April Reading: "The Will to Believe" by William James

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21

I am glad :+1:

But he does seem to regard the wager as trivial, or as trying to appeal to an inappropriately calculating mind:

We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted wilfully after such a mechanical calculation would lack the inner soul of faith’s reality

– Section II

In other words, the so-called faith motivated by such calculation is not really faith at all. This is because…

unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option.

And that’s what I take you to be getting at here:

It’s as if James introduces Pascal’s wager as a candidate argument in favour of faith, but dismisses it as insufficient or as aiming at something that is not really faith at all. He then offers his alternative argument, which is structurally similar but is enriched with the focus on living options and what the passional nature leads one to believe (if only we’d let it).

The interesting point for me is here:

It is evident that unless there be some pre-existing tendency to believe in masses and holy water, the option offered to the will by Pascal is not a living option. Certainly no Turk ever took to masses and holy water on its account; and even to us Protestants these means of salvation seem such foregone impossibilities that Pascal’s logic …

— Section II

So the wager doesn’t work for a non-Christian. But James is aware that his own argument wouldn’t work for a non-Christian either. Both Pascal’s wager and James’s argument depend on the religious hypothesis’s status as a living option. The difference is that James’s argument is honest and explicit about this.

22

Scholastic orthodoxy, to which one must always go when
one wishes to find things stated perfectly clearly, has beautifully
elaborated this b absolutist conviction in a doctrine that
it calls that of objective evidence. If, for example, I cannot
doubt that
•I now exist before you,
•two is less than three, and
•if all men are mortal then I am mortal too,
it is because these things shine in my intellect irresistibly.
The final ground of this objective evidence possessed by
certain propositions is the adaequatio intellectûs nostri cum
rê [‘the matching of our intellect to things’]. The certitude it brings
involves
on the part of the truth in question an aptitudinem
ad extorquendum certum assensum [‘a power to compel
assent’], and
•on the side of the subject a quietem in cognitione [‘a
quiet rest in knowledge’], when one has mentally received
something that leaves no possibility of doubt;
and in the whole transaction nothing operates but the entitas
ipsa of the object and the entitas ipsa of the mind.

…VI. But now, since we are all such absolutists by instinct,
what ought we in our role as students of philosophy to do
about that fact? Shall we a espouse and endorse it? Or shall
we b treat it as a weakness of our nature from which we must
if possible free ourselves?
I sincerely believe that b the latter course is the only one
that we as reflective men can follow. Objective evidence
and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with

If I cannot doubt that I now exist before you, it’s not because this thing “shines in my intellect irresistibly”. This is a dismissive way of critiquing certainty.
I cannot doubt this sort of thing because doubting whether I now exist before you would still prove, if not to me, then to you, that I exist. I can’t doubt and not exist at the same time.
There has to be grounds for doubting, as Witt argued.

23

Yes, this is what I was getting at with my question: Is James arguing for doxastic voluntarism?

On the face of it, it’s not plausible, no. And James agrees:

Does it not seem preposterous on the very face of it to talk of our opinions being modifiable at will? Can our will either help or hinder our intellect in its perceptions of truth? Can we, by just willing it, believe that Abraham Lincoln’s existence is a myth …

— Section II

He says this to introduce his comments on Pascal’s wager. His point is that Pascal’s wager doesn’t work because it relies on being able to voluntarily choose to believe. You can only genuinely believe if the hypothesis is a living option, i.e., it appeals as a real possibility, because of …

habits of belief that we cannot now escape from, I mean all such principles as prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set

— Section III

So, when James talks, in connection with his own argument (as opposed to Pascal’s wager) about beliefs reached according to volition, he means “volition” to encompass unconscious, emotional, habitual, and ideological motivations, and those influenced by authority.

And as I said above, being a pragmatist he may—reasonably, I think—have thought of a spectrum of volition, from conscious voluntary choice to unconscious belief:

As a matter of fact we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why.

I think that takes the edge off the implausibility objection.

24

Yet he does say the purpose of his paper is

In a way this seems to relate to free will libertarianism. The picture seems to be that even though I am not really convinced I can freely decide to believe anyway.If libertarian free will is not acceptable, then we might wonder what determines the willful adoption of a believing attitude other than some kind of reasoned conviction.

I find this kind of libertarianism to swallow, and it brings the question of what role logic plays. Is it not what we take to be evidence rather than logic that plays the principal role if our belief cannot be just chosen by fiat, since we can reason consistently, that is with valid logic, from any premise we like?

25

To be fair, it seems Pascal himself understood that and the wager was not so much about convincing non religious people but more to show that some matters are simply determined by your passions instead of your reason. At least according to this.

26

If for any of you religion is a hypothesis which cannot by any living possibility be true, then you need listen no further. I am speaking only to the others.

I insist: this text addresses only believers. Philosophers are explicitly told to get out; it is written in black and white. This is a religious text aping a philosophical one. The sole role of the philosopher here is to plant a block of C4 and press the detonator—i.e., to expose and blow up this intellectual scam.

The real question this text raises is: why does this pseudo-thinker feel compelled to ape philosophical argumentation, and why do you willingly participate in this masquerade?

Because the honor of the Human species is Thought. Religion does not think; it is the submission of thought to the alpha-dominance of the “god” idea. It is the absolute animalization of Thought.

However, thanks to the Greek miracle, the light of Thought flickered briefly inside the mental cave of the human ape. Ever since, this ape has been forced to mimic Greek thought just to give whatever comes out of its mouth the slightest shred of legitimacy.

Why do you partake in this masquerade? Because there is no such thing as English-language philosophical thought. There is only this masquerade—only these pitiful mental contortions performed in Judeo-Christian chains.

Does this mean I believe true philosophical thought is what you disdainfully label “Continental philosophy” (i.e., French or German thought)?

No, it is far worse than that. As the living frontier of human experience, philosophy was put to death long ago by anti-thought—by Judeo-Christian mental totalitarianism.

For 2,000 years, everyone called a “philosopher” has either been a literal believer or someone who uses the word “God” with the utmost seriousness. They are all monotheized: either explicit Judeo-Christians or zombie Judeo-Christians—cryptic monotheists like James, utterly oblivious to the monotheistic conditioning of their own minds. (Even Nietzsche, for instance, critiques Christianity but—like everyone else—defends Christ, effectively defending the root cause of Christianity! He is a zombie; he understands absolutely nothing about his own condition).

If I were to genuinely reopen the front line of true philosophical thought right here, every single one of you would immediately rush to click the “Report” button.

27

That’s an interesting interpretation: the wager is meant to be unconvincing. In that case, Pascal and James are pretty close.

1 Like
28

I don’t interpret him that way. In a nutshell, he means that we ought not to be afraid to follow our hearts.

29

Not really. Do you think it’s impossible to have two contrary living hypothesis?

Anyway, I’ll present one thing I find interesting. If Clifford argues that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”, but we accept the idea of a “forced option” which seems plausible; what does that mean about those kinds of options? If we literally can’t suspend judgment, as I think Clifford would prefer, what may be done instead? What if, in the worst case, we admit there is insufficient evidence for both positions?

The non-believer who would like to say that they are simply suspending judgment is actually always taking a position (if we accept that the religion hypothesis is forced) with insufficient evidence. At best, they can try to compare evidence, but they will lose the skeptic high ground, for they are as much believers as the religious.

30

Not really.

black and white written by James : are you a meta-James, his homunculus or something like that ?

Do you think it’s impossible to have two contrary living hypothesis?

“living hypothesis” is a rhetorical scam : a “living hypothesis” is a belief, is no more an hypothesis, by James’ own terms !

31

I thought you were simply exaggerating. Where does he say that? Are you talking about the thing you quoted?

Can be true \neq true

32

We can distinguish two senses of “address”. James is literally addressing only the educated New England Protestant elite. But his argument arguably addresses, in the sense of “has relevance for,” other aspects of life and other contexts.

33

I don’t see the relevance.

34

It’s not important. You and @MCogito were just talking about different things, is all I meant. Though @MCogito probably disputes the essay’s relevance as well.

35

I am a metaphysician, I can’t joke and can’t say anything not intrinsically true :smiley:
OK have a look at page 13:

Now, let us consider what the logical elements of this
situation are if both branches of the religious hypothesis are
really true.
(Of course, we must admit that possibility at the
outset.
If we are to discuss the question at all, it
must involve a living option. If for any of you religion
is a hypothesis which cannot by any living possibility
be true, then you need listen no further. I am speaking
only to the others.1)

In his obfuscated jargon “must involve a living option” means God is a very important live thing for you, i.e. means you are a believer: he address only believers. You can’t both belief in God and belief in non-existence of God : that’s the reason he/you are using the oxymoron “living hypothesis” : to ape philosophical reasoning under judeo-christian mental chains : this is a canonnical example of what I called “mental contorsions”.

36

I can understand being suspicious of the distinction and its use but you said it was “black and white written”.

According to you perhaps but that’s not in the text and that’s all I am arguing right now. It is not in any way written that he is only addressing believers, i.e. people who already believe in Christianity. Or you’re using “believers” idiosyncratically.

37

I’ve known James’ essay for some twenty years, and I find it to be one of the most useful pieces of writing I know.

As for “the religious angle”: Ironically, with his idea of what constitutes a “genuine option” James probably did the greatest disservice to religion ever. I’ve discussed (although usually, merely attempted to discuss) James’ ideas with many religious people and they all resented it. Namely, an adult person following James’ heuristic is highly unlikely to convert to a religion, at least not for religious reasons (but rather, for political or economical ones, if at all). Religious apologists would say that James readily provided people with excuses not to convert and not to believe. Precisely because (and religous apologists will not admit this) he cast religious choice as a matter of a person’s actual lived experience with the religion (or absence of such experience).

In contrast, most human discourse, be it philosophy, politics, religion, psychology, or just the general day-to-day interactions, take place assuming a view from nowhere, an objectivity, neutrality, a “stating of truths” (or “untruths”), suprapersonal, impersonal. As if arguments somehow “stand on their own”, and it’s not people who make them or believe them. But that people can and should be judged if they don’t accept those arguments.

38

Not only that; but that we sometimes have no choice but to follow our hearts; and more: that so many things in life are about “following our hearts” and that we’ll be miserable and waste time if we don’t.

Which is in stark contrast with rationalistic ideas (religious or non-religious ones) that there is only one correct way to live.

39

In fact, we often do. We can have many living hypotheses, some of them will be mutually exclusive; we can have many momentous hypotheses, and many logically forced ones.

With James’ heuristic of what constitutes a genuine option, it can be easier to choose among them.

Then we can conclude we don’t have a genuine option and we can stop devoting time and effort to it.
(Which is a rather American, modern thing to do.)

Whether the religious hypothesis is forced or not is not a given. If, for example, you live in medieval Europe under a ruler who reigns by “Cuius regio, eius religio” and you’re just a poor peasant, then your religious option is genuine: it’s live, forced, and momentous. If you’re higher up in the socio-economic hierarchy, your religious option may become less genuine, as your refusal to convert may carry no particular punishment for you.

If you live in modern times in a big secular city and you have not been religious so far, then, when a couple of Mormon missionaries stop you in the street and start preaching to you, what they say will probably be neither alive, nor forced, nor momentous.

I’m not sure where you were going with this.

40

Why would or should this matter? Can you explain?

Would you say that if a particular hypothesis is dead for a particular person, this can also be counted as this person’s fault, flaw, or failing, and that thus, this person should be judged and punished?

Note that a popular line of reasoning among both the religious apologists as well as the secular apologists is that if a person doesn’t take some particular claim for granted (ie. said claim isn’t alive for them), then that person is regarded as defective somehow, wrong, or lying.

This way, the monotheists hold it against the person if the person doesn’t take for granted that e.g.God exists, and attack this person’s character (“If you don’t see that God exists, you’re wrong, defective, evil, or lying.”)

Similary, secular apologists take the same route of attacking the person’s character when the person doesn’t take for granted what the secular apologists expect should be taken for granted
(“If you don’t see that the Earth is round, you’re wrong, defective, or lying.” And they might add the “evil” anyway".)