedoms that reinforce our desire for them in self-stroking cycles, we potentialize ontological freedom, which is a qualitative connection to the world as much as action or inaction.

And I absolutely agree with this.

Which is very close to what I said here:

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Yeah, in fact it did occur to me that my post ended up saying what you were saying just with Agambenese translated into Adornian.

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Yeah me neither, but in truth all language is signs (which is why Nietzsche details the aesthetic state as the zenith of communication, 809 WtP, and consequently, the style of communication of a Dithyramb [Thus Spoke Zarathustra being a Dithyramb, Ecce Homo, Wise § 7]).

The “true self” is merely a sign used to detail an older concept of psychology founded in the Platonic ideal… but all language is fundamentally irreducibly platonic in a sense. One can translate it into their current framework.

Actually quite a fire quote from Adorno, thank you for sharing. But also we see there is some style “necessity”

Just as Nietzsche details in Birth of Tragedy 13 of Socrates:

[Socrates] perceived, to his astonishment, that all these celebrities were without a proper and accurate insight, even with regard to their own callings, and practised them only by instinct. “Only by instinct”: with this phrase we touch upon the heart and core of the Socratic tendency. Socratism condemns therewith existing art as well as existing ethics; wherever Socratism turns its searching eyes it beholds the lack of insight and the power of illusion; and from this lack infers the inner perversity and objectionableness of existing conditions. From this point onwards, Socrates believed that he was called upon to, correct existence; and, with an air of disregard and superiority, as the precursor of an altogether different culture, art, and morality, he enters single-handed into a world, of which, if we reverently touched the hem, we should count it our greatest happiness.

In the same way sickness can be a stimulus towards health, boredom can be a stimulus towards action.

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