A Theory of Error?

Suppose we change the rules of chess so that it is illegal to move any piece more than four squares, severely limiting the power of the Bishop, Rook, and Queen.

If someone were to move their Bishop five squares, their error would be that they broke the new rule. They were playing the game in the old way.

Differing philosophies might be more like rule changes than outright mistakes.

But suppose we were to change the rules so that when in check, the King may move to any unoccupied square. It now becomes impossible to checkmate. This rule is inconsistent with play as we understand it—it is impossible to end the game. Now that would be a poor rule, given our purposes.

Some philosophies might, in an analogous way, not be coherent. Their structure may be such that they do not permit or account for things we need.

Or suppose we change the rules so that a player keeps making a move until no further move is possible, so White moves first and keeps moving until they win.

Some sets of rules produce a playable game; others are no fun or render an outcome impossible.

Philosophy involves, in part, working out which rules might work.

1 Like