# An Argument About Truth and Assertibility **URL:** \ **Category:** General Philosophy\ **Created:** [October 22, 2026, 2:07pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712 "2026-10-22T14:07:38Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 1
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 2:07pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/1 "2026-10-22T14:07:38Z")
I ran across this argument from Crispin Wright’s _Truth and_ _Objectivity_ (as paraphrased in Drew Khlentzos’ _Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge,_ pp. 25-29). It purports to show that truth and assertibility cannot be equivalent, by generating a problem in the case of undecidable propositions. I _think_ it works but would be interested in hearing from others. Suppose that we define deflationism regarding truth to mean the following: (T1) The predicate “true” functions purely as a device for endorsing assertions, and refers to no other norm than justified or warranted assertibility. The extension of “is true” coincides with the extension of “is warrantedly assertible”. and (T2) The disquotational schema (DS), “_p_” is true iff _p_, constitutes a complete explanation of the meaning of “true.” But for _p_ we can insert a sentence we can neither verify nor refute (Wright uses Goldbach’s conjecture as his example). In so doing, we can generate an “absurdity,” to use Wright’s term – I’d just call it a problem or a mistake. For DS implies that (i) “It is not the case that _p_” is true iff it is not the case that _p._ and (ii) It is not the case that _p_ iff it is not the case that “_p”_ is true. and, in combination, (iii) “It is not the case that _p_” is true iff it is not the case that “_p_” is true. So far, so good. But watch what happens when we substitute “assertible” for “true” in (iii), as would seem to be allowed by (T1): (iv) “It is not the case that _p_” is assertible iff it is not the case that “_p_” is assertible. This last sentence tells us we can assert that _p_ is not the case if we find that _p_ is not assertible. But that can’t be right. Using Goldbach’s conjecture as the example, it would mean that we can say that every even number above 4 is _not_ the sum of two primes, since we can’t assert that every even number above 4 _is_ the sum of two primes. But the conjecture is undecidable (as of now); we can’t _assert_ _anything_ about its truth value. Let’s line up (iii) and (iv): (iii) “It is not the case that _p_” is true iff it is not the case that “_p_” is true. (iv) “It is not the case that _p_” is assertible iff it is not the case that “_p_” is assertible. What has gone wrong? I suggest the following: (iii) simply says that, should we discover that _p_ isn’t true, it will therefore be the case that “not-_p_” is true. But (iv) says that, if we discover that _p_ isn’t _assertible,_ it’s OK to assert that not-_p_. But this is a mistake. As Wright puts it, “While ‛is true’ and ‛is warrantedly assertible’ are normatively coincident, satisfaction of the one norm does not entail satisfaction of the other.” It’s a bivalence problem. So we have to abandon (T1). The argument seems solid to me. Khlentzos thinks so too, though he believes (T1) is not essential to the deflationist’s case anyway. He believes the deflationist doesn’t need to claim that the extension of “is true” has to coincide with the extension of “is assertible”. So: Does the argument go through? And are claims about what is assertible bound by bivalent logic _in the same way_ as claims about what is true? Do they _have_ to be? ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 5:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/2 "2026-10-22T17:58:14Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > And are claims about what is assertible bound by bivalent logic _in the same way_ as claims about what is true? Do they _have_ to be? They don’t have to be. You can define assertability any way you want to. ---
**Author:** ![j\_j](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/3ab097/32.png) [@j\_j](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/j_j)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 7:26pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/3 "2026-10-22T19:26:38Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > Using Goldbach’s conjecture as the example, it would mean that we can say that every even number above 4 is _not_ the sum of two primes, since we can’t assert that every even number above 4 _is_ the sum of two primes. But the conjecture is undecidable (as of now); we can’t _assert_ _anything_ about its truth value. You mention the “truth value” of the GC. I’m not sure what you intended here, but it sounds like you are taking mathematical platonism for granted. If you assume a “truth-maker,” then you are no longer — in my view — performing an imminent critique of strong deflationism. > Intuitionism is a philosophy of mathematics that was introduced by the Dutch mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer (1881–1966). Intuitionism is based on the idea that mathematics is a creation of the mind. The truth of a mathematical statement can only be conceived via a mental construction that proves it to be true, and the communication between mathematicians only serves as a means to create the same mental process in different minds. > > This view on mathematics has far reaching implications for the daily practice of mathematics, one of its consequences being that the principle of the excluded middle… is no longer valid. Indeed, there are propositions, like the Riemann hypothesis, for which there exists currently neither a proof of the statement nor of its negation. Since knowing the negation of a statement in intuitionism means that one can prove that the statement is not true, this implies that both A and \neg A do not hold intuitionistically, at least not at this moment. The dependence of intuitionism on time is essential: statements can become provable in the course of time and therefore might become intuitionistically valid while not having been so before. [source](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intuitionism/) FWIW, I recommend situating each speech act in your examples. Tell me who is saying this or that. > [@Jay](#): > > (T1) The predicate “true” functions purely as a device for endorsing assertions, and refers to no other norm than justified or warranted assertibility. The extension of “is true” coincides with the extension of “is warrantedly assertible”. I also suggest avoiding this _fusion_ of the endorsement of belief and the **further** endorsement of the warrantedness of a belief. Thinkers like James and Sellars sometimes tried to keep the sign “truth” respectable and important, but I think they were wasting their time, however good their intentions. Is a claim/belief warranted ? That is the question. Joe might call a claim “true” without taking that claim to be warranted. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 8:58pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/4 "2026-10-22T20:58:00Z")
> [@Frank](#): > > > [@Jay](#): > > > > And are claims about what is assertible bound by bivalent logic _in the same way_ as claims about what is true? Do they _have_ to be? > > They don’t have to be. You can define assertability any way you want to. That’s true. But in this case, warranted or justified assertibility is meant to play a deflationary role vis a vis truth. So the question is – and sorry if I wasn’t clear enough – does assertibility have to use the same bivalent logic as truth in order to play that role? Does changing the logic neutralize the claim that truth _just is_ (warranted) assertibility? > [@j\_j](#): > > > [@Jay](#): > > > > Using Goldbach’s conjecture as the example, it would mean that we can say that every even number above 4 is _not_ the sum of two primes, since we can’t assert that every even number above 4 _is_ the sum of two primes. But the conjecture is undecidable (as of now); we can’t _assert_ _anything_ about its truth value. > > You mention the “truth value” of the GC. I’m not sure what you intended here, but **it sounds like you are taking mathematical platonism for granted**. If you assume a “truth-maker,” then you are no longer — in my view — performing an imminent critique of strong deflationism. No. I took it as read that, in the context, the phrase “about its truth value” would include the possibility that it _has no_ truth value. After all, that’s the contention of the deflationist, right? So to assume the GC is either true or false would beg the question horribly, which Wright is at pains to avoid. > [@j\_j](#): > > > [@Jay](#): > > > > (T1) The predicate “true” functions purely as a device for endorsing assertions, and refers to no other norm than justified or warranted assertibility. The extension of “is true” coincides with the extension of “is warrantedly assertible”. > > I also suggest avoiding this _fusion_ of the endorsement of belief and the **further** endorsement of the warrantedness of a belief. I’m wondering if maybe I didn’t set this up properly (or maybe you didn’t read it carefully? 😉). (T1) is Wright’s premise, not mine. I suppose you could recommend to him that he not see it this way, but since he does . . . the question is, is the argument, with (T1) as one of its premises, valid? What do you think? > [@j\_j](#): > > Is a claim/belief warranted ? That is the question. That’s a very good question, but not the question here. Can you grant that (T1) and (T2) are “deflationism as classically conceived”, to use Wright’s language? If not – if (T1) and (T2) don’t seem to you to represent a strong alternative to a non-deflationary or “traditional” understanding of what “true” means – then this argument would not be of much interest to you, which is fine. But I do want to stay within the bounds of the problem as I’ve set it out, at least for now. ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 9:21pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/5 "2026-10-22T21:21:30Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > That’s true. But in this case, warranted or justified assertibility is meant to play a deflationary role vis a vis truth. So the question is – and sorry if I wasn’t clear enough – does assertibility have to use the same bivalent logic as truth in order to play that role? Does changing the logic neutralize the claim that truth _just is_ (warranted) assertibility? I don’t know the answer to that, but just thinking about what’s going on at baseline: Asserting P is identical to saying that P is true. That’s just what assertion is. At this level of analysis, it doesn’t matter if we’re deflationary or inflationary about truth. If we’re deflationary, we’ll posit that there’s nothing more to truth than the role the utterance of the word plays in social situations. If I say, “That’s true.” the word doesn’t mean anything beyond my agreement. As deflationists, we’ll probably also point out that since the act of asserting P is the same as saying P is true, mentioning truth is redundant. So what about assertibility? At baseline, there are no rules for assertibility, except maybe rationality would require that the speaker understand the P that’s being asserted. In other words, you can’t assert P if you don’t know what it means. But do you need justification? That depends on the setting. If you’re a scientist, and you want to preserve your credibility, you’ll pay close attention to assertibility requirements honored by the scientific community. If you’re a politician, the requirements are very different, and sort of open-ended. In fact it’s expected that you’ll do a certain amount of lying. President Trump frequently asserts things that are utterly ridiculous. You can say he shouldn’t have made those assertions, but he did. Nobody can stop him. Therefore, if someone wants to define assertibility as requiring justification, we’re already in a rarified setting. What is that setting? Is it supposed to be natural language use? ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 10:12pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/6 "2026-10-22T22:12:37Z")
Good thoughts, thanks. > [@Frank](#): > > Asserting P is identical to saying that P is true. That’s just what assertion is. Yes, but the controversy is whether the converse holds as well: Is _p_ true only if it is (warrantedly) asserted? Can _p_ be true even if there is _no warrant_ for asserting it? (the Goldbach conjecture, for example). > [@Frank](#): > > So what about assertibility? At baseline, **there are no rules for assertibility** , except maybe rationality would require that the speaker understand the P that’s being asserted. In other words, you can’t assert P if you don’t know what it means. But do you need justification? That depends on the setting. > > If you’re a scientist, and you want to preserve your credibility, you’ll pay close attention to assertibility requirements honored by the scientific community. Right – but are there “rules” for _warranted_ or _justified_ assertibility? Are the assertibility requirements for the scientific community, for instance, meant to track truth in the way that (T1) proposes? I quite agree that “warranted assertibility” is full of problems. However, the additional problem here seems to be that the deflationist _needs_ this concept, or something much like it, in order to avoid deflating truth past all recognition – like Trump does. For (T1) and (T2) to be plausible, they need to give us an acceptable substitute for how we ordinarily use “true” and “truth”, without committing us to a quasi-representational scheme, and also without shrugging and saying “anything goes.” ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 10:33pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/7 "2026-10-22T22:33:31Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > Yes, but the controversy is whether the converse holds as well: Is _p_ true only if it is (warrantedly) asserted? Can _p_ be true even if there is _no warrant_ for asserting it? (the Goldbach conjecture, for example). It would be cool if @Nagase would drop by. I’ve learned a lot from him. I don’t know what the goal of this particular brand of deflation is. Do they want to tweak the view that “truth” only plays a social role? If so, why do they find that deficient? > [@Jay](#): > > Right – but are there “rules” for _warranted_ or _justified_ assertibility? Are the assertibility requirements for the scientific community, for instance, meant to track truth in the way that (T1) proposes? I don’t think people in the scientific community think much about truth theories. There might be some who are deflationary, but that would mean they’re philosophy buffs on the side. They do think about assertibility, though, and that’s definitely about evidence. This is the way medical evidence works: ![image](https://canada1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/uploads/thephilosophyforum/original/2X/9/96d657a54edab2db0d0e7360f5f185935b60a137.png) The higher you go on the pyramid, the more urgent it becomes to pay attention to that information and put it into practice in healthcare. If P is the conclusion of a randomized controlled trial, everybody better be doing P. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 10:41pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/8 "2026-10-22T22:41:03Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > The extension of “is true” coincides with the extension of “is warrantedly assertible”. So drop this. It can’t deal with undecidable statements. In a bit more detail, the disquotation works for undecidable statements, since \<“p” is true IFF p\> is indeed true whether p is true, false, or undecided; but “is warrantedly assertable” is not; so they do not have the same extension. Added: Looking again, that seems to be more or less your approach. Cool. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:03pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/9 "2026-10-22T23:03:52Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > the disquotation works for undecidable statements, since \<“p” is true IFF p\> is indeed true whether p is true, false, or undecided; but “is warrantedly assertable” is not; so **they do not have the same extension.** Right, that’s Wright’s point in a nutshell: (T1) has got to go. And the conclusion he wants to draw from that – though Khlentzos disputes it – is that this is a knockdown argument against “classical” deflationism vis a vis “truth”. Wright thinks that, for the deflationist, warranted assertibility has to have the same extension as truth. And since it doesn’t, truth is not the same thing as warranted assertibility. Therefore, classical deflationism is mistaken. > [@Frank](#): > > It would be cool if @Nagase would drop by. I’ve learned a lot from him. Me too. Hope he does. > [@Frank](#): > > I don’t know what the goal of this particular brand of deflation is. Do they want to tweak the view that “truth” only plays a social role? If so, why do they find that deficient? I think the goal is to show that “true” and “truth” can’t be deployed in the way that a metaphysical realist wants to deploy them. This deflationist, believing as they do that warranted assertibility has the same extension as “truth”, argues that therefore there are no true (or false) statements that can _be_ true or false without our epistemological engagement (a type of anti-realism). Against this, Wright is claiming to demonstrate a problem with undecided statements like the GC. I’m not sure what you mean by “tweak the view that ‘truth’ only plays a social role.” Could you say more? ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:08pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/10 "2026-10-22T23:08:17Z")
> [@Frank](#): > > They do think about assertibility, though, and that’s definitely about evidence. This is the way medical evidence works: Thanks for providing this. It’s good to see an actual, detailed example of what “justified assertiblility” looks like in a real-life practice. I imagine that a medical researcher, if asked “Does P represent a best practice based on what is _true_?” would reply, “Probably, but it doesn’t matter. It’s our best theory, based on the best evidence. And we have to _do_ stuff.” ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:14pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/11 "2026-10-22T23:14:01Z")
Notice that the disquotation remains, even if we set aside deflation? We still need truth. ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:26pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/12 "2026-10-22T23:26:01Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > I think the goal is to show that “true” and “truth” can’t be deployed in the way that a metaphysical realist wants to deploy them. A popular brand of deflationary truth says that truth just has a social role. That’s it. Nothing more. Take everything you imagine about truth and trash it. Evacuate all meaning from it. It’s nothing more than a kind of gesture. That’s deflationary truth. Why would someone want to have it that deflationary truth has something to do with warrant? I don’t know. I guess they were trying to add bells and whistles. ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:29pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/13 "2026-10-22T23:29:31Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > I imagine that a medical researcher, if asked “Does P represent a best practice based on what is _true_?” would reply, “Probably, but it doesn’t matter. It’s our best theory, based on the best evidence. And we have to _do_ stuff.” Exactly. ---
**Author:** ![John](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/john/32/665_2.png) [@John](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/John)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:36pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/14 "2026-10-22T23:36:30Z")
I thought deflationism about truth just consists in saying that “p is true” is equivalent to “p”. If “p” is something like “grass is green” then that works. The OP cites the “Goldbach Conjecture”―if it is substituted by “p” then “Goldbach’s conjecture is true” would be equivalent to “Goldbach’s conjecture”. That doesn’t seem to work so well! ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2026, 11:37pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/15 "2026-10-22T23:37:12Z")
> [@Frank](#): > > A popular brand of deflationary truth says that truth just has a social role. Those who claim all statements are no more than social posturing are, by their own admission, only engaging in social posturing. So no need to take their comments seriously. What we can’t have is all statements being equal; either true or false. We needs must differentiate some situations as true. ---
**Author:** ![Scorpion](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/scorpion/32/875_2.png) [@Scorpion](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Scorpion)\ **Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 2:25am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/16 "2026-10-23T02:25:01Z")
Is this about argumentum ad ignorantiam? Can’t assert p and so \neg p? p includes truth i.e. when p then if p = God is great then God is great. Why can’t we assert p? What does that mean for \neg p? By the way the Goldbach Conjecture is an unknown. ---
**Author:** ![Banno](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/banno/32/55_2.png) [@Banno](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Banno)\ **Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 2:37am UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/17 "2026-10-23T02:37:20Z")
> [@John](#): > > saying that “p is true” is equivalent to “p” Yes, but there are differing flavours of “saying”. So _asserting_ that “p is true” is just asserting p; the flavour that is the subject of the OP. “P” is true IFF p, another flavour, is truth-functional, having material equivalence at its core, and so about as basic an account as can be constructed. Need to take care with the quote marks, to be clear what is being mentioned and what used. ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 1:13pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/18 "2026-10-23T13:13:14Z")
> [@Banno](#): > > Notice that the disquotation remains, even if we set aside deflation? > > We still need truth. Yes, (T2) remains in play. But whether it correctly characterizes truth is at the heart of the discussion. _Is_ it a “_complete_ explanation of the meaning of ‘true’”? > [@Frank](#): > > A popular brand of deflationary truth says that truth just has a social role. That’s it. Nothing more. I agree there’s such a brand, but I don’t find it to be all that popular, at least not in the literature tradition I’m working with. > [@Frank](#): > > Why would someone want to have it that deflationary truth has something to do with warrant? I don’t know. I guess they were trying to add bells and whistles. I think it’s more what I was suggesting above. Anti-realists in the tradition of Dummett don’t deflate “true” to the level of “I like _p_, and so does everyone else.” They’re looking for a way to give “true” a meaning that explains _why_ it has come to be used the way it is, rightly or wrongly. And that meaning, they suggest, is “warranted assertibility.” Your medical researcher, for instance, might agree that some key sentence is not non-epistemically True, but they’d bristle at the idea that the evidential basis is irrelevant, and that consensus alone should determine a best practice. Their “true” is more than a gesture toward a social role. > [@John](#): > > I thought deflationism about truth just consists in saying that “p is true” is equivalent to “p”. You’re probably right that such a doctrine is often called “deflationism.” What Wright and I have in mind here is a different sense of deflationism, as you can see from the discussion. For the purposes of this thread, take “deflationism” to refer to the thesis laid out by (T1) and (T2). > [@Scorpion](#): > > Is this about argumentum ad ignorantiam? Can’t assert p 𝑝 and so ¬𝑝? Not quite. The fallacy here is not that _¬p_ must be true because its negation hasn’t been shown to be false. Rather, it’s that _¬p_ _can be asserted_ if _p_ can_not_ be asserted. And the difference between truth and assertion is precisely what’s at issue. > [@Scorpion](#): > > By the way the Goldbach Conjecture is an unknown. Or more informatively, we can call it a “non-ED sentence”, for “non–effectively decidable”. ---
**Author:** ![Frank](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/frank/32/216_2.png) [@Frank](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Frank)\ **Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 1:21pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/19 "2026-10-23T13:21:37Z")
> [@Jay](#): > > I agree there’s such a brand, but I don’t find it to be all that popular, at least not in the literature tradition I’m working with. What type of deflationary truth is it? ---
**Author:** ![Jay](https://yyz1.discourse-cdn.com/flex007/user_avatar/www.thephilosophyforum.com/jay/32/206_2.png) [@Jay](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/u/Jay)\ **Post date:** [October 23, 2026, 1:24pm UTC](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712/20 "2026-10-23T13:24:47Z")
(T1) and (T2), above. Or is that not your question? [Next page](https://www.thephilosophyforum.com/t/an-argument-about-truth-and-assertibility/3712.md?page=2)