“Your community”? What do you mean by that? Because Bob could be part of the same community as his neighbors, and we could imagine Bob built and maintained the institution over time.
So it’s not the functional contestability and whatever anymore. It’s because your community has built and maintained the institution over time. We are making progress.
Well, no. That’s just one of a cluster of conditions I’ve laid out — real contestability, procedural accountability, operative consent functioning under conditions of genuine inquiry. It seems your strategy is to push back on each one criterion and show that none of them is individually sufficient. And you’re right! None of them is. I’m not claiming any single condition does the work alone. I’m claiming they work together, as a package, and that the package admits of degrees.
You seem to want a single clean condition C such that C → rule. I don’t think political legitimacy works that way, and I’m not sure any interesting normative concept does. If you think it must, then I’d genuinely like to hear why — because that strikes me as the real disagreement between us, not the particular conditions I’ve proposed.
Sure, it could be multiple conditions.
I wrote it poorly. I meant that the problem with Bob’s scenario isn’t the contestability anymore, so we agree that the scenario satisfies it. I do not ask for a ‘single’ clean condition.
Wait — I don’t think we agree on that. I’ll concede that my appeal to “our community” was sloppy language on my part, but I am not conceding that Bob’s scenario satisfies genuine contestability. Those are different points.
Bob’s scenario has the formal apparatus of contestability — you can vote in 2 years, you can advocate for reform, etc. But formal apparatus isn’t the same as genuine contestability. Genuine contestability requires that the mechanisms have actually been used, tested, and have actually produced real changes in response to real objections. Bob’s institution is brand new and didn’t arise as an organic outgrowth of established precedent. Nobody has ever successfully challenged Bob’s rules through his stipulated mechanisms. Nobody has organized and won. There’s no track record whatsoever.
This isn’t a new condition I’m sneaking in — it’s what I’ve been saying about the difference between empty scaffolding and a functioning system. A set of rules that says “you can contest this” but has never actually been contested succesfully is like an escape hatch that’s never been inspected or tested. Maybe it works, maybe it doesn’t. You have no grounds for confidence either way.
So what Bob’s scenario is missing isn’t some additional criterion beyond contestability. Its that it doesn’t actually have contestability yet — it just has the promise of contestability. And promises from the guy who just showed up Tuesday and declared himself in charge are, to put it mildly, not worth much.
I am telling you that the rules in Bob’s institution are publicly contestable. This is just an assumption of the scenario, there is no promise. I could understand needing some past examples for epistemic purposes but I fail to see how it is relevant as a condition.
If the people wanted to protest or organize, they totally could and it could under the right circumstances lead to change just like in current states.
Fine, let’s go ahead and grant that Bob’s institution has genuine public contestability. Even with this fully stipulated Bob’s arrangement still feels like a shakedown. Why?
First, although you’ve stipulated mechanisms of contestability and revision, there’s no established history of those being inhabited and used to effect real change that could provide anyone with a reason to treat the system as something they are involved in sustaining, rather than something merely imposed on them.
Second, there is no clear connection to procurement of genuinely common goods — things like dispute resolution, basic security, or infrastructure — where the good in question isn’t just an aggregate of private benefits, and where it can’t be stably secured if participation is optional.
When those conditions aren’t met, then coercion looks gratuitous, like Bob just extracting resources for his own personal gain.
Now, you could try to stipulate all of this into Bob’s case, but notice what happens if you do. If Bob’s institution:
then it stops looking like “Bob and friends show up and extract money” and more like…a political institution. At that point the case is no longer doing the work you want it to do, because you’ve effectively built in the very features under dispute.
So it’s not that these conditions are irrelevant or insufficient. It’s that they only have force as a package — and as something that unfolds over time, not as a checklist you can instantiate by declaration.
If you reject all of that as morally irrelevant—if you think being subject to a historically extended, revisable, participatory scheme aimed at procuring common goods is no different from Bob knocking on your door Tuesday—then I agree we’ve probably reached bedrock. But that seems to me to be the real fault line, not whether we can describe the conditions in sufficiently “ground-level” terms.
Does it matter? Does the state agent assaulting someone becomes wrong if the person feels like the system was imposed on them?
What’s a “common good”? Why would you need to do all of that? If there is dispute resolution and infrastructure but not basic security, is that enough? What if there is only basic security?
This is different from the previous paragraph. There is a “can’t otherwise secure” thing now. What does that mean? Can you give examples with current states?
Well, a lot of citizens of current states haven’t participated in shaping and revising the rules of their states but are still being ruled. Does it matter then?
So it’s not that these conditions are irrelevant or insufficient. It’s that they only have force as a package — and as something that unfolds over time, not as a checklist you can instantiate by declaration.
You still aren’t explaining how this bundle of conditions specifically gives rise to the privileges. I know we can just keep adding everything states do today, but at some point it feels less like finding actual relevant conditions and just describing states.
Regarding taxes: without property laws adjudicated by the state, you wouldn’t have any property to be taxed. Anyone could sleep in your house (unless you shot or beat him). “Render unto Caesar,” said Jesus.
So taxation is a red herring. Since property derives from and is protected by the state, the state reasonably determines the manner in which it is distributed. He who makes the rules detrtmines the rules.
That’s not true. What do you think ‘property’ is? Property is a moral concept, property laws don’t create property. At least, I don’t think they do. I know two ways to see it
At best, they protect your property. But they also actively take it without your consent, so even that isn’t entirely true.
Anyone could sleep in your house (unless you shot or beat him).
Anyone can already sleep in your house (unless you shot or beat them) state or not.
Not true. You can call the police.
Many simple societies have limited notions of property. Most Native American cultures lacked ownership of land. Some Vikings thought you owned only what you made with your own hands (hence the burning ship funerals). Many hunting and gathering groups have almost no concept of personal property.
Property rights are fiat rights, determined by law. The state passes laws that determine the nature of these rights, and the rights include taxation. Property owners have other legal obligations as well. They must follow building codes, etc. All rights are nothing more than obligations on the part of other people (the right to life obliges other people not to kill you; it has no impact on cancer or sharks). Property rights give one person the legal authority to control other people (prevent them from driving your car or sleeping in your house, for example). That’s all they do. In an anarchy, there would be no property (and as I stated in an earlier post, utopia must be an anarchy). Unfortunately, we don’t live in utopia.
Not true. You can call the police.
How does you being able to call the police physically prevent someone from sleeping in your house?
Property rights are fiat rights, determined by law. The state passes laws that determine the nature of these rights, and the rights include taxation.
Repeating it won’t make it true.
All rights are nothing more than obligations on the part of other people (the right to life obliges other people not to kill you; it has no impact on cancer or sharks).
Right, moral obligations, it has nothing to do with states.
Property rights give one person the legal authority to control other people (prevent them from driving your car or sleeping in your house, for example). That’s all they do.
the moral “authority” if you want. There might be a legal concept of property but it is of no interest here.
I’m noticing a pattern in your replies where you take an integrated position, break it into isolated fragments, and then demand independent justification for each piece. “What’s a common good? Why all of that? What if only one condition?” But the whole point is that these conditions work together — pulling them apart and asking why each one individually authorizes coercion is like pulling an engine apart and asking why each piece individually makes the car move. None of them do. That’s the point.
But your last objection is the real one, so let me focus on that. You worry I’m just describing what states do and calling it justified. Fair concern. So let me put it differently.
Some human problems are constitutively cooperative — they literally cannot be solved except through coordinated, enforceable rules. Take dispute resolution. Two people disagree about who owns a piece of land. There is no private solution that doesn’t just reduce to “whoever is stronger wins.” An impartial adjudicator with enforcement authority isn’t one option among many — its the only structure that can actually resolve the dispute as a dispute rather than a contest of force. That’s not a description of what states happen to do. Its a claim about the nature of the problem.
So the justification for coercion isn’t “states exist and have these features.” Its “certain indispensable human goods require institutional coordination with enforceable rules, and the authority to enforce those rules is justified to the extent that the institution actually secures those goods under conditions of accountability and revisability.”
If you want to contest that, the place to push is whether those goods really do require enforced coordination, or whether I’m wrong about that. Thats a substantive disagreement we could actually make progress on.
That’s not what I am doing so you’re noticing wrong. I am asking for clarifications
I don’t really care about ‘institutional coordination’ and you’re being very abstract. Keep in mind what needs to be justified: that it is morally permissible for states to coerce, assault or more generally do what’s not permissible for the average individual.
What are those indispensable human goods? What actions are justified by this exactly? Can those rules be anything as long as the goods are secured under conditions of accountability and revisability?
You say you’re asking for clarifications, but I’ve given concrete examples — dispute resolution, infrastructure, security — and explained why these require enforceable coordination. Your response is to ask “what are those indispensable human goods?” as though that wasn’t just addressed. At a certain point, asking for clarification on things that have already been clarified is just a way of not engaging with the argument.
And “I don’t really care about institutional coordination” is a pretty significant thing to say in a thread about the justification of institutional authority. That’s the question. If you’ve already decided that no institutional fact can generate moral permissions, then we have a bedrock disagreement — not about the conditions of legitimacy, but about whether institutional moral facts are even possible. That’s a real philosophical question, but its not the one your OP posed.
I think I’ve laid out my position clearly enough that anyone following along can evaluate it. I’ve enjoyed the exchange and you’ve pushed me to sharpen things I was stating too loosely, which I appreciate. But I don’t think further rounds will be productive for either of us at this point. Thanks.
Nonsense. How is “property” a moral right? Doesn’t it limit freedom (a moral right)? Why does one person have a “moral right” to tell other pepple they can’t walk where they want to walk? How is that “right” determined, if not by law? Did the owner make the plot of land? Or did he acquire a deed from the government? What gives him the right to impinge on the “moral right” of freedom of movement for everyone else?
Property allows one person to control other people. That’s all it does. In a utopia, everyone would be free; nobody would be under the control of others Hence there would be no governments, and no property.
I have nothing against property rights. But I think we should see them for what they are.
Because societies have governance that requires people to follow. We have governance because they are effective in maintaining safety of the population against physical crimes, financial crimes, and well-being crimes. A governing body is needed because rule by everyone would result in a chaos. States are formalized united population.
I still don’t understand your last statement: what conditions the states fulfill that give them those privileges. We are talking in circles.
Because states are given the power by its population to enact all kinds of laws the violations of which result in a punishment.
Another thing I noticed with your response is this:
When I mentioned housing, food, safety, roads, schools. Why would you even object that these were made possible by the state? Who do you think made all these possible? Walmart?
You say you’re asking for clarifications, but I’ve given concrete examples — dispute resolution, infrastructure, security — and explained why these require enforceable coordination. Your response is to ask “what are those indispensable human goods?” as though that wasn’t just addressed. At a certain point, asking for clarification on things that have already been clarified is just a way of not engaging with the argument.
Sorry I didn’t realize the previous list of examples of the “common goods” was also “indispensable human goods requiring institutional coordination”.
The reason why I say “I don’t care about institutional coordination” is that you haven’t explained its place in this challenge. Why is solving those institutional coordination problems relevant for state privileges but not solving, idk, health problems?
You have two claims: Dispute resolution, infrastructure and security are indispensable human goods that require institutional coordination AND solving (every ?) institutional coordination problem is part of what allows one to obtain state (moral) privileges.
I’ll focus on the first one. What makes something require institutional coordination? Well, you say:
they literally cannot be solved except through coordinated, enforceable rules
Is this saying “no single instance can be solved…” or “solving every instance isn’t possible except…”? I am not sure. What is “coordinated” here? Why is this the case for security or infrastructure?
Let’s take dispute resolution. What actually is dispute resolution? It can’t be just resolving the dispute as the strongest winning by force would still be a way to resolve the dispute. But we don’t want the strongest of the two winning by virtue of being the strongest, so dispute resolution is resolving a dispute through a stronger third party. Let’s not get the delusion that we eliminated the contest of force. It is simply the third party being the strongest and imposing its decision. Does this imply “coordinated, enforceable rules”? Maybe.
It must also be clear that current states don’t solve every instance of “security,” “infrastructure,” or “dispute resolution” problems that arise.
Just like any other moral right.
I am not sure why this would be a problem. You yourself pointed that even the right to life limits the freedom of others to kill you.
Why would it not be possible?
Why would it be determined by law? The rights simply are there, naturally perhaps. Or there are no rights and we have moral nihilism.
I don’t know. But the owner could own the land even if they didn’t acquire a deed from the government.
I don’t think we have the same notion of rights here. Just to be clear, do you think there are any rights (right to life or whatever you want) outside of the state?
We have governance because they are effective in maintaining safety of the population against physical crimes, financial crimes, and well-being crimes.
Well crime is usually a thing that comes after states (i.e. an unlawful act) so what kind of “crimes” are we talking about? But that’s a possible justification. States are allowed to do as they do because they are effective at maintain safety. So we can look at the two principles:
Is it actually true that states are effective at maintaining safety?
Say a vigilante comes in who is also effective at maintaining safety, does that give them the same privileges? Would they be morally allowed to coerce or assault some for money etc.?
A governing body is needed because rule by everyone would result in a chaos.
That is a different justification. Here we can ask if it is actually true. What’s this “chaos” and what’s the evidence that this would happen?
States are formalized united population.
In what way? To me, states are simply rulers ruling over people. There is no ‘united population’.
I still don’t understand your last statement: what conditions the states fulfill that give them those privileges.
You gave conditions, so I don’t know what you don’t understand.
Because states are given the power by its population to enact all kinds of laws the violations of which result in a punishment.
States take and maintain power by force not because the population gives them power. In a sense, the population doesn’t try to go against state power but I wouldn’t say that means states get power by its population.
We clearly don’t. “Natural rights” are universal and independent of the law and government (although laws can promote their violation). Life and liberty are the standard ones. Fiat rights are legal rights that can change as law changes. Obviously there are many cultures (I mentioned several) in which property rights are non-existsnt or extremely limited. Communism, or anarchism, for example. This provides evidence that property rights as known in the West are neither “natural” nor universal. Instead, they are determined by law.
Indeed, in European history the king owned all the land. Feudal lords were granted “fiefs” which they controlled but were obliged to provide support for the king (their landlord) in the form of rents (taxes) and military support. Serfs were tied to the land; freeholders and yeoman paid rents. There were slso “commons” – usually grazing lands with shared usage.
All these different definitions of property rights should suffice to show that they are not “natural rights”, but fiat (legal) rights.
P.s. This being the case, taxes are simply a part of the fiat.