If you think about it, you’re using spatial concepts to describe the temporal difference.
But let’s look at the example. In your example of language, memory functions as a record, and a memory must be distinct from other memories—for instance, those preceding this linguistic situation. The difference can only be explained spatially because there is a coexistence of memories, but they must be more or less separated from the present. A spatial description is necessary.
The temporal difference is therefore spatial. The difference between retention and presentation is spatial, because there is a coexistence in the experience that gives us the sensation that the object endures… and moves (in the case of the car).
I don’t agree. The difference is obviously temporal. The recent memory, and the present, coexist in the experiencing mind, and the mind knows that the memory is a memory because of a temporal separation, it occurred prior to what is occurring. Where do you find the need for a spatial description? The coexistence which you speak of indicates that it’s not a spatial separation. They are present together in the same place, but one is recognized as temporally prior to the other.
To use an analogy (one that requires careful thought): it is like representing time as a line or a sequence of points (the famous timeline). The line has a length along which we can distinguish between points that are closer and those that are further apart. This is how our experience works, for example: there are moments further away and others closer to the present (axis), and there are distances between them. But they do not occupy the same place; that would mean that one experience is indistinguishable from another, or that one point on the timeline exists in the same place as another point. They must be spatially distinct. Hence the need for spatial description. We have to resort to geometric elements (the science of space, as someone say) to describe time. In this sense, experience is spatially inscribed.
You are begging the question. Your premise is to represent time as a spatial line. Therefore the “distance” between two points on the line will necessarily be a spatial difference.
That is a false premise though. It is not “how our experience works”. We experience a continuity of passing time, without any points of separation. The mind creates the appearance of points with its employment of what you call retention and protention. In retention it selects from the continuity of experience, specific “points” of occurrence to focus on. It may also focus on particular expected future points as protention. Those points are distinct from the primary experience of continuity though, because they require a reflexive, or intentional attention, to select specific points.
The key point is that the supposed “distances” between the points are artificial. That is why we can be mistaken as to how long something is taking, or will take, and in different situations time seems to pass fast or slow.
Going back to the supposed “line” which is the continuous experience, there is no points of separation, therefore no distances. The distances which you mention are all created, based on that reflexive and intentional attention. The analogy with space therefore does not hold up. In the case of space, points of separation (boundaries between things) actually inhere within the experience itself, and this supports “objective distances”, but with time the points are arbitrarily, or subjectively chosen.
They do “occupy the same place” the same observing mind. And the separation is temporal. But you are using a false premise, which represents temporality as a spatial line, and so you conclude that they cannot occupy the same place on that line. Your conclusion is valid but you have a false premise which begs the question, so it is unsound.
There is no need for a spatial description. That description introduces a false premise which is misleading. We can describe the experience of passing time more truthfully as continuous, but non-spatial, like I did above. In this way we can understand that points of separation are artificial, creating a space-like appearance in representations like yours.
Further, understanding these points as artificial allows us to recognize why mistakes in the measuring of supposed temporal “distances” is so common. Such measurements are not based on anything real. It’s like looking in your field of vision and saying “that tree is a half a kilometer from that other tree”. There is no one there with a real measurement tool, so it’s just an estimate based on experience.
I thought it was now understood that both space and time were simply different but complementary aspects of spacetime. I can’t see how they can be considered separable.
I look at the unity of space and time, spacetime, as a fundamental error of modern physics. One is continuous, the other discrete, making them incommensurable. Pretending that they are commensurable produces the infamous uncertainty principle.
It’s about extension, you can’t have one without the other. In accepting spacetime as a concept we are not saying anything about its ground, because we don’t know anything about that. But we do know that for there to be extension (rather than a singularity) in space (matter) and time (duration), both are required and in a sense feed off each other.
Discrete Points of separation break up the line, and the line cannot be reduced to a point (But no by separation) That is why the continuity of the line is preserved in the face of any point-based representation (point is not spacial, I wanted to highlight the spatial differentiation that point-based representation kinda allows us to conceive of, roughly speaking ). But that does not mean that spatial representation fails; in fact, it is confirmed: for every moment on the timeline implies a relationship with other moments in time, and this is where the concept or notions of distance, spacial transition, near and far, long, separation, etc, becomes necessary. Only in this sense expressions like “long time ago” are meaningful. In other words, the line precisely gives us the representation of continuity, which is irreducible to point-like existence. We continue to distinguish, by means of distance, the difference between moments in time, which are irrevocably separated from one another. There are moments that are further from the present than others. And furthermore, taking into account the relations of protension and retention which coexist with presentation, we have an order of coexistence, which has always characterised space.
This can no longer be sustained, given that the line precisely expresses continuity. But there is no continuity without succession and therefore without distance (although distances are inexact). In other words, they cannot occupy the same space because then no distances could be established, and a statement such as ‘I remember this long before that’ would make no sense, since that ‘long before’ can only be represented as a distance from the present. Not a greater difference, if you think only in temporal difference, because here we are not concerned with the intensity of moments or memories, but with distance in its undifferentiated spatial sense. For moments in time are undifferentiated insofar as they belong to the line; their distancing applies to all moments on the line.
This is why you so often fall into a pragmatic contradiction: there is no more fitting representation of time than its spatiality. And you constantly talk about a ‘separation’ between moments in time, as can be seen in your most recent messages.
Certainly. Why is the spatial representation of time so appropriate? It is because there is essentially a mutual interdependence between the two concepts. Each concept builds upon the other. Take, for example, space as the framework for coexistence: how can we conceive of coexistence without considering the notion of ‘at the same time’? Coexistence presupposes time, insofar as at least two things exist simultaneously. It is as though each concept emerges from itself into the other in order to be what it is.
Can you give a good reason to believe that you cannot have one without the other?
You start out by saying that points are just a representation, and do not break up the continuity. Then you proceed to talk about “moments in time”. By what you said, the moments are not in time, they are just a part of the representation, time is continuous.
If the line of time is not reducible to point-like existence, then how do you justify your talk about “moments in time”? There is no moments in time, by what you’ve said, the moments are only a part of the representation.
Your line does not express continuity because you explicitly referred to “moments in time”. There cannot be distinct moments in time without breaking any supposed continuity.
I don’t see how this assertion can be justified.
You are conflating temporal “duration” and spatial “distance”. There is no problem with different things occupying the same space at different times. That is what motion is all about. The problem we are looking at is the continuity between the time when one thing occupied that place and when another did. that is change.
Look, you are clearly confusing temporal duration with spatial distance. “Long before” does not in any way signify “a distance” as you say here. It signifies a separation of time, and this is not properly called “distance”, it is called “duration”.
This makes no sense. The subject of the sentence is “temporal difference”. But then you proceed to say we are concerned only with “distance in its undifferentiated spatial sense”. Have you somehow reduced temporal difference to spatial distance? I don’t understand how you derived this.
Well the idea goes that as space time emerged from the singularity, in order to be something other than a singularity it would extend beyond being a singularity. Which requires an extension spatially and temporally. This is because for there to be a (spatial) change, there would inevitably be a duration due to the process of change. Or for there to be a temporal change, there would inevitably be a spatial component, because if there is no spatial component (a singularity)there can be no duration.
The problem is that it is inconceivable what a singularity is like, also we don’t know the particulars of the singularity out of which the known universe emerged. But we can deduce logically that a singularity has no space and no time, as we understand them, by definition. So for a singularity to become a state in which there is both space and time, extension must occur in some way. If something extends, there must be a spatial component and a duration through which the extension occurs.
The singularity is a spacetime concept, which already assumes a unified space and time. So this reply is simply begging the question. You assume a premise which supports the desired conclusion. But the premise is false, because it is a product of “relativity”, which at its foundation, denies the possibility of truth. Therefore the argument is unsound.
If you allow for the possibility that the two are distinct, you can see that time is logically prior to space. All observed spatial existence is active, therefore time is implied. However, we can conceive of time passing without any spatial activity, in a duration shorter than Planck for example. So your claim that there can be no duration without a spatial component, is an unsupported assertion.
In relation to the op, I believe that apprehending the priority of time is crucial to the understanding of the reality of the immaterial. The material is the spatial realm of sense observation, ‘the external’. To comprehend the immaterial, requires that we support logically the non-spatial. We can substantiate a non-spatial reality by handing priority to time, and allowing that spatial existence emerges in time. This allows that the immaterial has non-spatial, temporal existence, and is free to act as a cause in the spatial world.
For a thought experiment, imagine that there is a beginning to time. At the point when time begins, there is no past. Yet at that moment when time starts there must be a future, or else time could not start. At this moment in time, there is only future without any past. Spatial existence involves activity, so it is dependent on the passing of time, therefore at this moment there is no spatial existence. However there is a future, which provides the possibility for spatial existence. And, we must assign some actuality to the future, as the cause of time passing, and spatial existence in general. Therefore the immaterial ‘future’ must be in some way causal.
That is, as you understand them, by the definitions of a spacetime manifold. But that spacetime model is what I argue is faulty, and accepting it as a premise is a matter of begging the question with an unsound premise.
And how long is that time? Or what is the extent of its duration? Or is it just in a state of stasis, until some spacial extension occurs?
Surely time in order to have any kind of existence there must be a duration to it. How is that duration manifest.
No, that doesn’t follow, the idea in the theory of relativity, is that time is a product of spatial extension and activity. If there is no extension and therefore no activity, there is nothing existing, so how come there is a disembodied time existing?
The immaterial is distinct from the physical, which is addressed in the theory of relativity. But this does not mean that it is somehow free of the obligation of extension and duration.
Describe to me something real, absent extension in some form, not physical form, some kind of, or alternative, immaterial form?
Yes, I can entertain this, for now. So is it a-temporal? or is there some kind of Platonic solid?
I don’t see how this question is relevant. The duration manifests as change within the immaterial, which we have an inadequate understanding of.
This I think, is incorrect. Relativity theory is based in the idea that all motions are relative. An exception is provided for the activity of light, by Einstein, to make light a constant, and this is special relativity. As a result of light being assigned the status of constant, time is tied to spatial activity. But it is only by that precept of special relativity, that time is bounded in this way. And this way of limiting time makes any immaterial forces which may act over a distance of space faster than the speed of light, unintelligible.
When time is tied to material activity, then any immaterial activity which causes physical activity (and intentional, free will acts are evidence of such), cannot be understood, because these would be activities which are “outside” of time, therefore incoherent. Immaterial activity is therefore unintelligible in this world view. But if we allow that time is not tied to material activity, then we have the premise required to understand immaterial activity which is prior to, and cause of material activity.
Human intention, as the cause of a freely willed act, has no identifiable physical form. In its purity, something in the same category as human intention, can be understood as prior to all physical forms.
It’s not properly atemporal, being in the future, and the future is as much a part of time as the past. Both are aspects of time, the past consists of what has manifested as the sensible (material) world, while the future consists of what is has not yet been actualized into a material past, it is immaterial. There is a concept employed by Thomas Aquinas to describe the existence of actualities which are within the immaterial future, angels etc.. This is “aeviternity”.
In this case, your point that time is continuous doesn’t really add anything, and so it isn’t a counterargument. Think of the transition from one colour to another in such a way that you can’t say exactly where one colour begins and the other ends. That’s more or less how the spatial transition of time works.
It’s simple. Just as we talk about the present, past and future. The past was a moment in time, and if it is preserved in our retention, we are necessarily talking about separate moments. That is to say, they are spatial insofar as there is a difference between them and insofar as they do not occupy the same place. Just as in the example of colours.
At different times. But the problem is that they occupy the same space at the same time. That is why spatial concepts are needed to distinguish between moments that do not occupy the same space. For example, to ensure that what happened a thousand years ago does not coexist (in terms of spatial order) with the present. Spatial relationships of difference and distance are necessary. Etc.
Ok, but this is the same as what I was saying about physical extension, or change. Time and change happen together. I’m not necessarily saying they are always co-dependent. But in spacetime, they are.
This is “spacetime”, I was referring to special relativity, when I mentioned spacetime.
If we are talking of immaterial reality, then there might well be other instantiations of time, or a-temporal states(other than a product of physical extension and activity). But we can’t go there other than coming up with our own ideas about something, we don’t know.
Yes, but there is always a correlate of material, a kind of extension of a subtle material, or something we don’t know about.
Yes, but it always has a form of extension and change. These mental events that humans perform are hosted by the physical world and where they aren’t (but rather in some kind of heavenly realm), they are hosted by some other kind of extension and activity.
But surely aeviternity is describing a reality which is atemporal in relation to our the physical world. Namely, in which the future is known, as the past and present are known. It is a dimension outside time, or eternal.
None of this frees us from my original premise that there isn’t time without extension, or extension without time. They are always two sides of the same coin. While being strange, or weird from our perspective when in the immaterial realms.
Sure, you can describe a temporal duration in terms of a “spatial transition”, but this is what I dispute as an unacceptable description. It is unacceptable because what you would be describing is a spatial change, not the passage of time.
For example, the sun rises, moves across the sky, sets, then rises again. You can argue that this described spatial transition is a description of the passage of time, one day. But you are not really describing the passage of time, you are describing a spatial transition which represents a specific quantity of time.
So we haven’t gotten anywhere in this discussion. You keep insisting that it is adequate to describe the passing of time as spatial change, when it is obvious to me that this is inadequate.
You can go on insisting that talking about temporal durations in terms of spatial separation, and temporal order as spatial order, is an acceptable way of describing things, if you want, and I’ll disagree. But if you still cannot see the reasons why this is unacceptable, I have nothing more to say to you about it.
We’re not saying the same thing though. I am saying that physical change is not necessary for the passage of time, so they do not always happen together. I am saying that immaterial, nonphysical change could happen without any physical change. So we can have time passing without any physical change occurring, yet immaterial change is occurring.
Consider that a scenario could appear static to the observer, over a period of time, yet we know that some minute changes unobservable to the eye of the observer are occurring. Now extend this to all observable, physical reality. There could be a very short period of time (like shorter than Planck time) during which no physical activity can take place, yet nonphysical, immaterial activity is still occurring.
I do not believe that special relativity provides a truthful representation, for the reasons I stated above. Therefore we have to look beyond that for the truth about time.
Why do you say that there must be a material correlate to every immaterial reality? I don’t see any reason for that assumption.
The point is that activity does not necessarily require spatial extension. It requires temporal extension, but if the active thing is immaterial, and nonspatial then it does not involve spatial extension.
I accept that this might be true, but we are not in a position to comment on this, as we are viewing the question from within the time space manifold and are blind to what is beyond that.
I’m saying that that “immaterial change” is also a material, but a subtle material, rather than being entirely immaterial. That we can’t go there and that mental activity in the mind of people is not immaterial in the way you are suggesting, but is hosted and acted out by physical activity in the brain.
You are still describing activity. Also, shorter than the Plank period is essentially a singularity. I know it isn’t the singularity, but it is so close to being the singularity that the way reality behaves is different to what happens externally to that state.
Now if we are considering that each atom is an expression of that singularity/Planck state and that it informs physical reality, we might have something to agree on. But it means going beyond philosophical enquiry into Theology, or mysticism. Because it ca only be speculation.
Correlate to the passage of time, is what I’m saying. For time to pass there is a form of extension, not necessarily physical extension.
It could be discrete spatial extension, a kind of extension that we are incapable of realising, or understanding, as we have no conscious access to it. As I say we can talk about it in mystical, or Theological terms, but that will be throwing philosophy out of the window.