Perhaps it could be designated ‘Wittgensteinian behaviourism’ 
The action is the same, the use of the symbols is the same. Something like this happens every day in mathematical operations. But what about the meaning attributed to it in each case? Is it something private? Perhaps. But we cannot avoid talking about it.
I don’t see how that answers the problem.
Ok, so the action and the use of the symbols are the same. But isn’t it your contention that there is more to understanding than is shown by the actions and use of symbols?
Ok, what more?
Same question. What more is there to the meaning than the actions and the way we use the symbols?
Suppose the meaning of some utterance of mine is private. Then in what sense could we say that you have understood my utterance? If you understand me, then you know what I mean; but then the meaning is no longer private.
Is the spirit a black box? But how do we even know the Spirit exists?
Meaning
Private meaning. But it is really private?:
But then the distinction between private and non-private no longer holds as you suppose private meaning. And then we can talk freely about our insights. We have to believe that there is such a things “in our heads” or other heads, and still talk about it even if others don’t understand us.
Yes. What does that amount to? Hence
Indeed. And adding that the notion is a nonsense. Meaning is pubic, shown in the doing.
Why must we believe any such thing? How does doing so help, if it is private and hence unavailable to share? But moreover: others do understand you, apparently. How do they understand what is private?
Is this Wittgensteinian approach novel to you? Have you some familiarity?
Not really for all cases. Haven’t you ever heard that inner voice?
Because, at first, we don’t have a doubt when we have an insight, we just have it. And so, thanks to empathy, we are able to trust others. Even if the other person cannot prove their insight to us, we believe them. Where does this tendency to believe in others come from? I don’t know; it’s deeply ingrained. But the important thing is that we can transmit it. And as a result, the meaning transcends the act that can be demonstrated.
Not really.
Yes, there are exceptions, edge cases, borderline examples. But as a principle, looking to use rather than to meaning is very helpful, especially in philosophical situations.
Of course. It’s not a counterexample that you can’t hear my inner voice. I can tell you most of what it is saying, as you can me.
Yep - we can now do it. Wonderful, isn’t it!
Because they also can perform the task competently, or explain it, or whatever reason you might provide; except for their possessing some private inner conception that is unavailable to us to inspect - that’s no reason to agree with them.
Cheers. That gives me some indication of where to focus my responses.
A large part of this is realising what is not being claimed. I’m not saying that there is no inner life - of course there is, and of course it is of the utmost import. That’s why calling Wittgenstein “behaviourist” fails - even apart from childish name-calling that does not amount to an argument.
But as a method for philosophical analysis, it is far better to look at what folk say and do than to pretend to have access to “private” concepts, meanings, or sensations.
There is a joy in realising that one has understood integration and differentiation. But that joy is not the very same as the understanding. To understand is to do.
No. That’s like saying you could add or remove a valence electron without affecting the atom’s capacity to bond. There would be no capacity to bond without the shell structure, and yet the shell structure and the capacity to bond are clearly not identical.
You seem to be arguing that there could be a change in the agent’s capacity to demonstrate, without some grounding structural change in the agent. Is that what you are saying?
This exchange between @Banno, @EQV and @JuanZu reads like a Platonic dialogue. I can’t tell who Socrates is. Well done, and keep going.
I would just interject two things:
Banno, your position doesn’t seem to refute or show as completely fabricated the position that distinguishes meaning from use. You seem to be saying this is a distinction without a difference at best, or, that meaning conceived as more than use is simply not the better method, not the better use of time when defining or clarifying what words do for us. So I would ask, if private meaning development happens at all to you, why isn’t it interesting to ask how about just that narrow “edge case”? Why not just focus on explaining that? Why not just say Plato and Simmias were just talking about that, and stay on that topic?
Second, could there be a problem equating the doing of using words, with the doing of building with planks, and the doing of understanding/grasping how to use words? Is understanding or grasping of the same kind of action as saying “plank” to move a plank around? What moves, what is done, when we say “equal” in mathematics (other minds?)? If we look to how words are used in order to determine how to use a word, and do not ever just understand what a word means (say “aha”), how come we can debate “what is a woman?” (This puts a sharp, political point on the public/private language and use/meaning distinction that should absolutely NOT distract from this philosophical discussion!) We all see how people can use words in new ways and old ways - but we have to grasp meaning to distinguish and meaningfully point out “this way is new and that way is old,” or say “this way works and that way doesn’t.” The word “woman” works for a transwoman, just not in all cases, because of what people took the word “woman” to mean, not simply and only because of how people used the word. This now goes back to my first point again. Communicating may be justified in use, but not completely and solely justified in use - meaning (or not) remains.
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But I can’t say that you’re really listening to that inner voice. And you can’t prove it. What you can do is communicate it, and what I can do is believe you, or not.
I’m not talking about agreeing; I’m talking about believing. They’re two different things. If I feel sad and tell you, I can’t show you; I can only tell it, and all you can do is choose to believe me or not.
Ok, good.
Well, I doubt that philosophy is devoid of such ‘private’ things. All phenomenology is based on this that can’t be shown. But it can be communicated, and can be the subject of philosophical analysis.
I don’t agree. If we already know that meaning goes beyond usage, then a whole new dimension of meanings opens up that can be explored from a philosophical perspective. More precisely, from a phenomenological perspective. In fact, virtually all of phenomenology is based on this inner layer that cannot be shown as use.
Pretty much. So such things can only enter into our philosophical considerations tangentially.
A good example. There is more to being sad than what is said, of course. If you are laughing and partying when you tell me you are sad, I might have cause for doubt. Sadness can be shown as well as spoken.
If so, then that is a profound methodological issue for phenomenology.
Not really. Sadness can be communicated, but it cannot be shown. A feeling is not shown; it is expressed. The expression might be feigned, however. That is why there is always something secret and intimate about feelings. But that does not mean we say they do not exist.
No, not really – there is some evidence of the phenomena of consciousness as they are presented or given to us. Is evident for us (but then we have to reevaluate the meaning of evidence beyond its positivist acception). Besides, You said earlier that you do not deny their existence. How, then, can one deny them? I think that is kinda impossible. If such phenomena do exist, then what can be shown does not cover the whole spectrum. A very big one!
So for example, when i took trigonometry in high school, the teacher showed us diagrams of how sine, cosine etc. were derived. Then we moved on to the tables where we looked them up, without taking the time to understanding how they are derived. So I learned how to look it up, apply it, without understanding it at all.
The “more” derived from understanding the meaning, is what allows one to take the system, improve it, expand on it, manipulate it to solve new types of problems, and also isolate potential problems which may inhere within it. This is pretty much the difference between theory and practise.
That strikes me as a very odd comment. One can usually tell if someone is sad long before they say so.
Yes, there is “something secret and intimate about feelings” - this is not being denied; they do exist. But the extent to which they are “secret and intimate” is the extent to which they cannot be communicated, and so also the extent to which they cannot be relevant to our “meaning” and “conceptualisation”.
Never mind all this ‘=’ stuff.
The brain doesn’t produce conscious experience; the hard problem is too Hard; so, consciousness is fundamental and thus the brain shapes it to its neurology.