That is ludicrous. You are literally demanding I prove a negative in order to refute an entirely unfounded metaphysical declaration.
No. The burden of proof is squarely on you. You are the one who believes in ontologically real things called “intentions”. Has anybody ever measured an “intention”? What possible reason do we have for believing in them? I have asked you this question repeatedly, and all you can say is response is some variation on “Every action must be preceded by intention…”. I know this is what you believe, but you have not provided any reason why anybody else should believe it.
The intention IS the freely choosing. Don’t you intend to do something specific before you start moving? Say you’re sitting in your chair, watching a TV show. You don’t unconsciously stand up, walk to the refrigerator, and get a can of soda. Getting the soda was your intention. You would not have stood up if you hadn’t intended to get a soda. You thought, “I want a soda.” Then you stood up.
There you go. “You intended to get a soda”, or “You deliberately chose to get a soda.” Call it by either name, you would have remained seated without the intention/deliberate choice.
True. Intending is not action. The intention is the reason for the action.
True. “I intend to walk left” is followed by walking left. I am not, and I don’t think litewave is, suggesting your added step.
As I say, the normal framing of this debate is that free will is defined as something like “could have chosen differently”. And that Determinism is difficult to reconcile with that, if not outright incompatible, because it would mean all our choices were a predictable consequence of the physical state of the universe. Do you agree that this is a very typical presentation of the problem?
This is certainly the way I typically have heard it, and of course I, like most people, completely accepted this framing at one time.
The thing that starts to unravel this for me is when we point to the phenomena that actually suggest that our universe isn’t deterministic. For example, something like when an unstable nucleus emits a neutron cannot be determined by local hidden variables. It’s possible it’s determined by non-local hidden variables, but right now the most parsimonious model is simply that there is randomness at this low level – though before anyone jumps in at this point, note that I don’t need to make the claim that it actually is random, only that this is a position held by a great number of physicists.
However, when this fact is mentioned in the context of the free will debate, it gets trivially dismissed. People say things like “How would randomness at the (sub)atomic level give us free choices?”
Do you agree that this is the typical response, because I’ll pause there to check we’re in agreement on everything so far.
The intention is the valuation, which initiates the movement.
Yes. And I am saying this the moment of this choice occurs when you conclusively value one possible outcome over the others. What feels like an “act of will”, is the commitment to a specific future.
Yes. My position is that the intention is assignment of a high valuation to a specific future, not as a plan for future action but as an action right now. Not just thinking about doing it, but actually doing it.
Intentions are commonly defined “in ontological sense” as states of mind. If you identify your “valuation” with an intention or with an action, you still have the problem of how it is freely willed: why do you assign certain values instead of others? If the valuation is determined by your preference and you have not intentionally created your preference, then your valuation is determined by something you have not intentionally created. On the other hand, if your valuation is not determined by your preference, then it is tantamount to rolling a dice, so your valuation is determined by chance, or to being decided by whatever else that is out of your control. Either way, the valuation is not feely willed or chosen.
There is no answer to that, just like there is no answer to the question of how mathematicians can “just see” that Godel sentences are true. The answer is that our “selves” aren’t just our brains, but also constituted by the ground of all being – we are infinite ourselves. That is where explanation must end. The only way to understand this is the same way the mathematicians understand the truth of Godel sentences.
This is a very different answer to the false dichotomy you just presented.
I didn’t mention consequences. My interest is in the decision-making process itself.
From my point of view, when I weigh up whether I like the taste of coffee or tea more, and whether I’ve had a lot of caffeine already etc, does “non-computable” make this more or less free?
Does it make me behave differently in a way that from my perspective is non-random?
If questions like this feel unfair, they are, and it is. There’s either reasons for doing something, or there isn’t. Neither gives us libertarian free will, which requires something which is somehow neither reasoned nor unreasoned.
First, thank you for this. People usually give a dozen steps in their thought process, focusing on the end. Much better to go step-by-step, to make sure there is at least understanding.
I agree.
I’m not sure about this. Don’t people point to that to support their position? Something like, “If even physical events are not a predictable consequence of the physical state of the universe, why would we think mental events are?”
It’s a plan if you intend to go get a soda during the next commercial break.
If you don’t think about soda until the commercials start, and you get up as soon as you think of it, it is still your intention to get a soda. You don’t go get a soda without intending to go get a soda.
That’s not what makes it free. What makes it free is that there is such a thing as you, and it was you who selected that possibility from the range of outcomes you believed to be on offer. Having a reason to do it is not the same as being forced to do it by the laws of physics. Tough decisions involve competing reasons which can’t all be satisfied. YOU are what resolved that non-computable situation, and that’s all that matters to make it free. You are free from the laws of physics, not free from the reasons that compete for your attention and valuations. The laws of physics determined the choice available to you. You made the choice.
That’s not free will. Free will occurs in the metaphysical “now” - in the specious present. There’s no time for it have been a plan. The commitment occurs right now. Doesn’t matter what you were thinking 10 seconds ago.
Ok, however the valuation happens, it is determined by something you have not intentionally created or chosen, or it is not determined by anything. Either way, the valuation is not freely willed.
Yes some people do, and indeed, within this thread, some people are proponents of the view that if there are non-computable elements within human cognition, then that means we have free will.
So I should be a bit more precise:
If pointing out that the universe is potentially non-deterministic ended the free will debate, then it would be a very short and simple debate. That isn’t what happens though. Typically proponents of the view that we do not have free will not find quantum fuzziness a compelling mechanism for granting free will. They would say that whether we consider decisions “bubbling up” from quantum randomness, or quantum randomness just having a random effect on our cognition, neither would seem attributable to the will.
Hopefully you agree with me on this, but in a sense it doesn’t matter because I have arguments against both the views of “free will, because not deterministic” and “no free will regardless”.
Firstly, “non-computable” would still be within the laws of physics.
Secondly, I think it’s wrong to see this as being “forced” by physics. Your brain, your conscious thoughts, your wants; they are all part of the universe. If your life is on rails, then your conscious thoughts are part of how the path of those rails gets determined; you are not merely a passenger.
You can disagree all you like, but if by “intention” you are talking about something that happened months ago, then it has absolutely nothing to do with free will as I am defining it. So by disagreeing, you are saying that you don’t actually understand my proposal. Your disagreement has got nothing to do with what I’m saying.
Free will is something that occurs in the present. According to my definition, it IS the present. It is a name for the transition from quantum possibility to classical actuality that is always happening right now. Whether or not it is free depends on the metaphysics of what is happening right now, not something you were thinking about three weeks ago.
No. That is the same false dichotomy again. It is determined by YOU. Doesn’t matter what your reasons were. It matters that there is an infinite “you”, and that you made the decision.
It is not enough for free will that the valuation is determined by me, no matter whether I am infinite. I may have determined the valuation unconsciously or by accident - would that be a freely willed valuation? Or the valuation may have been determined by my preference/bias that I have not freely willed or chosen - would that be a freely willed valuation?
I don’t think that is possible if you are finite. Finite means just your brain, but in the model of reality I am defending, brains on their own cannot be conscious.
No. Anything that happens unconsciously or by accident isn’t willed. You do not will your heart to beat. Mostly you don’t will your breathing, but in that case you can choose to control it (to a degree). And accidents aren’t willed by definition.
No. It must be determined by you. Your SELF. You believe in ontologically real “intentions”, but you do not believe in an ontologically real self. I believe the self is not only real, but the missing “observer” that physicalism cannot account for. It is the locus of wavefunction collapse, consciousness and free will.
Demonstrating that not everything is determined by the physical state the instant before doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with the topic of free will. But, yes, it means determinists cannot say all things are determined.
(For my part, I can’t help but wonder if the quantum fuzziness has anything to do with my [unverifiable] panpsychist ideas.)