For instance, we are discussing the same Wittgenstein.
My word for “sense” is “significance.” I doubt than any sign offers the same exact significance twice.
Consciousness might be the presence or quality of a sign, and this presence/quality includes its “significance.” And “it can have an indefinite multiplicity of senses depending on the context.”
Right. This is why we need discordant ontological perspectivism. Recall that I said we don’t have W and then also f_1(W), f_2(W),.... We do not need a “true” reality, a W.
Instead we have imperfectly entangled torrents of worlding. I may create “transcendent” objects ( a poem perhaps) that no other sentient creature ever perceives. I may perceive something that others try to percieve but cannot. I may be persuaded to reclassify that perception as an hallucination. Or maybe not. And so on.
This is where Habermas, Apel, Sellars, and other come in. I call ontology’s necessary object the forum.
If phenomenology aspires to “rationally” sketch the structure of all world-manifestation, then it presupposes ( tacitly if not explicitly) a shared world discussable in a shared language. This sharing need not be perfectly universal. Typically philosophers assume a universal human rationality. But it suffices, in my view, to assume a less global community.
For instance, you suggest that maybe assuming that we share a world is an unjustified assumption. But what can this lack of justification be if we don’t share language and rational norms ? Do you see how you presuppose a logic that binds us both ? But I have emphasized that we each appropriate these norms personally. No god’s eye view on logic. So I see myself as explaining why I personally think the forum is a safe assumption. Because to me it would be a performative contradiction to challenge or question in.
Kant’s desire for a proof of the external world was absurd. The possiblity of proof presupposes the essence of “externality” — the transcendence of “logic” as binding on each individual in the community.
I tend to see language as fundamentally intersubjective. I am “us” before I can be “me.” Even if my perception remains situated, it’s “mute” without a borrowed sign system.
I would prefer to use “consciousness” as a synonym of “being” or “presence.” A radically simple quasi-concept. A pointer to the “is-ness” of all that is.
I agree that we “automatically” experience an articulated world. We automatically “take” a seeing as the seeing of that old lamp. I prefer to just look at the empirical-psychological ego. “Constitution” is primarily a topic for psychology.