What I meant was, when you say ‘large swathes of the world’, then there’s an implicit distinction between those ‘swathes’ or aspects of the world that are mental constructions, and those that aren’t. That’s what I meant by an ‘implied dualism’. I didn’t think it was a difficult point.
What I mean by ‘physicalism’ is the standard definition of ‘physicalism’:
Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that everything in reality is physical, or supervenes on the physical, meaning there is nothing over and above physical entities, forces, and laws. It posits that all phenomena, including mental states, are fundamentally physical, making it a form of ontological monism often considered the dominant view in contemporary philosophy ~ SEP
The argument in the OP is, in a nutshell, that the equation of ‘mental states’ and the physical brain relies on the concept ‘identity’ which itself can’t be accounted for in physicalist terms.
Experience as an ‘intrinsic property of matter’ seems rather like Galen Strawson and Philip Goff’s panpsychism. I’ve never really been able to agree with them.
Notice I just also posted a passage from Bertrand Russell, although to a different point!
Underpinning your account is the idea that mind is a different thing to matter. Where that account goes astray is in supposing that mind is a thing.
Perhaps we cannot substitute a brain state for a thought. But that does not immediately lead to the conclusion that mind is immaterial. I decide to move my arm, and it moves.
You want to show that mind is not a material thing. Mind is not even a thing. So you are right, in the wrong way.
Well, when Russell is wheeled out in defence of Thomism…
You’ve slid form forms to universals. Austin has a better account:
(ii) Finally, it must be pointed out that the first part of the argument (a), is wrong. Indeed, it is so artless that it is difficult to state it plausibly. clearly it depends on a suppressed premiss which there is no reason whatever to accept, namely, that words are essentially ‘proper names’, unum nomen unum nominatum. But why, if ‘one identical’ word is used, must there be ‘one identical’ object present which it denotes? Why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things?Why should not words be by nature ‘general’ ? However, it is in any case simply false that we use the same name for different things: ‘grey’ and ‘grey’ are not the same, they are two similar symbols (tokens), just as the things denoted by ‘this’ and by ‘that’ are similar things . In this matter, the ‘words’ are in a position precisely analogous to that of the objects denoted by them.
(a) is Since we use the same single name in each case, there must surely be some single identical thing ‘there’ in each case.
Notice that the mysterious universal, the spooky form, turns out to be a way of talking, a bit of grammar.
And it does this by treating mind as a thing? We are up to the part were you slide form saying I’m wrong to the bit were you say you agreed with me all along.
But that’s better than Tim, who can’t move past attempts at ridicule.
First, Austin’s nominalist resemblance account doesn’t escape universals — it presupposes them. For things to be recognised as similar in a relevant respect, a standard of comparison must already be operative. Resemblance is itself a universal. You need at least one universal to get nominalism started.
Second, Austin’s argument is that universals are objects analogous to the objects denoted by proper names, just located elsewhere. I’ve argued consistently that the universal is not an object in that sense. It is an invariant principle, an intelligible content — an object of thought rather than a physical or quasi-physical thing. The reification of universals into things-in-another-realm is just the error I’ve been arguing against throughout this thread.
You’re just not reading it right. It doesn’t say that.
If you could, please explain to me how the present is spatially distinct from the past and future. That is what is at issue here. I see no spatial separation between past, present. and future, therefore no spatial distinction. The difference is purely temporal.
So you say, but I believe that the spatial representation leads us to misunderstand time.
You disagree with me. And I really do not see either one of us changing the other’s mind, so I think discussion between us, on this point is wasting our time.
In the case of time, it is absolutely impossible for us to choose our position on the line. So your premise is false, and your spatial line is a faulty representation.
This is very inaccurate and misleading. That is just one thing that “=” tells us, but it also tells us a lot more than simply when substitution is acceptable. That claim is like saying “colour” tells us what red is. Yeah sure, it does tell us that, but it also tells us a lot more than just that.
That’s quite mistaken. He simply asks why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things - and the answer is pretty clear: we do use the same word to refer to different things. This directly contradicts your unum nomen unum nominatum. There need be no one thing that a predicate refers to.
That’s not at all what he is saying - quite the opposite.
The sky, the car and your blood are all red. Yet they are not the same colour. One word, different “objects”.
One word, “mind”. Yours is not mine. What of the mind of the crowd? The mind of god?
Is the mind material or immaterial? Which mind, the one that feeling a pain or the one solving a maths problem or the one reading this? Why must we think of mind as a type of thing? What do you mean by “mind”?
The examples I quoted were whiteness (Russell), triangles (Feser) and health (Perl). In all cases the word denotes a universal. When I say ‘white’ or ‘red’ or ‘triangular’, then you will understand what I mean, because those terms have universal applicability and you will understand what is meant by them.
So when Austin asks:
Words denote many things due to the power of abstraction. We can recognise types, kinds, species, and so on, precisely because of the ability of the mind to abstract the common featues of like things, so as to recognise them. Which is pretty well what ‘universal’ means. So the general nature of words is an argument for universals, not an argument against them.
I don’t think my notion of mind is idiosyncratic. What the argument in the OP points out is that we recognise equal things because we know what ‘equals’ means. We have the concept of equality, without which instances of equal things would be meaningless.
The problem, as I see it, is that what is non-physical? If you say, as defined here, that the mind is “above” the physical, what does that mean?
That mind is not a physical law or force or whatever? Well, if by law you mean a law of physics (which notice, is not being used here and that’s a big issue), then sure. Laws of physics apply to quite simple systems in terms of explanatory depth.
Correct. They use Russell to make a claim that goes slightly beyond what Russell is saying. Russell merely says that we don’t know enough about physical stuff to say if it is like or if it is not like the mind. But that we shouldn’t be surprised that one property which matter has is that it produces sensations. That’s what we do.
I don’t follow panpsychism, but that thinking or mind is a property of matter shouldn’t be too contentious, though it is. Locke pointed this out long ago but was ignored.
Only if one presumes that predicate terms are the proper name for something.
To understand “whiteness” is to be able to choose the white paint, to follow the white car, to stand on the white line.
To understand “triangle” is to be able to pick the triangle from the square and the circle, to be able to find the sum of the angles, to be able to calculate the length of one side given the length of two sides and an angle, and so on.
To understand health is to recognise disease and injury.
Why go further, adding that there must be a “something” that is the referent of “whiteness” or “triangle” or “health”?
“But surely there is something that all white things share?” They share in our practice. That’s not arbitrary, in the way Tim pretends. It is mediated by both the community that share the practice and the world in which that practice takes place. So when we go to the paint shop and ask for white paint, the bloke behind the counter has found that only certain tins will satisfy his customers. When we are asked to construct a right angle, only certain shapes will help. When we deal with illness, certain states are preferable. The meaning of a predicate is found in our use of the term, not in a make-believe form.
To understand what “equals” means is to be able to substitute one thing for another without making a relevant difference. It is not grasping the essential essence of a platonic form.
But it isn’t to say there is such a thing. It is simply an observation about the nature of reason itself, its ability to recognise and abstract. Surely, this is applied ‘in practice’ as you say, but it can only be applied in practice, because of the ability of the mind to ‘get the idea’.
Let me ask you: do you think that mind and mental acts can be understood as brain states? Is that what you’re attempting to prove? Because that’s what the argument is actually about.
In the context of The Phaedo, from which the ‘argument from equals’ is taken, mind (actually nous) is the faculty which discerns what is real, in the context of Socrates philosophical analyses.
I always saw Galen Strawson’s panpsychism as an attempt to rescue materialism by attributing consciousness to matter. Discussed it at length previously.
To “get the idea” of whiteness is to bring home the white paint and not the red. To “get the idea” of triangles is to be able to choose the three-sided shape. To “get the idea” of health is to take a run each day and recognise and deal with injury and disease. To “get the idea” is not to grasp an abstraction but to act in one way and not another.
Stop there and think about this for a bit. It is the core of the problem with Platonism.
As if, given someone that can bring home the white paint and stand on the white line and do whatever else is asked, you and Tim might insist that nevertheless they have not “got the idea” because they have not grasped the pure form or whatever—you insist that there is something more to “get the idea” but can’t say what that amounts to or how it be identified.
The forms make no difference to what we do.
Think on that for me, before we move on to other things.
So you’re a behaviourist? B F Skinner went out of vogue decades ago.
Again there is no special class of things called ‘forms’. The term was simply ‘eidos’ in Plato, which is the idea, principle, or ‘what-ness’ of whatever kind of particular is being discussed. It’s not as if there’s the thing, and the form of the thing, making two things, as you continue to insist on believing.
But that is exactly “a special class of things called ‘forms’”.
There need be no “whatness”, no idea or principle, apart from what we do.
So you are now disavowing the “what-ness”… you don’t have this and that triangle and the “whatness” that is the principle or idea that somehow makes it a triangle? You can dispose of the form by changing it’s name to “eidos”?
I know exactly what the problem is here, and I also know you won’t accept the diagnosis. Platonic epistemology is hierarchical - there’s an hierarchy of being at which the ideas or forms are the archetypes. But they are not existents in the sense that sensory objects are existents. That’s why in Platonism there is a corresponding hierarchy of types of knowledge, pistis, doxa, dianoia, noesis. But none of that is recognised in modern philosophy, with the result that the hierarchy is represented by a flat ontology, in which there is no room for different leves of being and knowing. So ideas are understood to be on the same plane as existents (‘things’) as there is no other way to understand them. But, as I say, I realise that will be rejected as meaningless by many.
What people do with things depends on what they already are. Otherwise, how could anyone decide what is useful for doing what? Indeed, why would we even initially experiencing anything one way instead of any other unless it was already something in particular?
Form is, in the broadest sense, just a name for the actuality that determines why anything is what it is, and not something else, or nothing in particular, and so why it is experienced and known as one thing and not any other.
For instance, raising bees for honey, raising donkeys as draft animals, using rocks instead of jellyfish as hammers, these are all doings, but the doings themselves only make sense in terms of what things already were. It’s not like bees make honey in virtue of being raised to make honey (i.e., human doing) but rather the ordering is the opposite.
One could not coherently decide to do anything without understanding at least something, but then there must already be something there to experience and understand (that being the form, or actuality if you will).
Now perhaps we could talk about the doings of all things, the doings of rocks, stars, ants, and ocean waves, the dynamic actuality, but then this is all the form is as manifest.
