You continue to conflate “logic” with first-order predicate logic.
This is of course sophistry
Here is what you said:
So again, if Leibniz is talking about identity in a way that is not restricted to a particular domain, then your attempt to translate his thesis into first-order logic won’t work on your own terms.
So Leibniz’ law means a quasi-first-order thesis when it suits you, and when it doesn’t suit you it doesn’t. That’s how you do philosophy.
The basic point is not at issue, which is why I put ‘domain’ in scare-quotes when I first related it to Leibniz. But your approach is ad hoc in that you have no principled way of translating Leibniz into your favored logical system.
This is the voluntarism I spoke of.
Wrong again. That would be second-order, not first-order.
If it’s just stipulation, as you say, then there is no normative way that it should “work”.